A considerable amount of 9/11 research has been concerned simply with verifying the 9/11 Commission's timeline of that day. Much of this focuses on the flights themselves, and when the FAA and NORAD knew each were hijacked, but there are many other issues that have also raised questions. When was Dick Cheney evacuated to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, for instance? What was Donald Rumsfeld doing before the Pentagon was hit? Where was Richard Myers?
One key source raised by many questioning the 9/11 Commission is Richard Clarke's book "Against All Enemies", which begins with Clarke's account of that day. He explains how he ran a teleconference involving the FAA, Department of Defence, CIA, Deputy Attorney General and more as they discussed what was happening. The 9/11 Commission talked about the teleconference here:
The FAA and White House Teleconferences.
The FAA,the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferences—at least before 10:00— included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none
succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings.
At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department.The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic,it was of little value,and there were other important tasks.The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11.Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call.
At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40. The first topic addressed in the White House video teleconference—at about 9:40—was the physical security of the President, the White House, and federal agencies. Immediately thereafter it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon. We found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior information that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck.
Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in this video teleconference at various times. We do not know who from Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the personnel involved in managing the crisis did.And none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC.As one witness recalled,“[It] was almost like there were parallel decisionmaking processes going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC . . . and then there was the [White House video teleconference]. . . . [I]n my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decisionmaking.”
At 10:03, the conference received reports of more missing aircraft,“2 possibly 3 aloft,” and learned of a combat air patrol over Washington. There was discussion of the need for rules of engagement. Clarke reported that they were asking the President for authority to shoot down aircraft. Confirmation of that authority came at 10:25, but the commands were already being conveyed in more direct contacts with the Pentagon.
Chapter 1, 9/11 Commission Report
According to the Commission, then, the teleconference began late, included the wrong people, and so had no chance of playing a useful part in exchanging information, and perhaps preventing the attack on the Pentagon. However, after reading Clarke's book, other researchers have taken a very different view.
David Ray Griffin's "The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions", for instance, uses Clarke's account to derive a starting time of around 9:15 for the teleconference, notably earlier than the Commission describes. Especially as Clarke begins the conference with Jane Garvey of the FAA, who the Commission Report didn't have joining until at least 25 minutes later.
Further, while the Commission told us that "none of these teleconferences—at least before 10:00— included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department", Griffin points out that "Clarke's account suggests that his teleconference included exactly the right people: Jane Garvey, Richard Myers and Donald Rumsfeld". He suggests that "Garvey surely would have known at this time about the signs suggesting that Flight 77 had been hijacked", and says "Clarke's White House teleconference provided, therefore, one more context in which the US military - if it did not already know - could have learned about the hijacking of Flight 77". Griffin concludes:
The 9/11 Commission's claim that the US military did not even know that Flight 77 had been hijacked seems to based [sic] not on an impartial scrutiny of the evidence but purely on the conclusion that this claim is needed to protect the US military from suspicion that it deliberately allowed the Pentagon to be attacked. NORAD's September 18 timeline, with its already extreme claim that it was not notified by the FAA until 9:24, had not succeeded in removing this suspicion. This claim, therefore, had to be declared "incorrect" and replaced with the even more extreme claim that the US military was never notified about the hijacking of Flight 77. Those who care more about evidence and common sense than the reputation of the US military, however, will likely find this new claim dubious.
David Ray Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions
It's important to note that Dr Griffin presents more evidence for his claims than we've quoted here, and so this page cannot refute his conclusion in full. Instead we will focus on a single issue, the teleconference: is it more likely that it began in full at 9:15 under the Clarke account, or 9:40 as reported by the 9/11 Commission?
Clarke's account
Here's how Richard Clarke describes events between 8:45 and around 10:15 on the morning of 9/11.
I ran through the West Wing to the Vice President's office, oblivious to the stares and concern that brought. I had been at a conference in the Ronald Reagan Building three blocks away when Lisa Gordon-Hagerty called to say that an aircraft had struck the World Trade Center: "Until we know what this is, Dick, we should assume the worst." Lisa had been in the center of crisis coordination many times in exercises and all too often in the real world.
"Right. Activate the CSG on secure video. I'll be there in less than five," I told her as I ran to my car. The CSG was the Counterterrorism Security Group, the leaders of each of the federal government's counterterrorism and security organisations. I had chaired it since 1992. It was on a five-minute tether during business hours, twenty minutes at all other times. I looked at the clock on the dashboard. It was 9:03 am, September 11, 2001."
As I drove up tp the first White House gate Lisa called again: "The other tower was just hit." "Well, now we know who we're dealing with. I want the highest-level person in Washington from each agency on-screen now, especially the FAA," the Federal Aviation Administration.
As I pulled the car up to the West Wing door, Paul Kurtz, one of the White House counterterrorism team, ran up to me. "We were in the Morning Staff Meeting when we heard. Condi told me to find you fast and broke up the meeting. She's with Cheney."
Bursting in on the Vice President and Condi - Condoleeza Rice, the President's National Security Advisor - alone in Cheney's office, I caught my breath. Cheney was famously implacable, but I thought I saw a reflection of horror on his face. "What do you think?" he asked.
"It's al al Qaeda attack and they like simultaneous attacks. This may not be over."
"Okay, Dick," Condi said, "you're the crisis manager, what do you recommend?" She and I had discussed what we would do if and when another terrorist attack hit. In June I had given her a checklist of things to do after an attack, in part to underline my belief that something big was coming and we needed to go on the offensive.
"We're putting together a secure teleconference to manage the crisis," I replied. "I'd like to get the highest-ranking official from each department." My mind was already racing, developing a new list of what had to be done and done now.
"Do it," the Vice President ordered.
"Secret Service wants us to go to the bomb shelter," Condi added.
I nodded. "I would and... I would evacuate the White House."
Cheney began to gather up his papers. In his outer office the normal Security Service presence was two agents. As I left, I counted eight, ready to move to the PEOC, The Presidential Emergency Operations Center, a bunker in the East Wing.
Just off the main floor of the situation room on the ground level of the West Wing is a Secure Video Conferencing Center, a clone of the Situation Room conference room except for the bank of monitors in the far wall opposite the chairman's seat. Like the conference room the Video Center is small and paneled with dark wood. The presidential seal hangs on the wall over the chair at the head of the table.
On my way through the Operations Center of the Situation Room, Ralph Siegler, the longtime Situation Room deputy director, grabbed me. "We're on the line with NORAD, on an air threat conference call." That was a procedure instituted by the North American Aerospace Defense Command during the Cold War to alert the White House when Soviet bombers got too close to U.S. airspace.
"Where's POTUS? Who have we got with him?" I asked, as we moved quickly together through the center, using the White House staff jargon for the President.
"He's in a kindergarten in Florida. Deb's with him." Deb was Navy Captain Deborah Lower, the director of the White House Situation Room. "We have a line open to her cell."
As I entered the Video Center, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty was taking the roll and I could see people rushing into studios around the city: Donald Rumsfeld at Defense and George Tenet at CIA. But at many of the sites the Principal was traveling. The Attorny General was in Milwaukee, so Larry Thompson, the Deputy, was at Justice. Rich Armitage, the number two at State, was filling in for Colin Powell, who was in Peru. Air Force four-star General Dick Myers was filling in for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Hugh Shelton, who was over the Atlantic. Bob Mueller was at the FBI, but he had just started that job.
Each Principal was supported by his or her member at the CSG and behind them staffs could be seen frantically yelling on telephones and grabbing papers. Condi Rice walked in behind me with her deputy, Steve Hadley. "Do you want to chair this as a Principal's meeting?" I asked. Rice, as National Security Advisor, chaired the Principals Committee, which consisted of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the CIA Director, the Chairman of the Join Chiefs, and often now the Vice President.
"No. You run it." I pushed aside the chair at the head of the table and stood there, Condi visibly by my side.
"Let's begin. Calmly. We will do this in crisis mode, which means keep your microphones off unless you're speaking. If you want to speak, wave at the camera. If it's something you don't want everyone to hear, call me on the red phone."
Rice would later be criticised in the press by unnamed participants of the meeting for just standing around. From my obviously partial perspective, she had shown courage by standing back. She knew it looked odd, but she also had enough self-confidence to feel no need to be in the chair. She did not want to waste time. I thought back to the scene in this room when the Oklahoma City bombing took place. President [Bill] Clinton had walked in and sat down, chairing the CSG video conference for a few minutes. While it showed high-level concern and we were glad to have him there, it would have slowed down our response if he had stayed.
"You're going to need some decisions quickly," Rice said off camera. "I'm going to the PEOC to be with the Vice President. Tell us what you need."
"What I need is an open line to Cheney and you." I turned to my White House Fellow, Army Major Mike Fenzel. The highly competitive process that had selected White House fellows had turned out some extraordinary people over the years, such as another army major named Colin Powell. "Mike," I said, "go with Condi to the PEOC and open a secure line to me. I'll relay the decisions we need to you."
Fenzel was used to pressure. As a lieutenant, he had driven his Bradley Fighting Vehicle down the runway of an Iraqi air base shooting up MiGs and taking return fire. As a captain, he had led a company of infantry into war-torn Liberia and faced down a mob outside the US embassy. [Eighteen months after 9/11, Fenzel would be the first man to parachute out of his C-17 in a nighttime combat jump into Iraq.]
"OK," I began. "Let's start with the facts. FAA, FAA, go." I fell into using the style of communication on tactical radio so that those listening in other studios around town could hear who was being called on over the din in their own rooms.
Jane Garvey, the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, was in the chair. "The two aircraft that went in were American flight 11, a 767, and United 175, also a 767. Hijacked."
"Jane, where's Norm?" I asked. They were frantically looking for Norman Mineta, the Secretary of Transportation, and, like me, a rare holdover from the Clinton administration. At first, FAA could not find him. "Well, Jane, can you order aircraft down? We're going to have to clear the airspace around Washington and New York."
"We may have to do a lot more than that, Dick. I already put a hold on all takeoffs and landings in New York and Washington, but we have reports of eleven aircraft off course of out of communications, maybe hijacked."
Lisa slowly whispered "Oh shit." All conversation had stopped in the studios on the screen. Everyone was listening.
"Eleven," I repeated. "Okay, Jane, how long will it take to get all aircraft now aloft onto the ground somewhere?" My mind flashed back to 1995 when I asked FAA to ground all US flights over the Pacific because of a terrorist threat, causing chaos for days. It had taken hours then to find the Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pena.
"The air traffic manager," Jane went on, "says there are 4400 birds up now. We can cancel all take-offs quickly, but grounding them all that are already up ... nobody's ever done this before. Don't know how long it will take. By the way, it's Ben's first day on the job." Garvey was referring to Ben Sliney, the very new National Operations Manager at the FAA.
"Jane, if you haven't found the Secretary yet, are you prepared to order a national ground stop and no-fly zone?"
"Yes, but it will take a while." Shortly thereafter, Mineta called in from his car, and I asked him to come directly to the Situation Room. He had two sons who were pilots for United. He did not know where they were that day. I suggested he join the Vice President.
Roger Cressey, my deputy and a marathoner, had run eight blocks from his doctors office. Convincing the Uniformed Secret Service guards to let him into the compound, Roger pressed through to the situation room. I was pleased to see him.
I turned to the Pentagon screen. "JCS, JCS. I assume NORAD has scrambled fighters and AWACS. How many. Where?"
"Not a pretty picture, Dick." Dick Myers, himself a fighter pilot, knew that the days when we had scores of fighters on strip alert had ended with the Cold War. "We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise, but... Otis has launched two birds toward New York. Langley is trying to get two up now. The AWACS are at Tinker and not on alert." Oris was an Air National Guard base on Cape Cod. Langley Air Force Base was outside Norfolk, Virginia. Tinker AFB, home to all of America's flying radar stations, was in Oklahoma.
"Okay, how long to CAP over D.C."?" Combat Air Patrol, CAP, was something we were used to placing over Iraq, not our nation's capital.
"Fast as we can. Fifteen minutes?" Myers asked, looking at the generals and colonels behind him. It was now 9:28.
I thought about the 1998 simultaneous attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. There was the possibility now of multiple simultaneous attacks in several countries. "State, State. DOD, DOD. We have to assume there will be simultaneous attacks on us overseas. We need to close the embassies. Move DOD bases to combat Threatcon."
The television screen in the upper left was running CNN on mute. Noticing the President coming on, Lisa turned on the volume and the crisis conference halted to listen: "... into the World Trade Centre in an apparent terrorist attack on our country."
During the pause, I noticed that Brian Stafford, director of the Secret Service, was now in the room. He pulled me aside. "We gotta get him out of there to some place safe ... and secret. I've stashed FLOTUS." FLOTUS was White House speak for Mrs Bush, first lady of the US, now in a heavily guarded, unmarked building in Washington. Stafford had been President Clinton's bodyguard, led the presidential protection detail. Everyone knew that, despite the Elvis hairstyle, Stafford was solid and serious. He told presidents what to do, politely and in a soft Southern drawl, but in a way that left little room for discussion.
Franklin Miller, my colleague and Special Assistant to the President for Defense Affairs, joined Stafford. Frank squeezed my bicep. "Guess I'm working for you today. What can I do?" With him was a member of his staff, Marine Corps Colonel Tom Greenwood.
"Can you work with Brian," I told Miller. "Figure out where to move the President? He can't come back here until we know what the shit is happening." I knew that would not go down well with the Commander in Chief. "And Tom," I directed at Colonel Greenwood, "work with Roger - Cressey - on getting some CAP here - fast."
Stafford had another request. "When Air Force One takes off, can it have fighter escorts?"
"Sure, we can ask," Miller replied, "but you guys know that CAP, fighter escorts, they can't just shoot down planes inside the United States. We'll need an order." Miller had spent two decades working in the Pentagon and knew that the military would want clear instructions before they used force.
I picked up the open line to the PEOC. I got a dial tone. Someone had hung up on the other end. I punched the PEOC button on the large, white secure phone that had twenty speed dial buttons. When Major Fenzel got on the line I gave him the first three decisions we needed. "Mike, somebody has to tell the President he can't come back here. Cheney, Condi, somebody. Secret Service concurs. We do not want them saying where they are going when they take off. Second, when they take off, they should have fighter escort. Three, we need to authorize the Air Force to shoot down any aircraft - including a hijacked passenger flight - that looks like it is threatening to attack and cause large-scale death on the ground. Got it?"
"Roger that, Dick, get right back to you." Fenzel was, I thought, optimistic about how long decisions like that would take.
I resumed the video conference. "FAA, FAA, go. Status report. How many aircraft do you still carry as hijacked?" Garvey read from a list: "All aircraft have been ordered to land at the nearest field. Here's what we have as potential hijacks: Delta 1989 over West Virginia, United 93 over Pennsylvania ..."
Stafford slipped me a note. "Radar shows aircraft headed this way." Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what the FAA's radar was seeing. "I'm going to empty out the complex." He was ordering the evacuation of the White House.
Ralph Siegler stuck his head into the room. "There has been an explosion in the Pentagon parking lot, maybe a car bomb!"
"If we evacuate the White House, what about the rest of Washington?" Paul Kurtz asked me. "What about COG?" Continuity of Government was another program left over from the Cold War. It was designed to relocate officials to alternate sites during periods of national emergency. COG was also planned to devolve power in case the President or key cabinet members were killed.
Roger Cressey stepped back into the video conference and announced: "A plane just hit the Pentagon." I was still talking with the FAA, taking down a list of possibly hijacked aircraft. "Did you hear me?" Cressey was on loan to the White House from the Pentagon. He had friends there; we all did.
"I can still see Rumsfeld on the screen," I replied, "so the whole building didn't get hit. No emotion in here. We are going to stay focused. Roger, find out where the fighter planes are. I want combat air patrol over every major city in this country. Now."
Stafford's order to evacuate was going into effect. As the staff poured out of the White House compound, the residence, the west wing and the Executive Office Building, the uniformed Secret Service guards yelled at the women, "If you're in high heels, take off your shoes and run - run!" My secretary, Beverly Roundtree, was on the line to Lisa, telling her that she and the rest of my staff were still in our vault in the Executive Office Building. "Okay, okay," Lisa was saying, knowing she could not persuade her to leave, "then bring over the chem-bio gear."
Our coordinator for Continuity of Government [we will call him Fred here to protect his identity at the request of the government] joined us.
"How do I activate COG?" I asked him. In the exercises we had done, the person playing the President had always given that order.
"You tell me to do it," Fred replied.
At that moment, Paul handed me the white phone to the PEOC. It was Fenzel. "Air Force One is getting ready to take off, with some press still on board. He'll divert to an air base. Fighter escort is authorized. And..." He paused. "Tell the Pentagon that they have authority from the President to shoot down hostile aircraft, repeat, they have authority to shoot down hostile aircraft."
"Roger that." I was amazed at the speed of the decisions coming from Cheney and, through him, from Bush. "Tell them I am instituting COG." I turned back to Fred: "Go."
"DOD, DOD." I tried to get the attention of those still on the screen in the Pentagon. "Three decisions. One, the Pentagon has ordered the use of force against aircraft deemed to be hostile. Two, the White House is also requesting fighter escort of Air Force One. Three, and this applies to all agencies, we are initiating COG. Please activate your alternate command centers and move staff to them immediately."
Rumsfeld said that smoke was getting into the Pentagon secure teleconferencing studio. Franklin Miller urged him to helicopter to DOD's alternate site. "I am too goddamn old to go to an alternate site," the Secretary answered. Rumsfeld moved to another studio in the Pentagon and sent his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, to the remote site.
General Myers asked, "Okay, shoot down aircraft, but what are the ROE?" ROE were Rules of Engagement. It was one thing to say it's okay to shoot down a hijacked aircraft threatening to kill people on the ground, but we needed to give pilots more specific guidelines than that. I asked Miller and Greenwood to make sure DOD had an answer to that question quickly. "I don't want them delaying while they lawyer that to death."
Lisa slipped a note in front of me: "CNN says car bomb at the State Department. Fire on the Mall near the Capitol."
Ralph Siegler stuck his head around the door: "Secret Service reports a hostile aircraft ten minutes out."
Beverly Roundtree arrived and distributed gas masks. Cressey suggested we activate the Emergency Broadcast System.
"And have them say what?" I asked.
"State, State..." I called to get Rich Armitage's attention.
The Deputy Secretary of State had been a Navy Seal and looked it. He responded in tactical radio style: "State, here, go".
"Rich, has your building just been bombed?"
"Does it fucking look like I've been bombed, Dick?"
"Well, no, but the building covers about four blocks and you're behind a big vault door. And you need to activate your COG site."
"All right, goddamn it, I'll go look for myself," Armitage said, lifting himself out of the chair and disappearing off camera. "Where the hell is our COG site..."
Fred returned. "We have a chopper on the way to extract the Speaker from the Capitol. Did you want all the departments to go to COG or just the national security agencies?" The Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, was next in line to the Presidency if Bush or Cheney were killed or incapacitated. Soon, he would be skimming across the backed-up traffic and on his way to a cave.
"Everybody, Fred, all departments. And check with the Capitol Police to see if there is a fire."
"Already did, " Fred replied. "It's bogus. No fires, no bombs, but the streets and Metro and jammed with people trying to get out of town. It's going to be hard to get people to alternate sites."
Siegler was back: "Hostile aircraft eight minutes out."...
Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke
However, some of Clarke's details were disputed by others on the scene. Condoleezza Rice aide Franklin Miller has said that he didn't talk to Rumsfeld on 9/11, didn't recall Ralph Siegler delivering the repeated messages about an approaching hostile aircraft, and that a later dramatic moment not described above was "complete fiction". These relatively minor disputes don't materially affect our calculations here, but are relevant when considering how accurate Clarke's account might be. Read more here.
We're more concerned here with the timetable, though. Clarke provides very few specific times to anchor the account, and so calculating precisely when an event occurred requires a little guesswork.
Still, there's no doubt that Clarke places the start of the teleconference at before 9:28. He also talks to Myers and Garvey prior to that time, and sees Rumsfeld on the screen, in contradiction to the 9/11 Commission account. A smoking gun? Let's find out.
Richard Myers
David Ray Griffin discusses Richard Myers whereabouts in "The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions":
Myers on Myers: In a note, the Commission says: "The Vice Chairman was on Capitol Hill when the Pentagon was struck, and he saw smoke as his car made its way back to the building (Richard Myers interview, Feb. 17, 2004.)" (463n199)
As we can see, this statement about the whereabouts of Richard Myers seems to be based solely on an interview with Myers himself. The Commission could have, to be sure, cited Secretary Rumsfeld's statement, according to which when he (Rumsfeld) entered the NMCC at 10:30, Myers had "just returned from Capitol Hill". This, however, would have provided poor support, because according to Myers himself, he had been back for 50 minutes, and the Commission itself has him in the NMCC by 10:00 (38). It is perhaps understandable, therefore, that the Commission did not cite Rumsfeld's supporting testimony. So it was left with Myers himself as the only one to testify that he had been to Capitol Hill.
Furthermore, lest one think that someone on the Commission staff simply misunderstood what Myers said, we can see from other sources that that Commission's statement fits with a rather elaborate tale Myers has evidently told about what he was doing on Capitol Hill. In James Bamford's book, A Pretext for War, we read the following account:
Air Force General Richard Myers, the Vice Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was] in charge of the country's armed forces. But incredibly, he would remain unaware of what was going on around him during the series of attacks.
Myers was on Capitol Hill waiting to meet with Georgia Senator Max Cleland about his upcoming confirmation hearings to become the new Joint Chiefs chairman. While in Cleland's outer office, he watched live television reports following the first crash into the World Trade Center and then went into Cleland's office for his routine meeting. There he would remain for the next forty-five minutes, self-promoting his talents to lead the military...
Through it all, the general in charge of the country's military was completely ignorant of its worst attack in nearly two centuries.
As his source for this information, Bamford cites an article by Sgt Kathleen Rhem of the US military, which was published by the American Forces Press Service about six weeks after 9/11.
As Bamford's final paragraph implies, this story is incredible. We are supposed to believe that after the North Tower of the World Trade Center was struck by an airplane, Air Force General Myers, the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs simply sat there watching TV coverage like an ordinary American citizen. We are supposed to believe that he did not call the NMCC, and that no one from it called him. We are then supposed to believe that he went into Cleland's office without telling Cleland's secretary to notify him if the TV coverage reported any further developments. We are then supposed to believe that even after the South Tower was struck, the secretary did not inform him and also that no one from the NMCC or anywhere else in the Pentagon called to notify him or consult with him. We are even supposed to believe that he still was not called when the Pentagon itself was struck.
...
According to Richard Clarke, therefore, General Myers participated in the White House video conference from the beginning and evidently - perhaps off and on - until the end. If Clarke's account is correct about this, the Commissioners could have learned about the participation of Myers simply by reading Clarke's book, the accuracy of which they could have confirmed by watching the videotape. On the other hand, if they had discovered that Myers had not participated, they should have told us that Clarke's account is false. But the Commission fails even to mention Clarke's account, which has Myers not only involved in the Pentagon, but actively involved in a NORAD exercise. This failure makes it hard not to conclude that the Commission was deliberately attempting to protect Myers' own account from challenge.
We should remind ourselves that the Commission could easily have cleared up this controversy if only Max Cleland had remained a member. As I reported in The New Pearl Harbor, Cleland, a Democrat who had lost his Senate seat in the previous election, needed a job with a salary. Senate Democrats had recommended him for a Democratic slot on the board of the Export-Import Bank, and the White House sent this nomination to the Senate near the end of 2003. Being legally forbidden from holding both positions, Cleland resigned from the Commission (after which he was replaced by former Senator Bob Kerrey). But if Cleland had remained on the Commission, he could have simply confirmed or disconfirmed Myers' presence in his office from 8:45 to 9:45 on the morning of 9/11. Of course, having Cleland physically present at the Commission hearing was not necessary. The Commissioners could have simply telephoned Cleland to ask him about this, but it evidently did not occur to them to make this call. So we are left simply with the contradiction of the accounts by Myers and Clarke.
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, David Ray Griffin
This is a near-textbook example in how to create something out of nothing.
We're told, for example, that the Commission not mentioning Clarke's account is somehow a major sign that they were covering up for Myers. Could it not also be the case that they didn't see it as an issue with any priority? There wasn't the time or space to rebut every theory in the final report.
Then Griffin tells us that Myers account could easily have been verified. "The Commissioners could have simply telephoned Cleland to ask him about this, but it evidently did not occur to them to make this call". Where is his evidence to support this? How does he know that the Commissioners didn't verify Myers whereabouts? Once again, the absence of evidence is used to "prove" a point, while other explanations are ignored.
As it happens, the Commissioners may not have had to call anyone about this issue, as Cleland had already spoke about his meeting with Myers in public on more than one occasion.
Cleland is a Democrat who criticised the Bush administration before resigning from the Commission, and as such it's hard to believe he would be lying to cover up for Myers:
If we are to accept Cleland and Myers account, though, this shoots a significant hole in Richard Clarke's version of his teleconference. Clarke said he was talking to Myers in the Pentagon just before 9:28, yet it seems in reality Myers was at Capitol Hill for at least another 10 minutes. And this is just the first problem with Clarke's timeline.
Jane Garvey
Richard Clarke tells us that Jane Garvey was first up during his teleconference.
If this is accurate, and the teleconference began at 9:15, then this tells us that the FAA were "frantically looking for Norman Mineta, the Secretary of Transportation" at this time. And that's a little bizarre, because what you're rarely told during discussions of these issues is that Garvey was in a meeting with Mineta that very morning. Mineta mentioned Garvey in his 9/11 Commission testimony, for instance:
Further details appeared in an interesting interview with the Acadmey of Achievement:
AoA: As a young boy, you experienced December 7, 1941, and then as Secretary of Transportation, you experienced September 11, 2001. Can you tell us about that day?
Norman Mineta: That morning I was having breakfast with the Vice Premier of Belgium, Isobel Durant, who was also the Minister of Transport, and Jane Garvey, the head of the Federal Aviation Administration, was also there at breakfast. So the three of us were having breakfast, and my Chief of Staff, John Flaherty, came in and said, "Mr. Secretary, may I see you?" So I excused myself, went into my office. At the other end of my office, I have a television set. Obviously, the World Trade Center, black smoke pouring out of there. I said, "What the heck is that?" He said, "Well, we don't know. We have heard 'explosion,' we've heard 'general aviation plane going into the building,' we've heard 'commercial airplane going into the building.' We don't know." So I said, "Well, I am going to go back into the breakfast, keep me posted." So I went in and explained to Jane and to Mrs. Durant what I had just been told. About six or seven minutes later, John came back in and said, "May I see you?" So I excused myself, went back in, and he said, "It has been confirmed. It was an American Airlines (plane) that went into the World Trade Center." I went up to the TV set to get a closer look, see if I could see the hole where the plane went in, and as I was watching the TV set, all of a sudden a gray object comes from the right side of the screen, comes across, sort of disappears, and then a yellow and white billowy cloud over here, and I go, "Holy Cow, what the heck was that."
I ran back into the conference room and said, "I don't know what is going on in New York, but Mrs. Durant, I have got to excuse myself. Jane, you have got to get back to the Operations Center over at FAA." I excused myself, came back into the office. By that time, the White House had called and said I had to get over there right away...
http://web.archive.org/web/20070915151402/http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/min0int-8
If Mineta is correct, then it seems that Garvey called the FAA after the first WTC impact, but then returned to the meeting. She was present when Mineta saw footage of the second impact, which would have been at 9:03 at the earliest. Garvey then returned to the FAA (just down the street, I believe, so a very short walk), presumably had time to brief herself on what was going on, then called with a message about "the CEO of Delta Airlines".
That phone call is a further curiosity. Delta 1989 was eventually reported as a suspected hijack to NEADS, but the 9/11 Commission placed this at 9:41. There were concerns about the flight earlier, as it had several similarities to Flights 11 and 175 (airport, destination, departure time) but most media reports say it only got real attention from around 9:30. So if the CEOs call was about this plane, then how could it be happening prior to 9:15?
That issue aside, it's physically possible for Garvey to have got back to her office in time for a 9:15 teleconference, then, but why would she have been "frantically looking" for Mineta when they'd been together 12 minutes earlier, and she had been on the phone to his office only moments before?
And if we look at the content of what Garvey is saying, then it only gets worse.
Garvey begins by telling Clarke that "the two aircraft that went in were American flight 11, a 767, and United 175, also a 767", for instance. No if's, buts or qualifications, therefore we're supposed to believe that the FAA knew the second plane was Flight 175 by 9:15. So why is it that the 9/11 Commission timeline says that, while they had suspicions earlier, even United Airlines weren't sure what had happened until 9:20?
- (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: UAL believe second crash was Flight 175
- (9:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001: UAL crisis center activated
Next, Clarke has Garvey reporting that "we have reports of eleven aircraft off course of out of communications, maybe hijacked", for instance. Really? Reports of eleven hijacked planes by 9:15? A 2002 USA Today story reports on some of the suspicious jets, but say the figure only reaches 11 "eventually":
The 9/11 Commission also say that there were only a few mistaken reports early on:
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the “we have some planes” remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA’s Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
9/11 Commission Report
And MSNBC told us this in 2002:
If Clarke had spoken to the FAA at around 9:40, then, he may way have heard that there were 11 possibly hijacked planes. But we've yet to see anyone even begin to explain how this can have happened at 9:15. Of course it could be argued that he was right about the time, but she just didn't mention the eleven planes until later, however that's entering into a dangerous area (and still doesn't explain the "frantically looking for Mineta" problem). Once you know that one part of Clarke's story is incorrect, how are you able to decide which other elements are reliable?
Donald Rumsfeld
Clarke reports that he could see Donald Rumsfeld in a Pentagon studio on 9/11, even before the teleconference began. However, Rumsfeld apparently takes no part it until after the Pentagon is hit. This account is contradicted by others, though, who place Rumsfeld in his office all along.
There's Rumsfeld himself, delivering a statement to the 9/11 Commission and talking to Larry King:
Mark Kirk describes being at the breakfast meeting with Rumsfeld and others:
Assistant Secretary of Defence Torie Clark gave the following interview to WBZ Boston. No mention of Rumsfeld leaving his office:
Pentagon police officer Aubrey Harris similarly places Rumsfeld inside his office as the Pentagon was hit:
‘Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy’
By ANDREW COCKBURN
Published: March 25, 2007
Just after 9:37 A.M. on the morning of September 11, 2001, Officer Aubrey Davis of the Pentagon police was standing outside Donald Rumsfeld's office on the third floor of the Pentagon's E Ring. Inside, Rumsfeld, though aware that the World Trade Center towers in New York had already been hit, was proceeding with his regularly scheduled CIA briefing. Davis, on the other hand, had concluded from watching the TV news that the country was under attack and the Pentagon might be a target. Assigned to the defense secretary's personal bodyguard, he had come on his own initiative, ready to move Rumsfeld to a better-protected location.
"There was an incredibly loud 'boom,'" says Davis, raising his voice slightly on the last word. Fifteen or twenty seconds later, just as his radio crackled with a message, the door opened and Rumsfeld walked out, looking composed and wearing the jacket he normally discarded while in his office. "Sir," said Davis, quoting what he had heard on his radio, "we're getting a report that an airplane has hit the Mall."
"The Mall?" replied Rumsfeld calmly. Without further word, the secretary of defense turned on his heel and set off at a sharp pace toward the so-called Mall section of the Pentagon. Down the hall, someone ran out of a VIP dining room screaming, "They're bombing the building, they're bombing the building." Davis frantically waved for colleagues to catch up as the stocky, 5' 8" defense secretary marched ahead of his lanky escort.
The group, which grew to include several more police officers as well as Rumsfeld's personal communications aide, turned into the wide passageway running along the Mall face of the building. Thick crowds of Pentagon staff, in and out of uniform, were hurrying past in the opposite direction. They could smell smoke, but there was no sign of any damage here. "I thought you said the Mall," said Rumsfeld.
"Sir," responded Davis, holding his radio, "now we're hearing it's by the heliport." This meant the next side of the building farther along from the Mall. Rumsfeld set off again without a word, ignoring Davis's protestations that they should turn back. "At the end of the Mall corridor, we dropped down a stairway to the second floor, and then a little farther we dropped down to the first. It was dark and there was a lot of smoke. Then we saw daylight through a door that was hanging open." Groping through the darkness to the door, the group emerged outside. In front of them, just thirty yards away, roared a "wall of flame."
"There were the flames, and bits of metal all around," Davis remembers, as well as injured people. He noticed the white legs of a woman lying on the ground, then realized with a shock that she was African-American, horribly burned. "The secretary picked up one of the pieces of metal. I was telling him he shouldn't be interfering with a crime scene when he looked at some inscription on it and said, 'American Airlines.' Then someone shouted, 'Help, over here,' and we ran over and helped push an injured person on a gurney over to the road."
While the secretary of defense was pushing a gurney, Davis's radio was crackling with frantic pleas from his control room regarding Rumsfeld's whereabouts. "It was 'Dr. Cambone [Rumsfeld's closest aide] is asking, Dr. Cambone wants to find the secretary.' I kept saying, 'We've got him,' but the system was overloaded, everyone on the frequency was talking, everything jumbled, so I couldn't get through and they went on asking."
An emergency worker approached, saying that equipment and medical supplies were needed. "Tell this man what you need," said Rumsfeld, gesturing to the communications aide, apparently oblivious of the fact that there were no communications.
Once they had pushed the wounded man on the gurney over to the road, the bodyguard was finally able to lead his charge back inside the building. "I'd say we were gone fifteen minutes, max," he told me in his account of what happened that morning. Given the time it took to make their way down those Pentagon corridors - each side of the enormous building is the length of three football fields - Rumsfeld was actually at the crash site for only a fraction of that period.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/books/chapters/0325-1st-cockb.html?pagewanted=1
Most of the reaction to such stories has concentrated in looking for discrepancies in Rumsfeld's own accounts. David Ray Griffin points out in "The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions" that Rumsfeld said in one account that he was at the scene for "half an hour", but in another that he was back in his office by 10:00, and most of that time would have been consumed in walking there and back. Griffin goes on to state:
The even more important question is whether all the versions of Rumsfeld's story are false. The possibility would be raised if it is true - as it has been suggested - that there may be a lack of any photographs or eye witnesses to confirm that Rumsfeld was at the crash site at all. We would, in any case, be forced to conclude that all three versions of Rumsfeld on Rumsfeld are indeed false if we accept the truth of Richard Clarke's statements about Rumsfeld.
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, David Ray Griffin
Not at the scene at all? That's not what CNN appeared to think (although admittedly this footage doesn't clearly give a time):
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Dr Griffin calls these versions of the story "Rumsfeld on Rumsfeld", perhaps in an effort to persuade you that there's only his word for what happened. But as we've seen, that isn't true. Others report that he was in his office and make no mention of any trips to a teleconference studio. We could theorise that perhaps Rumsfeld slipped away without anyone noticing (or they're all lying to cover it up), reached the studio in time to be seen by Clarke, then returned again. But given that there's reason to doubt Clarke's account with regard to both Jane Garvey and Richard Myers, a simpler explanation may be that he's wrong here, too.
Conclusion
Many 9/11 researchers have pointed to the 9:10 to 9:15 start time of Clarke's teleconference as a clear contradiction of the 9/11 Commission account. They said, for instance, "none of these teleconferences—at least before 10:00— included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department", but David Ray Griffin stated that "Clarke's account suggests that his teleconference included exactly the right people: Jane Garvey, Richard Myers and Donald Rumsfeld".
However, look a little deeper and support for Clarke's version of events is very thin, at least amongst these key players. Max Cleland says Richard Myers was away from the Pentagon until after it was hit; witnesses place Rumsfeld in his office up until the same time; Clarke's account of what Garvey supposedly said at 9:15 makes very little sense.
None of this can conclusively prove Clarke is wrong, of course. There will always be people who say he is correct, and everyone else is lying. But until there's more evidence to support that, we would recommend you be particularly cautious about any conclusions drawn from Richard Clarke's teleconference timeline: most simply don't stand up to scrutiny.