

9/11 Commission files

Team 7/ Box 1

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Scanned by Mike Williams of 911myths.com on 16th March 2009

MFR NOTES

GERARD

ARPEY

AAL

Gerard Anper

11/8/2004

- Gary Kennedy with Camel

Functional Area

- flight
- maintenance and operation
- SOC
- Business Units, Cargo, Eagle

Stuff that moved

Started
1999 - 2001
made
expanded in
Spring of 2002
President of the
company. gave
Don Carley zone
him zone
April in 2003
President and
CEO

~~Head of Operations~~

Operations would have to implement whatever Tim did.

history had been in the commercial, financial side.

Summer 2001

- we were focused on
some aspect this complex.
Dynamic

culturally we take everything we do.

Compliance is very important.

- we were doing our best to comply -

Anper
was
the

Implementer →

- performance of your security system →

→ Culturally we had an attitude that we wanted to set the standard for Security.

General Managers → Tim head his own, and by

Efficiency

Sept. 11th got in early
Don Cartip's direct reports.

Every morning he has a 7:45 operations call.
SOC, flight;
arrived at 7:00 - 7:15 AM. - He called Reuss
to say he wouldn't be on the 8:45.
Joe Bertapelle answered

Craig Marquis has a flight attendant on the
line.

- How we ID a real employee.

- Sometimes we get crash calls →
He said Canderbined to be a little skeptical. Cockpit intrusion
has alarmed him as a "real" episode. I called Ben
Carty. I left ~~and~~ went for
grabbed Dan Huffman - Head of Maintenance and Engineering.
Saw Bertapelle, Parfitt, Kyle Phelps.

He knew it was real when it was in the Control Center.

Marquis was still on the phone.

They adopted the FAA procedures on board and were
going down the list following it

7:45 → we
COT

We got a phone call from SOCC saying that a plane had hit the WTC.

Tried to absorb

a lot of erroneous ~~info~~ had been coming into the SOCC. Got a call ^{info} from Don Carthy.

~~Don~~ asked if that was the problem.

→ next piece of info was No Comm / no transponder on 77 right after Carthy before the 2nd.

→ Ground Stop. No more take offs in No.E.

Someone also reported in ^{VHF} No Comm / No transponder

- Lots Ground Stop the whole airline.

- 2nd Crash occurred

→ 8:10 CDT → Strange reports. We had a Kennedy Seattle flight.

→ SOCC couldn't get CNN

→ Report around 8:15 that a 2nd airplane had gone into the WTC.

They weren't

I feel like we better get everything on the deck. Everyone agreed that they should do it

Carthy arrived.

- 15 minutes later -
he heard the FAA ordered everything down.

- Arpay briefed Don Carter.

- ~~FAA~~ ^{Carter} He

- Arpay said no discussion of what to tell the aircraft.

→ a lot of chaos. Lots of other erroneous reports of airplanes crashing.

What do we do now?

→

77 into WTC?? → Doesit remember truly whose airplane is where?

Joe B. saying how did 77 get to N.Y.

Many erroneous reports. - - He began to tune out because it was unconfined.

Doesit recall any mention about a gun.

Stayed throughout the day and night.

→ How do we get. ←

related to the efficacy.

→ ATA → Carol Hallett

FAR would ask what would the implication
of methods of implementation

Angey -

Keep this a matter of National Security.

Leo Mullin →

Have one brief to work with the

Gerard Arvey -

1/8/04

1999 to 9/11 Exec. VP for Ops, as well
as for AMP - reported to Certy -
office of Chairmen - Baker

Vice Chairmen -

Flight Dept. - maintenance - SOC Center -
Crew scheduling - Cargo - Am. Eagle

Expanded in Spring 02 - to become
President of Company -

April 2003 - Pres & CEO,

Pre 9/11 Head of Ops

Separate Safety/Security function
reported to Baker

Worked on implementation of
Security ~~directive~~ directive

doesn't recall disagreement w/ Atheron,
but if so would have resolved w/
Baker, Certy

Summer of 01

Complexity of airline industry, competition
(from financial background)

heavily focused on reliability (completion
rate - on time / arrival performance etc.)

Oper folks constantly challenged to
stay ahead - customers want
safety, security, on time performance

Doesn't recall extraordinary ^{security} threats in summer
of 2001

Culturally took business seriously, of
complying w/ FAA rule, regs

had thought of there being more security
issues internationally than domestically

didn't recall problematic security initiative

At AA, Aheron responsible for working
w/ FAA on rule, regs; Aheron's task
was simply to implement

- didn't

"We (American) went to set the
standard for performance" including
safety, security

Screening Contracts under jurisdiction of
General Managers -

Prey - 3-
9/11

flew back from Barton on 9/10

got back for Tue, Exec. Committee mtg.

- was in early

7:45 AM daily conference call w/SOC,
maintenance, flight - day before,
weather, etc.

- typical, 5-15 minutes

in around 7 - 7:15 - called Russ Chay
around 7:30 that he would miss
7:45 call because he needed to
prepare for Exec. mtg.

- Spike to Bentapelle - asked if
answering page - talk of Morgan's
call w/ Flight Attendant reporting
that bad guys on plane, F/A
stabbed, trying to verify if
really legit thing: perpetrators
had gotten access to cockpit

Something about discussion made him
think it was something amiss
(needed to be verified) - because
of reference to cockpit intrusion

Went over to SOC, took Don Huffman
(maintenance) with him - tried to call
Carty - left message -

Went to Command Center - Bartopelle,
Ruffitt, Kyle Phelps, setting up
• when he saw them there, he
knew they had concluded it was
real

Margul still on call w/ Ory, confirmed
as hijacking - following FAA procedure
around 7:45-7:50 CT - more people
coming to SOCC - got report of
WTC being hit - group "aborted"
that - many erroneous reports
(i.e. report of small airplane)

Call from Carty - asked if was AA
Apey: we don't know, confirmed
hijacking, flying to NYC, descending
(before 8 AM)

Told about 77 lost after Carty
call (8 AM) - decided to ground
stop NE flights

8:05-8:10 report that 44th had
No comm, no transponder -
expanded ground stop nationally

People reacting instinctively to bad
events - what's next thing to do

Apey

- 5 -

NY - Seattle flight reported
(Cerroneals) + be NoComm

- couldn't get CNN that day
- got report on 2nd plane around 8:15 AM - got TV coverage of Towers burning, shortly thereafter thought they needed to get planes down - all agreed

Carty arrived shortly thereafter -
Apey briefed - Carty agreed with
grounding all flights - done

10-15 minutes heard of FAA order
on grounding

- Things happening rapidly - not time to
thrust through screening, etc.
- Bertozzi, Perfit responsible for
implementing - they decided on
what to communicate to flights

more emergency reports about other flights
- thinking about aftermath of grounding

most of senior management came to SOCC
wasn't focused on which planes crashed
where

Given mass of erroneous reports, began to tune out details -

Didn't leave SOCC whole day -
had to focus on how to get
airline up and ~~and~~ running

Response

Conference call w/FAA on implications
of various measures - airline
responded factually - airline
didn't veto proposals -

Recommendation

Keep security matter of national
priority; provide adequate resources