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September 21, 1998, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A12

LENGTH: 1634 words

HEADLINE: White House Overflights Breach Strict Security Zone; FAA Warns Pilots, Traffic Controllers

BYLINE: Don Phillips, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:
An American Airlines jetliner flew directly over the White House two months ago, through some of the country's most sensitive restricted airspace, apparently because of a mix-up at Reagan National Airport's radar control facility.

The July 16 incident presented no danger to President Clinton or anyone else on the ground or in the air, and the aircraft was flying high enough that likely no one even noticed, other than air traffic controllers, the pilots and the Secret Service.

But it was one of a rapidly increasing number of White House airspace violations, which have more than doubled each year since fiscal 1996, despite precautions taken after a small plane struck the White House in 1994. The trend has concerned the Secret Service and the Federal Aviation Administration, leading to new warnings to pilots and a recommendation by a task force to update maps and make other changes at National. The American Airlines incident alone apparently has prompted the FAA to consider changes in procedures for one National landing pattern.

The incursions range from "minor clips" of the airspace during takeoff and landing to high-altitude overflights by military, commercial and private planes. A moment of inattention or even an unexpected gust of wind can propel an aircraft into the fringes of the area.

Nevertheless, the issue is considered extremely sensitive by the FAA and the Secret Service, even though at the moment no one will officially label the overflights either a safety issue or a security problem. Neither the FAA nor the Secret Service will discuss any aspect of the protected airspace other than to confirm its boundaries, which are printed on publicly available maps. Neither agency would offer an explanation for the increase in intrusions.

The FAA has become sufficiently worried about continuing violations that it has sent memos reminding various aviation groups to avoid the area. The agency also has admonished controllers at National to do more to ensure that planes do not stray into the restricted area. This, in turn, has fueled a bitter labor dispute in which National's traditionally combative air traffic controllers union has claimed that local management is ignoring a union plan to solve the problem because it would cost money.

The restricted airspace, known as Area P-56, stretches from the north bank of the Potomac River to downtown Washington and from the Capitol to the Lincoln Memorial. A separate small, circular area, P-56B, surrounds Vice President Gore's residence on the grounds of the Naval Observatory off upper Wisconsin Avenue. Other than approved aircraft movements, such as helicopter flights ferrying Clinton to Andrews Air Force Base or Camp David, no aircraft may fly through this area at less than 18,000 feet.

On March 4, the manager of the National Airport tower, Boyd V. Archer, issued a memo to all personnel warning controllers to "treat this area as a 'Granite Mountain' to be avoided in every possible way."

On July 1, the tower issued a letter to pilots saying that "avoidance of Prohibited Areas P-56A and P-56B is an essential and serious aspect of operating in the vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport."

The FAA and the Secret Service have declined to release documents and other material concerning the airspace that would normally be public. FAA documents provided by sources outside official channels, however, shed some light on the growing problem.

According to the documents, there were 13 incursions in fiscal 1996, six of them involving commercial air carriers. There were 27 incursions in fiscal 1997, nine of them involving air carriers. And in the first 4 1/2 months of fiscal 1998, there were 20 incursions, five of them involving air carriers.

The issue is sensitive not because of innocent mistakes by pilots or controllers but because of the ongoing threat of terrorism.

There have been serious threats to the White House from the air, the most dramatic coming on Feb. 22, 1974, when Samuel J. Byck, an unemployed Philadelphia salesman, attempted to hijack a Delta Air Lines jet at Baltimore-Washington International Airport. Byck killed an airport guard and the plane's co-pilot. A police officer shot Byck in the chest, and Byck then fired a bullet into his own head.

Byck's plan to crash the aircraft into the White House was revealed in letters and tape recordings he mailed to public officials just before the hijack attempt.

On Sept. 12, 1994, Frank Corder of Aberdeen, Md., stole a single-engine Cessna from an airfield near Baltimore and crashed it onto the White House lawn, slightly damaging the executive mansion. Corder, high on alcohol and cocaine, was killed.

The Corder incident shocked both the Secret Service and the FAA because no one apparently had a clue the plane was coming until it was in sight over the White House lawn at about 1:49 a.m. Late at night the National tower has little air traffic to control and only a skeleton staff, and controllers apparently were not looking at radar screens. Officials later discovered that a special telephone link from the tower to the White House was broken that night, even if someone had tried to use it.

After a security review the two agencies developed a "memorandum of understanding" about air security threats. That document, in a red envelope marked secret, is locked in a safe.

Then-FAA administrator David Hinson refused to discuss the memorandum at the time, but on Oct. 8, 1994, he told reporters that if there had been a security coordination problem, "the problem has been addressed."

The Secret Service will not discuss what equipment it may have in the White House to monitor air traffic in the vicinity. But numerous sources said they believe the agency has a radar "repeater" allowing agents to watch radar images piped in from nearby FAA locations. Aviation sources said the agency now sometimes calls about airspace intrusions even before the FAA has noticed the violation took place.

The trend toward more violations became evident in 1996 and took a sharp upturn during late 1997 and early this year.

A "P-56 Work Group" was formed in November 1996, made up of representatives of the FAA, the Air Line Pilots Association, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, American Airlines, United Airlines, the U.S. Park Police, and the Secret Service. The group later added mapping and charting companies and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.

The group developed a number of recommendations, most involving special warning language on charts and maps, as well as runway warning signs. Most of these recommendations are now being implemented.

A Feb. 23, 1998, FAA memo, made available to The Post by aviation sources, noted that "the number of aircraft incursions into this airspace has increased dramatically over the last two years and continues to escalate." Most of the 60 incursions during that two-year period -- 87 percent -- involved the tricky approach and departure route to the north of the National airport.

According to FAA documents, about half of the incursions involve corporate aircraft and a much smaller number involve commercial airliners, making the July 16 incident involving the American Airlines McDonnell Douglas MD-80, as well as a June 5 overflight above the vice president's home by a Boeing 737 jet flown by another airline, relatively unusual.

In light of the American Airlines incident, sources said the FAA is considering a change in National's procedures. The American jet was approaching from the south, and air traffic controllers were supposed to give the pilot a left turn toward Great Falls, where the jet was to have turned downriver to land from the north.

For reasons still being investigated, the controller did not turn the aircraft even though the pilot reminded the controller that he should be turning. Following standard procedure, the American pilot remained at 10,000 feet and flew directly over the airport. By the time controllers realized their mistake, it was too late to prevent a White House overflight.

Sources said one possible new procedure for such approaches would be for pilots to make the turn at a set point south of the airport, even if there is no contact with controllers.

The incident was considered especially unusual because it appears to have been a mistake by controllers, called an "operational error." Almost all incursions involve pilot error.

FAA air traffic managers and the National Airport local of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) now are battling over what to do about Area P-56. The labor-management dispute, which erupted early this year with an increasingly bitter exchange of letters between the union and local FAA management, has reached the desk of FAA Administrator Jane Garvey.

Andrew G. Acres, facility representative for the controllers union at National, charged that local FAA management is more interested in disciplining controllers than in solving the problem. Acres wrote Garvey on March 9, saying: "We realize that we are stepping outside the chain of command. However, we believe no one else within the FAA will listen."

Acres said the NATCA plan will cost money but will eliminate the problem. He said the FAA should assign an extra controller on each shift to do nothing but monitor the restricted area and steer aircraft away from it. Under current procedures it is solely the responsibility of the pilot to avoid the airspace, although controller mistakes can sometimes lead to violations.

To fix the problem, "you have to eliminate it," Acres said. "And the only way to eliminate it is staffing." Under current procedures, he said, "it's set up for failure."

The FAA would not discuss the NATCA plan.