Latest revision as of 17:37, 28 June 2012
One issue sometimes raised about the 9/11 flights is that they may have carried unusually few passengers. Margie Burns wrote about this in July 2006:
Aside from other factors, one that surely worked to the advantage of the 9/11 hijackers was that each of the four flights they caught on that fateful day was carrying significantly less than a full passenger load. Again we have what appears to be little short of a miraculous concatenation of timing and other circumstances:
Since the four planes, like the World Trade Center, were mercifully not full to capacity, casualties ultimately proved less than they might otherwise have. On the other hand, the hijackers also had fewer passengers to overpower or keep under control, and there was less passenger weight to use up fuel. Magically, the flight that carried four hijackers rather than five -- United Airlines flight 93 – was the flight that also carried even fewer passengers than the other flights. (Paradoxically that was the flight that the passengers brought down using additional reaction time and communications with the ground.)
Here are the passenger numbers, or what the airline industry calls load factor, for the four flights:
American Airlines flight 11, a Boeing 767-223ER with capacity of 165 according to American Airlines, had 76 passengers, 11 crew members, and the 5 hijackers. United Airlines flight 175, a Boeing 767-222 with the same capacity, had 51 passengers, 9 crew and 5 hijackers. American flight 77, a Boeing 757 with capacity of 180-188, carried 53 passengers, 6 crew, and 5 hijackers. United flight 93, another Boeing 757, carried 33 passengers, 7 crew and the 4 hijackers.
These are load factors of about 57% for AA flight 11, 33% for UAL flight 175, 32% for AA 77, and 20% for UAL 93 -- pretty low compared to the industry average for the period (see next graf). The kicker is that these are the percentages with the hijackers counted among the passengers. Not counting the hijackers, the load factors were 46% for AA flight 11, 30% for UAL flight 175, 29% for AA flight 77, and 18% for UAL flight 93.
Load factor being a very big deal for airlines, the industry press tends to bristle with statistics and comparisons. Load factor in U.S. airlines was 70% in the 4th quarter of 2000, for example, and was down to 61% in the 4th quarter of 2001. In other words, load factor diminished by 9/11 was still significantly higher than the percentages aboard the four hijacked flights. Generally the numbers had been running 70% - 75% during the year. Now recall that we have no narratives of the hijackers trying to get on some flight and having to take another instead on 9/11: they took the ones they meant – or were meant – to take. Thus on a day with around 4,000 commercial airliners aloft in the U.S., all 19 of the skyjackers got the seats they wanted,* literally no questions asked, on each of those four flights, all flying at less than 50% capacity.
So one question, although not raised in the 9/11 Commission Report, is whether any other 757s and 767s scheduled for takeoff that morning carried an equally light passenger load for any reason.
A rigorous discussion of passenger load would examine the four planes fully in context, to determine reliably whether the light passenger load on these flights was anomalous and if so, how anomalous it was. The 9/11 Commission was alert to questions suggested by load factor and raised the topic on the first page of its final Report as well as in some notes to Chapter 1, interviewing witnesses including several individuals who bought tickets/made reservations and then did not fly.
Calendar and weather are partly chance; it was chance of the calendar that “911,” perennial date of military operations and simulations, fell in 2001 on a Tuesday, generally one of the lighter days of the week for domestic passenger flight. That the weather was beautifully clear and conducive to flying in most parts of the country on September 11 was also chance.
But it is not a given that the comparatively light passenger load on the four jumbo jets to be hijacked from three U.S. airports that day was entirely chance. On these points, for some reason the Commission Report is terse. The Commission’s Note 40 to Chapter 1 states, “The 56 passengers represented a load factor of 33.33 percent of the airplane's seating capacity of 168, below the 49.22 percent for Flight 175 on Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11, 2001. See UAL report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors, undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001). Nine passengers holding reservations for Flight 175 did not show for the flight. They were interviewed and cleared by the FBI. FAA report, "Executive Summary," Sept. 12, 2001; FAA report, "Executive Summary, Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; UAL record, Flight 175 ACARS report, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 175 Flight Data Recap, Sept. 11, 2001.”
Due mention of flight 175, yes, but no mention of the even lower load factors on two other flights. Did the documents provided to the Commission include the same kind of information for United flight 93? Or for any of the other three jets hijacked that day?
http://web.archive.org/web/20061101075014/http://www.margieburns.com/blog/_archives/2006/7/14/2118910.html
Others take a similar view, though we're not entirely sure why. Would reduced load factors really be such a huge advantage?
Burns explains that fewer passengers meant less people to control, for example. That's true, but it's hard to see how it would have made an effective difference on 9/11. The passengers would still have cooperated, we believe, as they'd have expected the hijacking to have turned into a hostage situation. An extra 50 passengers on board wouldn't have changed that.
And if a group of passengers had decided to fight back, then only so many could have usefully done so at one time. There were more than enough passengers and crew to fill the aisles in the assumed assault on the cockpit door, for instance. If there were another 50 people available, what more could they have done?
Burns also suggests that there was "less passenger weight to use up fuel". Again, true enough, but how much difference would this have made? And if the flight had been 100% full, loaded with cargo and luggage, then don't airlines take account of this and load up with more fuel? That's just an assumption, don't take that as accurate, but if it is true then a fuller plane may have been an advantage to the hijackers. Not least because it would have increased the casualty figures.
We don't necessarily buy the idea that low passenger numbers particularly helped the hijackers, then. And in reality there's another reason why this may have come about. The hijackers researched their flights online, and had particular requirements, for example wanting each team to be either in first class, or as close to the front of the plane as possible. They also knew that they were going to book tickets in small groups, no more than two at a time, presumably to avoid suspicion. Whoever picked the flights would avoid any that were full or almost full, then, as there was a chance they wouldn't get all the seats they needed. They would instead gravitate to emptier flights, perhaps contributing to figures we've eventually seen.
Of course the Burns piece does nothing to prove that the load factors were unusual, anyway. Vague comparisons like "generally the numbers had been running 70% - 75% during the year" are meaningless: what you really need to know is what the figures had been like previously for those particular flights. And interestingly enough, while Burns attempts to tell us that the 9/11 Commission avoided the topic ("no mention of the even lower load factors on two other flights"), they did actually publish the details we need in a "Staff Monograph on the Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security".
Flight 11
The aircraft had a capacity of 158 passengers: 9 seats in first class, 30 in business class, and 119 in coach. On September 11, the flight carried 81 passengers (including the 5 terrorists) with 2 pilots and 9 flight attendants, for a total of 92 people on board.
All 9 of the first-class seats were occupied, 2 of them by hijackers Waleed al Shehri (2B) and Wail al Shehri (2A). Nineteen of the 30 seats in business class were occupied (49 percent), 3 by hijackers Atta (8D), Omari (8G), and Suqami (10B).36 Fifty-three of the 119 coach seats were occupied (44 percent), none of them by hijackers.
The percentage of seats occupied on the aircraft—also known as the "load factor"—on September 11, 2001, was 51 percent, compared to an average load factor for Flight 11 of almost 39 percent on Tuesdays over the three months preceding 9/11.37 Thus, the load factor on this flight was somewhat above the norm. The Commission found no ticketing, passenger occupancy, or financial evidence to indicate that the hijackers purchased additional seats beyond the ones they actually used in order to limit the number of passengers they would need to control during the operation.
Flight 77
The aircraft had a capacity of 176 passengers, 22 in first class and 154 in coach. On September 11, 2001, the flight carried 58 passengers (including 5 hijackers) with 2 pilots and 4 flight attendants for a total of 64 people on board. Fifteen of the 22 first-class seats were occupied, 3 by hijackers. Forty-three of the 154 economy seats aboard were occupied, 2 by hijackers.
The 58 passengers represented a load factor of 33.0 percent of the plane's passenger capacity of 176. This figure is almost identical to the 32.8 percent average load factor for Flight 77 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11. During that time, Tuesdays were the least traveled day for Flight 77.
The Commission has found no ticketing, passenger occupancy, or financial evidence to indicate that the hijackers purchased additional seats (beyond the ones they actually used) in order to limit the number of passengers they would need to control during the operation.
Flight 93
On September 11, 2001, the flight carried 37 passengers (including 4 hijackers) with two pilot and 5 flight attendants for a total of 44 people on board.
Ten passengers were seated in first class, including all four of the hijackers; the other 27 were in coach. There was no business class on Flight 93.
The 37 passengers (including the four hijackers) represented a load factor of 20 percent of the plane's passenger capacity of 182. This figure is considerably below the 52 percent average load factor for Flight 93 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11; indeed, it represents the lowest load factor among these flights during that time span. In this three-month period, Tuesdays were the least traveled day for Flight 93.
There is no evidence that Flight 93 hijackers purchased additional tickets for the flight beyond the ones they used.
Flight 175
The aircraft had a capacity of 168 passengers: 10 in first class, 33 in business class, and 125 in coach. The flight carried 56 passengers (including 5 hijackers) with 2 pilots and 7 flight attendants, for a total of 65 people on board.
Nine of the 10 first-class seats were occupied, including 2 by hijackers Banihammad and Mohand al Shehri. Eleven of the 33 business-class seats were occupied, 3 by hijackers Shehhi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Ahmed al Ghamdi; and 36 of the 125 coach seats were occupied, none by hijackers.
The 56 passengers represented a load factor of one-third of the plane's passenger capacity. This figure is considerably below the 49 percent average load factor for Flight 175 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11. It represented the third-lowest load factor among the scheduled flights during that period, when Tuesdays were the least traveled day for Flight 175.
There is no evidence that the Flight 175 hijackers purchased additional tickets for the flight beyond the ones they actually used.
Staff Monograph on the Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security
http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-monographs.html
Excluding the hijackers, then Flight 11 had 76 passengers out of a capacity of 158, a load factor of 48.1%. The average over Tuesdays on the past three months is reported as "almost 39%", so the 9/11 flight was noticeably higher.
Flight 77 had 53 passengers out of a capacity of 176, a load factor of 30.1%. The average over Tuesdays on the past three months is reported as 32.8%, so the 9/11 flight was a little lower.
Flight 93 had 33 passengers out of a capacity of 182, a load factor of 18.1%. The average over Tuesdays on the past three months is reported as 52.8%, so the 9/11 flight was vastly lower, in fact the lowest at any time in that three month period.
Flight 175 had 51 passengers out of a capacity of 168, a load factor of 30.3%. The average over Tuesdays on the past three months is reported as 49%, so the 9/11 flight was considerably lower, although there were two flights during that three month period when it was lower still.
Overall, then, we have one flight with an above average load factor; one marginally below average; one well below average, though still within the range of other flights in the preceding 3 months; and one with the lowest load factor during that period. It's hard to see any real pattern here.
Still, though inconsistent, overall the load factor is clearly on the low side. Could there be any reason for this? From my home in the UK I have no knowledge whatsoever about US internal flights, however a discussion thread on this topic at Airliners.net should have involved many that do, and their thoughts included the following:
1. Tuesdays are also notoriously light days in the airline business...
2. Also it was the week after a Holiday, so still a light travel period...
3. 1-2 weeks after most school districts in the US start classes (colleges/universities too), so vacation and student travel would have been low...
4. Another thing that might have contributed to the low pax is the time of the flight. Perhaps the fact that the flights were so early in the morning added to the mixture. I know not all flights are like that--I've been on many that have been packed in the morning...
5. Many are forgetting the economy was on the down turn. April 2001 TWA bit the dust, Dot-com bubble was bursting, load factors were low for all airlines, UAL lost 2.14 Billion in 2001.
The events of 9-11 were just the straw that broke the camels back in the airline industry...
6. Was it maybe due to they were the first flights of the day on those routes and some like traveling in afternoon as apposed to early/mid morning?
7. Too much capacity. There's a reason why the airlines were in trouble long before 9/11. In those days we were still in the .com bubble and money was growing on trees. In addition to that, like other folks have said, it was a Tuesday and school vacation had just ended.
In 2001, the full impact of the slowing economy had not been fully anticipated, and airlines were flying empty aircraft all over the country. This stragedy was to protect marketshare. As most airline's overall networks were still highly profitable at the time of the attacks, it was reasonable to continue offering some flights with low passenger loads so the customer wouldn't go elsewhere.
8. Actually, the flights were chosen for the combination of high fuel loads and low passenger counts. High fuel load for destructive potential, and low passenger count to reduce the possibility of the passengers fighting back. The terrorists chose flights departing early in the morning largely because getting the planes all in the air (and taken over) at close to the same time gave them a better element of surprise.
9. Tuesdays and Wednesdays have both been weak days for traffic historically; many sale fares are for Tuesday/Wednesday travel only. I can recall being on Delta flights from DFW to BOS that had loads under 20% on Tuesday morning; Thursday or Friday evening flights on the reverse route were generally full or nearly so. September is also a weak month for travel as others have stated, with summer vacations having just ended...
10. The terrorists chose 9/11 for the date not for day of the week. So the load factor could have been either way.
Flying westward the load-factor is higher in the afternoon because you waste the day if you fly in the morning. If you fly in the afternoon you get almost a days of work on the east coast and you get to California by night...
11. This is not an issue of workweek position or tourist/business commute flows. It's real simple, Tuesdays in September are just plain empty (both ways). That's THE reason why this wasn't done on July 11 2001...
Maybe if the flights were full, passengers would have beaten the hijackers (hopefully to death) and 9/11 would have been less awful. Just a thought...
12. In the airline industry...Tuesday is a very slow day and September is a slow month. so it spared many lives that may have traveled during a peak time.
13. Loads on 9/11 had nothing to do with why they chose the flights. They bought first class seats so they wouldn't have far to travel to the flight deck. They chose 767, and 757 flights for high fuel loads to cause maximum damage. The fact that the flights were so relatively empty was probably an added bonus. Less chance of a resistance that United 93 saw.
14. I do not know about AA but UA was slow with light loads throughout the entire system on 09/11/01. I had the misfortune of non-reving and looking for the lightest load day around that week, and that was it.
15. It may simply have to do with the hijackers purchasing the cheapest ticket. The cheapest tickets are obviously available on the lightest load days since the cheaper fare buckets would still be open...
http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/read.main/2717881/1
I can't vouch for any of the information here, but there is wide support for the idea that a Tuesday, in September, after the holiday, in the aviation climate of the day, would be expected to deliver reduced load factors. (Although we've intentionally included only ideas as to why this might be, so please go read the thread to see how it played out originally.) Combine this view with the fact that only two of the four flights had significantly fewer passengers than usual anyway, and it's hard to see any real significance in the load factor data.