|
|
Line 31: |
Line 31: |
| When Maj Nix and LCDR Viger learned of the second aircraft hitting the World Trade Center, they recognized the events as something out of the ordinary and decided to return immediately to FAA Headquarters Building. They arrived at FAA Headquarters around 1030 hrs due to the transportation standstill following the attack on the Pentagon. Their first reaction was to "make sure that the FAA Headquarters Command/Operations Center had the feel for what was going on from a DoD perspective." What they learned and passed on was that CINC NORAD had designated General Arnold, the Commander of the Continental U.S. Region of NORAD (CONR), to direct the air defense reaction. | | When Maj Nix and LCDR Viger learned of the second aircraft hitting the World Trade Center, they recognized the events as something out of the ordinary and decided to return immediately to FAA Headquarters Building. They arrived at FAA Headquarters around 1030 hrs due to the transportation standstill following the attack on the Pentagon. Their first reaction was to "make sure that the FAA Headquarters Command/Operations Center had the feel for what was going on from a DoD perspective." What they learned and passed on was that CINC NORAD had designated General Arnold, the Commander of the Continental U.S. Region of NORAD (CONR), to direct the air defense reaction. |
| | | |
− | LTC Gillick remained at Fort Belvoir all day and returned to the FAA building the following day. COL Atkins was the only liaison in FAA Headquarters that morning. When the severity of the situation was known, she reported to the FAA Headquarters Colland Center (i.e., Air Traffic Situation Room) that was being established on the 10th floor.<br>[https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxhHk-kM0huWRG1yRi1aeEZlMlU/edit?usp=sharing Draft Report - "The Air Traffic Organization's Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack"]}} | + | LTC Gillick remained at Fort Belvoir all day and returned to the FAA building the following day. COL Atkins was the only liaison in FAA Headquarters that morning. When the severity of the situation was known, she reported to the FAA Headquarters Colland Center (i.e., Air Traffic Situation Room) that was being established on the 10th floor.}}<br>[https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxhHk-kM0huWRG1yRi1aeEZlMlU/edit?usp=sharing Draft Report - "The Air Traffic Organization's Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack"] |
| | | |
| Three of the four Air Traffic military liaisons were out of the building until long after all four hijacked planes had crashed, then. They could have played no part in informing NORAD about Flight 93, or anyone else. And the fourth? She appears to be mentioned in a separate report. | | Three of the four Air Traffic military liaisons were out of the building until long after all four hijacked planes had crashed, then. They could have played no part in informing NORAD about Flight 93, or anyone else. And the fourth? She appears to be mentioned in a separate report. |
Revision as of 18:56, 23 September 2014
The 9/11 Commission explained that NORAD were unable to intercept any flights on 9/11 because the FAA didn't notify them until it was too late. Others have argued that this cannot be true, though, and one of those arguments points to the existence of military liaisons at the FAA. Here David Ray Griffin claims they would have informed NORAD, even if the FAA hadn't done so:
Dr Griffin tells us that "if FAA headquarters heard about UA 93’s approach to Washington at 9:32, as the tapes indicate, then that would be when the military learned about it", but he provides no evidence to support it. He doesn't tell us who they were, where they were, when they became involved in the events of the day or what they were doing. He doesn't demonstrate that they were in a position to hear FAA news as it arrived, or show how it would be their responsibility to inform NORAD immediately.
Fortunately there are documents that can help us fill in the considerable gaps surrounding these military liaisons. Here's what we've learned so far.
ATO Report
Appendix B of the draft report "The Air Traffic Organization's Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack: ATC System Assessment, Shutdown and Restoration" provides some useful information on the Air Traffic military liaison activities on 9/11. We've quoted the section covering the crucial period when all four planes were in the air, but if you click the source link then you'll find more information on what they did later.
This appendix addresses the activities of the Air Traffic military liaison personnel during the periods of ATC system assessment, shutdown, and restoration. The following military liaison personnel were interviewed and provided input to this appendix.
- Colonel Sheryl Atkins, USAF
- Lieutenant Colonel Paul Gillick, USA
- Major William Nix, USMC
- Lieutenant Commander Dave Viger, USN
Each of the four military services within the Department of Defense (DoD) assigns a FAA liaison officer to represent its requirements to the Director of Air Traffic. They each share office space on the fourth floor of FAA Headquarters. Each officer is independently responsible to his/her military organization.
System Assessment (0800 hrs 11 September 2001 - 1106 hrs, 11 September 2002
On 9-11, the four military liaisons assigned to the Director of Air Traffic were spread out over northern Virginia and Washington DC. Major William Nix, USMC, and LCDR Dave Viger, USN, were attending a meeting in Crystal City, VA. LTC Paul Gillick, USA, was at Fort Belvoir, VA, and COL Sheryl Atkins, USAF, was in the FAA Headquarters Building in Washington DC.
When Maj Nix and LCDR Viger learned of the second aircraft hitting the World Trade Center, they recognized the events as something out of the ordinary and decided to return immediately to FAA Headquarters Building. They arrived at FAA Headquarters around 1030 hrs due to the transportation standstill following the attack on the Pentagon. Their first reaction was to "make sure that the FAA Headquarters Command/Operations Center had the feel for what was going on from a DoD perspective." What they learned and passed on was that CINC NORAD had designated General Arnold, the Commander of the Continental U.S. Region of NORAD (CONR), to direct the air defense reaction.
LTC Gillick remained at Fort Belvoir all day and returned to the FAA building the following day. COL Atkins was the only liaison in FAA Headquarters that morning. When the severity of the situation was known, she reported to the FAA Headquarters Colland Center (i.e., Air Traffic Situation Room) that was being established on the 10th floor.
Draft Report - "The Air Traffic Organization's Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack"
Three of the four Air Traffic military liaisons were out of the building until long after all four hijacked planes had crashed, then. They could have played no part in informing NORAD about Flight 93, or anyone else. And the fourth? She appears to be mentioned in a separate report.
Colonel Sheryl Atkins
The 9/11 Commission asked the DoT Office of the Inspector General to investigate several incorrect statements made by the FAA, regarding the timeline of 9/11. One of those related to the claim that the Air Force Liaison to the FAA had established contact with NORAD "immediately" following the crash of Flight 11. However, they discovered she didn't actually join the phone bridge until after the Pentagon impact at 9:37:
The report doesn't name this person, but they do say it's a female, the Air Force Liaison, and that she's now retired. That's a match for Sheryl Atkins, so we believe she's the most likely candidate. In this case it seems that Atkins began to take part in events at some point after the crash at the Pentagon (9:37), but exactly what she did, and whether she would have taken the responsibility to pass on information to NORAD, has yet to be explained.
Military cell
History Commons suggest there were other military liaisons who could have played a part in the events of 9/11:
Would the military cell have informed NORAD? The full exchange gives more context to Sliney's quote:
MR. GORTON: On 9/11, the Command Center effectively was the nerve center for information on suspicious aircraft. Yet as I understand it the Command Center had no defined role with respect to obtaining military assistance, fighter assistance. Is that correct? And, if so, why weren't those authorities combined?
MR. SLINEY: Available to us at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.
The normal protocols for the events that were transpiring then -- that is to say hijacked aircraft, which requires a notification to NORAD -- those, at least I was given to understand, were made promptly -- the notifications on each hijack. The --
MR. GORTON: You understood that they were made promptly?
MR. SLINEY: That's correct.
MR. GORTON: It wasn't you -- it wasn't your responsibility to do so?
MR. SLINEY: That is correct. I believe I am correct in stating that that responsibility devolves upon the air route traffic control center in whose jurisdiction that hijack occurs. I was given to understand that all such notifications were made. I had no reason to believe they were not.
The -- I'm getting away from your question, though. You ask me if we had a procedure in place to deal with such an event -- is that what you're asking?
MR. GORTON: At the Command Center.
MR. SLINEY: With -- well, I just want to be clear on this aspect of it. Dealing with aircraft that would be hijacked and used as weapons?
MR. GORTON: No.
MR. SLINEY: No. Dealing with hijacked --
MR. GORTON: Dealing with direct notification to the military or request for assistance from the military.
MR. SLINEY: In direct response to your question was FAA headquarters primarily through the security organization to request assistance from the military. We had no process in place where a Command Center would make such a request for a military assistance. I believe the military was involved, and you know I suppose in hindsight it's too simplistic to say that they all look alike to me. If you tell the military you've told the military. They have their own communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military.
MR. GORTON: By the Command Center?
MR. SLINEY: Correct.
http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm
Sliney explains that "responsibility [for notifying the military] devolves upon the air route traffic control center in whose jurisdiction that hijack occurs", and that he "was given to understand that all such notifications were made". It's not the responsibility of the military liaisons at FAA HQ to do so, and in fact there was "no process in place where a Command Center would make such a request for a military assistance".
So what were the Air Traffic Services Cell officers doing? FAA Deputy Director (on 9/11) Jeff Griffith provides a hint:
Fortunately Aviation Week provided more details:
Once all civil aircraft had been cleared from U.S. skies following the Sept. 11 attacks, a small group of Air Force reservists and FAA air traffic experts started working on the inevitable next phase--how to restore the National Airspace System.
Without question, many aircraft and people--starting with President Bush--had valid needs to fly, but all the rules had changed. Getting a civilian airliner or an emergency-services helicopter to its intended destination was no longer a matter of simply filing a flight plan and requesting FAA clearance. First, hundreds of military fighters, tankers, cargo transports and radar warning and control aircraft had to be given whatever airspace and priority they needed to protect the nation. Next, dozens of other aircraft--government and civilian--also had critical missions to perform and needed to get airborne.
Sorting out who absolutely needed to fly from those who were simply inconvenienced ultimately fell to the national Defense Dept./FAA Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC), a small office manned by military reservists and FAA specialists. Colocated with the FAA's national nerve center--the Air Traffic Control System Command Center here--the cell was established after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf war to facilitate movements of military aircraft in U.S., Pacific and European airspace. Reservists assigned to ATSC have strong backgrounds in fighter, tanker, AWACS and strategic airlift operations. Many are also airline pilots.
That experienced cadre, backed by the right equipment, paid dividends on Sept. 11, when the cell quickly became a key communications node during the military's response to terrorist attacks (AW&ST June 3, p. 48). A secure Internet (Siprnet) terminal and other hardware had been installed only six weeks earlier, greatly enhancing the movement of vital information.
"BECAUSE WE HAD that [Siprnet] terminal in this building, we could immediately look at Norad and [Defense Dept.] plans as they evolved; filter, package and format them, then walk out to the [FAA] National Operations Manager--who had control of the entire National Airspace System--and give him current visibility into . . . fighter, tanker and support aircraft activities. It cut down our response time tremendously," said USAF Col. Brian P. Meenan, who was ATSC director at the time. Meenan has since turned command of the cell over to Col. Dale G. Goodrich.
Three officers were in the ATSC when terrorists struck the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Col. John Czabaranek, Meenan's deputy, was directing the cell that morning, backed by Lt. Col. Michael-Anne Cherry--the only full-time reservist assigned to ATSC--and Maj. Kevin Bridges. They quickly established several communications "bridges," essentially open teleconference calls that linked key players, such as Norad's command center, area defense sectors, key FAA personnel, airline operations and the NMCC.
After all aircraft were ordered to land, clearing U.S. skies, "we started asking questions about how to bring it all back up again," said Bridges. "We knew we had to get military, law enforcement and fire fighters back in the air soon, to defend and protect [the nation]."
[
http://web.archive.org/web/20020913090602/http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020610/aw52.htm Aviation Week's Aviation Week & Space Technology
From this description the cell officers earliest task appears to have been to set up the various teleconferences. They were assisting with communications in general, and there's nothing here to say the officers would take it upon themselves to monitor FAA information and pass it on to NORAD, especially if they believed (like Sliney) NORAD had already been informed. It wasn't their job, and they had other things to do.
Conclusion
Dr Griffin claimed that the presence of military liaisons meant that "if FAA headquarters heard about UA 93’s approach to Washington at 9:32, as the tapes indicate, then that would be when the military learned about it". But as we've seen, several liaisons weren't "in the loop" at 9:32; others had specific tasks of their own; no-one has yet explained why a liaison would take it upon themselves to do something that the FAA's Ben Sliney assumed had been done already (inform NORAD of the hijacking). Perhaps we're wrong, maybe they did anyway, but it's clear that Dr Griffin is a very long way from proving that. This isn't nearly as simple a story as he suggests.