Losing Flight 77

FAA Awareness. American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:54, with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from radar at Indianapolis Center, which was controlling the flight.¹³⁸

The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane’s projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone.¹³⁹

Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed. At 9:08, Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft. The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24.¹⁴⁰

By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters of the situation.¹⁴¹

The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further.Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center.¹⁴² The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction,American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center’s airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center’s airspace at 9:10. As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft,two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight’s projected path, not east—where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.¹⁴³

In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west.Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C.¹⁴⁴

By 9:25, FAA’s Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said “we have some planes.” Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount.A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a “nationwide ground stop.” While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25.¹⁴⁵

The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed” and notified Reagan National Airport.FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service.The aircraft’s identity or type was unknown.¹⁴⁶

Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the suspicious aircraft. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to the control tower:“looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon sir.”¹⁴⁷

Military Notification and Response. NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed:American 11.

At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA:

FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington.
NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?
FAA:Yes.
NEADS: On its way towards Washington?
FAA: That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower.That’s the latest report we have.
NEADS: Okay.
FAA: I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn’t the hijack at all then, right?
FAA: No, he is a hijack.
NEADS: He—American 11 is a hijack?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: And he’s heading into Washington?
FAA: Yes. This could be a third aircraft. ¹⁴⁸

The mention of a “third aircraft”was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA.Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne.We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information.

The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the mission crew commander, who reported to the NEADS battle commander:

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh,American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.¹⁴⁹

After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23:“Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area. . . . [I]f they’re there then we’ll run on them. . . .These guys are smart.” That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over NewYork. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation’s capital.¹⁵⁰

At the suggestion of the Boston Center’s military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA’s Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS:“We’re looking— we also lost American 77.”The time was 9:34.¹⁵¹ This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington: “Latest report.Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.” This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters: “Okay,we’re going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House.” He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed,but east over the ocean. “I don’t care how many windows you break,” he said.“Damn it. . . . Okay.Push them back.”¹⁵²

The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target’s location. Second, a “generic” flight plan—prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go “090 for 60” superseded the original scramble order.¹⁵³

After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington,D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but “it kind of faded” over Washington. The time was 9:38. The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46. The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away...¹⁵⁴

[Footnotes for the above]

138. Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control transmissions.

139.The Indianapolis Center controller advised other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situation. They agreed to “sterilize” the airspace along the flight’s westerly route so the safety of other planes would not be affected. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).

140. John Thomas interview (Sept. 24, 2003).According to the FAA-produced timeline, at 9:09 Indianapolis Center “notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AMERICAN 77 due to the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.”FAA report,“Summary of AirTraffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001.

141. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Operations Manager position, line 4525;FAA audio file,Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer east position, line 4530; FAA memo,“Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center,National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001,” Oct. 21, 2003, p. 13.

142. Primary radar contact for Flight 77 was lost because the “preferred” radar in this geographic area had no primary radar system, the “supplemental” radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC software did not allow the display of primary radar data from the “tertiary” and “quadrary” radars.

143. David Boone interview (May 4, 2004);Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic.

144. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).We have reviewed all FAA documents, transcripts, and tape recordings related to American 77 and have found no evidence that FAA headquarters issued a directive to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets.Review of the same materials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the aircraft was identified by Dulles controllers at 9:32. For much of that time, American 77 was traveling through Washington Center’s airspace. The Washington Center’s controllers were looking for the flight,but they were not told to look for primary radar returns.

145. John White interview (May 7, 2004);Ellen King interview (Apr.5, 2004);Linda Schuessler interview (Apr. 6, 2004); Benedict Sliney interview (May 21, 2004); FAA memo, “Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001,” Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 14, 27.

146. John Hendershot interview (Dec. 22, 2003).

147. FAA memo, “Partial Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL77;Washington, DC; September 11, 2001,” Sept. 20, 2001, p. 7.

148. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7, 9:21:10.

149.NEADS audio file,Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:21:50;Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22–23, 2004).

150. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, Channel 2, 9:22:34.The mission commander thought to put the Langley scramble over Baltimore and place a “barrier cap” between the hijack and Washington, D.C. Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22–23, 2004).

151. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:32:10; ibid., 9:33:58.

152. For first quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:35:50. For second quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position,channel 7, 9:36:34;Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22–23, 2004). For the third quote, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:39; 9:39:37; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22–23, 2004).

153.Dean Eckmann interview (Dec.1, 2003);FAA memo,“PartialTranscript;Scramble Aircraft;QUIT25;September 11, 2001,” Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2–4 (Peninsular Radar position); FAA memo,“Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001,” Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2–5 (East Feeder Radar position).

154. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:38:02; Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003).The estimated time of impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon is based on Commission analysis of FDR, air traffic control, radar, and Pentagon elevation and impact site data.
Chapter 1, The 9/11 Commission Report

By no later than 9:18 A.M., FAA centers in Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Washington were aware that Flight 77 was missing and that two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center.

By 9:20 AM., Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft in the system, and began to doubt its initial assumption that Flight 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Herndon Command Center prompted the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that Flight 77 was lost.
9/11 Commission Staff Report, We Have Some Planes

NEADS ID2 = Technical Sergeant Shelley Watson

WAS OP = Washington ARTCC Operations Manager
NEADS ID3 = Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley

(Timecode begins 13:31:36UTC or 09:31:36EDT)

13:31:36 UTC - NEADS ID2: Open line. Huntress ID, unsecure line.
31:39 - WAS OP: Huntress ID this is Washington Center the Operations Manager.
31:42 - NEADS ID2: Go ahead sir.
31:43 - WAS OP: Okay, I guess you called here a couple of times, you never talked to me, but if there's anything you need or anything I can help you with let me know what it is right now please.
31:52 - NEADS ID2: Okay, do you want me to let you know what we have going on sir?
31:55 - WAS OP: Yes but- I have a pretty good idea, but yes.
31:57 - NEADS ID2: Okay, there's three aircraft missing out of Boston. I just spoke with Boston and they said they're not sure of the third aircraft callsign, but they do have two; one of them is United 175, the other one is American 11.
32:05 - WAS OP: Uh huh. Right.
32:07 - NEADS ID2: They thought that the American 11 was the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center with the United 175, however American 11 is not the aircraft that crashed. He said the pilot on American 11 was talking to him; having a rough time telling him what was going on, there were threats in the cockpit being made - this was the initial hijack information that we got American 11 the 767 from Boston to Los Angeles. Proposed route he was headed towards JFK at the time that they lost contact but that was not the aircraft headed into the World Trade Center, that hit it.
32:39 - WAS OP: Okay.
32:39 - NEADS ID2: That's what Boston's saying. He- the last known, and I'm not sure where we heard it through the grapevine, people calling, is that American 11 was headed for Washington, and that's the only thing-
32:49 - WAS OP: Was headed towards where?
32:50 - NEADS ID2: Washington.
32:51 - WAS OP: Okay.
32:51 - NEADS ID2: So your AOR. And I just wanted to give you a heads up. The last-
32:54 - WAS OP: Okay, now- okay, go ahead.
32:56 - NEADS ID2: The Last known lat long that we had, primary target only, was 4038 north 07403 west on American 11.
33:08 - WAS OP: Okay.
33:08 - NEADS ID2: But again, remember nothing has been confirmed as far as which aircraft has hit the World Trade Center, but the other one we have is information headed towards Washington.
33:16 - WAS OP: Okay, now let me tell you this; I- I'll- We'll be looking, we've also lost American 77.
33:21 - NEADS ID2: American 77? Where was he proposed to head sir?
33:23 - NEADS ID3: American 77's lost - American 7 7.
33:25 - WAS OP: Excuse me?
33:26 - NEADS ID2: Where was he proposed to head sir?
33:28 - WAS OP: Okay, he was going to LA also.
33:30 - NEADS ID3: He was also going to LA.
33:32 - WAS OP: Now-
33:33 - NEADS ID2: From where, sir?
33:34 - WAS OP: Ah, I think he was from Boston also.
33:36 - NEADS ID3: Boston to LA.
33:36 - WAS OP: Now, listen, now let me tell you this story here. Indianapolis Center was working this guy-
33:43 - NEADS ID2: What guy?
33:44 - WAS OP: American 77.
33:45 - NEADS ID2: Okay.
33:46 - WAS OP: At flight level 350 however they lost radar with him, they lost contact with him, they lost everything, and they don't have any idea where he is or what happened. So what we've done at the surrounding centers here is to tell everyone to look out for limited codes, primary targets, or whatever the case may be.
34:04 - NEADS ID2: Okay.
34:05 - WAS OP: And that was the last time- that was about fifteen minutes ago, since I talked to the Indianapolis Center Operations Manager.
34:09 - NEADS ID2: Type? Type aircraft?
34:13 - NEADS ID2: Do you have a Type aircraft sir?
34:14 - WAS OP: It was a seven-sixty-seven I believe.
34:16 - NEADS ID3: Seven sixty seven.
34:18 - NEADS ID2: Okay, and ****>
34:21 - WAS OP: Somebody else is talking, I'm sorry I can't hear you - in the background.
34:24 - NEADS ID2: Um, all I need is the lat-long, last known position of the seven-sixty-seven.
34:28 - WAS OP: Well, I don't know, that was Bos- that was Indy Center. But they said somewhere- it was- the last time I talked to them they said it was east of York. It was- and I don't even know what state that is.
34:37 - NEADS ID2: Okay sir, well I'm gonna go ahead and just give them a call.
34:39 - WAS OP: Okay.
34:39 - NEADS ID2: Thank you sir.

34:40 - WAS OP: Thanks.
This audio clip only (3.62 MB)
Full DRM1_DAT2_Channel_5_ID_TK.zip (153 MB)

October 16, 2001

Transcript of American Airlines Flight 77 By THE NEW YORK TIMES

Following is a transcript of the radio communications of American Airlines Flight 77 (AAL77), which took off from Dulles International Airport outside Washington on Sept. 11 and then was crashed into the Pentagon. The transcripts were obtained by The New York Times.

8:12:29 — AAL77: Good morning ground American seven seven is off of dixie twenty six with information tango.

8:12:36 — Ground Control West: American 77 Dulles taxi to runway three zero.

8:12:39 — AAL77: Taxi three zero American seven seven.

8:16:01 — Local Control West: American 77, Dulles tower. Runway three zero taxi into position and hold you'll be holding for landing traffic one left and for spacing wake turbulence spacing behind the DC 10.

8:16:29 — AAL77: And American ah seven seven is ready.

8:16:32 — Local Control West: American 77, Dulles tower. Runway three zero. Taxi into position and hold you're holding for wake turbulence landing traffic one left and you need to be fifteen in trail of that DC 10.

8:16:41 — AAL77: Position and hold three zero, American seven seven.

8:19:20 — Local Control West: American 77 your departure frequency will be one two five point zero five. Runway three zero cleared for take off.

8:19:27 — AAL77: One two five oh five. Runway three zero cleared for takeoff, American 77.

8:20:26 — Local Control West: American 77, turn left heading two seven zero contact departure.

8:20:31 — AAL77: Two seventy heading departure, American 77. Good day.

8:20:38 — AAL77: Is with you passing one decimal one for three.

8:20:43 — North Departure: American 77, Dulles departure radar. Contact climb and maintain five thousand.

8:20:47 — AAL77: Five thousand, American 77.

8:22:05 — North Departure: American 77 climb and maintain one one thousand eleven thousand

8:22:08 — AAL77: up to one one thousand American 77.

8:23:23 — North Departure: American 77 (whistling sound) cleared cleared direct linden contact Dulles one one eight point six seven.

8:23:28 — AAL77: direct linden eighteen sixty seven American 77 good day

8:23:28 — North Departure Low: O.K. O.K. O.K.

8:23:34 — Radar Control: Got the board there already

8:23:36 — North Departure Low: All right we got normal frequencies all the way around nothing hot at this time. Ah, traffic where is this where is this go one twenty-eight where the hell is that? O.K., O.K.

8:23:43 — AAL77: American 77 with you passing nine decimal one for eleven one one thousand.

8:23:47 — North Departure: American 77 Dulles approach climb and maintain one seven thousand.

8:23:50 — AAL77: one seven thousand American 77.

8:23:55 — North Departure Low: O.K., alright. Point outs at this time you got seven lima vector direct d c a seven thousand november zero nine romeo is at five thousand he's already talking to north north sees the traffic, he's going to climb do whatever he has to do. American 77 is direct linden climbing to eleven switched and gone one tango seven is a point out to manassas seven nine xray's been pointed out to west he's at six thousand on going to join victor one sixty eight other than that that's all you have.

8:24:23 — Radar Control: I got it.

8:25:33 — NH: American 77 contact Washington center one two zero point six five good luck.

8:25:37 — AAL77: point six five American 77 thank you ma'am good day.

8:25:49 — AAL77: center American 77 with you passing one three decimal zero for one seven thousand.

8:25:57 — Controller 5: American 77 Washington center roger climb and maintain flight level two seven zero.

8:26:00 — AAL77: two seven zero American 77.

8:30:38 — Controller 5: American 77 contact Washington center one three three point two seven.

8:30:42 — AAL77: ah thirty three twenty seven American 77.

8:31:08 — AAL77: (unintelligible) American 77 passing two five decimal one for two seven oh.

8:31:23 — Controller 3: American 77 ah climb climb and maintain flight level two niner zero sir.

8:31:30 — AAL77: two niner zero American 77.

8:34:16 — Controller 3: American 77 turn twenty degrees right vector for your climb.

8:34:17 — Controller 3: American 77 turn twenty degrees right vector for your climb.

8:34:19 — AAL77: turn twenty right American 77.

8:37:33 — Controller 3: American 77 recleared direct Charleston climb and maintain cor correction recleared direct Henderson sir climb and maintain flight level three niner zero.

8:37:39 — AAL77: direct Henderson out of two nine for three nine oh requesting three five zero for a final American 77.

8:37:57 — AAL77: center American 77 you copy request for three five zero as a final.

8:38:03 — AAL77: three five zero for a final American 77 thank you sir.

8:39:30 — Controller 3: American 77 amend your altitude maintain flight level three three zero for traffic.

8:39:36 — AAL77: American 77 stop at three three zero.

8:39:52 — Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center in Leesburg, Va: so who wants to talk to American 77 Bobcat or Henderson

8:40:03 — Controller 3: American 77 contact Indy center one two zero point two seven.

8:40:06 — AAL77: twenty five seven American 77 thanks sir good day.

8:40:14 — AAL77: center American 77 with you level three three zero.

8:40:16 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 Indy center roger sqauwk three seven four three.

8:40:18 — AAL77: three seven four three American 77.

8:43:52 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 climb and maintain flight level three five zero.

8:43:54 — AAL77: thirty three for three five oh American 77.

8:47:20 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 turn ten degrees to the right vectors for traffic.

8:47:23 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 turn ten degrees to the right vectors for traffic.

8:47:23 — AAL77: ten right American 77.

8:47:33 — AAL77: ten right American 77.

8:50:48 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 cleared direct um Falmouth.

8:50:51 — AAL77: uh direct Falmouth American 77 thank you.

8:56:32 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 Indy.

8:56:46 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 Indy.

8:56:53 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 American Indy radio check how do you read.

8:57:12 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 American Indy radio check how do you read.

8:57:28 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American alt 77 American radio check how do you read.

8:57:35 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: override beeping.

8:57:35 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar: this is uh — Indianapolis Control, Dacos.

8:57:38 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar: this is uh — Indianapolis Control, Dacos.

8:57:55 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: override line beeping.

8:57:59 — Controller 3: American 77 roger maintain flight level three five zero show that as your final

8:58:08 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: outside line ringing.

8:58:14 — AAL: American dispatch Jim McDonnell.

8:58:19 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: this is indianapolis center trying to get a hold of American 77.

8:58:23 — AAL: uh Indys hang on one second please.

8:58:25 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: what

8:58:26 — AAL: hang on one second sir.

8:58:28 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: all right

8:58:30 — AAL: who ya trying to get a hold of.

8:58:31 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: American 77.

8:58:32 — AAL: O.K.

8:58:33 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: on frequency one two zero point two seven.

8:58:35 — AAL: one two zero.

8:58:36 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: point two seven we were talking to him and all of a sudden it just uh —

8:58:38 — AAL O.K., all right we'll get a hold of him for ya.

8:58:40 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: all right

8:58:41 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American ah 77 Indy ah center how do you read.

8:58:51 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 Indy radio check how do you read.

9:00:25 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 Indy

9:00:29 — AAL2493: center American ah twenty four ninety three.

9:00:31 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American twenty four ninety three go ahead.

9:00:33 — AAL2493: yeah we uh sent a message to dispatch to have him come up on twenty twenty seven is that what you want em to do.

9:00:41 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: yeah we had em on west side of our airspace and they went into coast and ah don't have a track on em and now he's not talking to me so we don't know exactly what happened to him. we're trying to get a hold of him we also contacted you company so thanks for the help.

9:00:51 — AAL2493: all right.

9:01:50 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: over ride line beeping.

9:02:00 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: outside line ringing

9:02:07 — AAL: American dispatch Jim McDonnel.

9:02:09 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: yeah this is indianapolis center we uh I don't know if I'm talking to the same guy about American 77.

9:02:13 — AAL: yeah I I I cell called him but I did not get a reply back from him.

9:02:17 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: we uh we lost track control of the guy he's in coast track but we haven't we don't where his target is and we can't get a hold of him um you guys tried him and no response.

9:02:26 — AAL: no response (background noise).

9:02:28 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: yeah we have no radar contact and uh no communications with him so if you guys could try again.

9:02:35 — AAL: we're doing it.

9:02:37 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: all right thanks a lot.

9:02:38 — AAL: we're doing it thank you.

9:03:07 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar: American 77 Indy.

9:06:20 — Indianapolis Control: override line beeping.

9:06:21 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: Falmouth Decos

9:06:22 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: this is henderson American seventy seven do you guys have radar on him is he over falmouth or —

9:06:25 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: no we just moved the track there we never you know.

9:06:27 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: O.K. all right you just have the track out there.

9:06:29 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: you guys never been able to raise him at all.

9:06:31 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: no we called company they can't even get a hold of him so there's no no uh no radio communications and no radar.

9:06:36 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: and his last clearance as far as you know is on course to falmouth and then jay one thirty four right well we're just gonna treat him like non radar and we've already told the next sector they're gonna have to sterilize for him until we find out.

9:06:49 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: O.K. thanks.

9:06:50 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: ID.

9:08:43 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: override line beeping.

9:08:54 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: line ringing.

9:09: 27: AAL: and it was a Boston-L.A. flight and 77 is a Dulles-L.A. flight and uh we've had an unconfirmed report a second airplane just flew into the World Trade Center

9:09:00 — AAL: American dispatch Jim McDonnel.

9:09:02 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector radar associate: Indianapolis Center did you get a hold of American 77 by chance?

9:09:05 — AAL: no sir but we have an unconfirmed report the second airplane hit the World Trade Center and exploded.

9:09:10 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: say again

9:09:11 — AAL: you know we lost American eleven to a highjacking American was off . . . boston to los angeles flight.

9:09:17 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: it was all right i can't really I can't hear what you're saying there you said American eleven.

9:09:23 — AAL: yes we were hijacked.

9:09:25 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: and it —

9:09:27 — AAL: and it was a Boston-L.A. flight and 77 is a Dulles-L.A. flight and uh we've had an unconfirmed report a second airplane just flew into the World Trade Center.

9:09:42 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: thank you very much good bye.

9:10:30 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: calls Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate line beeps.

9:10:32 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: Indianapolis Control, Dacos.

9:10:34 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: all right this is Henderson there was an American eleven departed off of uh New York goinh to L.A. got hijacked American 77 departed off of Dulles is going to L.A. dispatch doesn't know where he's at and confirmed that two airplanes have been uh they crashed into uh the world trade center in New York so as far as American 77 we don't know where he is but they say uh American eleven was hijacked off of a new york airport going to lax and uh

9:11:07 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos PA: but we don't have a track on him.

9:11:07 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: affirmative.

9:11:10 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: you mean like they just took off without a clearance.

9:11:13 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: no you mean American eleven.

9:11:14 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: yep.

9:11:15 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: he he's depart well I guess he did because he was goin to L.A.

9:11:17 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: but nobody ever tracked American eleven is what i'm asking.

9:11:20 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: don't know that I don't.

9:11:22 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: oh O.K.

9:11:23 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: know just where he lefi from or uh.

9:11:25 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: there's no flight plan in the machine right now and —

9:11:28 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: yeah I just looked at that, too.

9:11:29 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: I'm

9:11:30 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: as far as what we know that's that's all we know I talked to dispatch and that's what they relayed and they confirmed it here that I guess two airplanes about crashed into the the trade center.

9:11:37 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: huh?

9:11:39 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: all right.

9:11:40 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: oh

9:11:40 — Indianapolis Control, Dacos Radar Associate: oh

9:13:54 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: override line beeping.

9:14:04 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: line ringing.

9:14:37 — AAL: American dispatch Jim McDonnel.

9:14:39 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: Indy center here.

9:14:40 — AAL: yes sir.

9:14:42 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: American eleven you guys said he departed off of uh New York.

9:14:45 — AAL: Boston.

9:14:46 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: Boston he was going to L.A. and it was a hijacked airplane.

9:14:49 — AAL: yes.

9:14:50 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: and you have you heard anything from American 77.

9:14:52 — AAL: no.

9:14:52 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: O.K. and if.

9:14:53 — AAL: I talked to a winder in the center up there and I gave em them the information I got.

9:14:55 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: O.K. thanks a lot.

9:14:56 — AAL: O.K.

9:14:57 — Indianapolis Control, Henderson Sector Radar Associate: all right.
New York Times source

0850:51 AAL77 acknowledged the clearance to Falmouth. This was the last radio communication with this flight.

0854:43 AAL77 began a left turn towards the south without air traffic authorization. The altitude indicated thirty-five thousand feet. Shortly after the turn, the aircraft was observed descending.

0856:18 Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude and flight information is lost on ZID radar displays. There was no longer any radar return information (either primary or secondary) on AAL77 indicated at the ZID radar displays. Note: The initial review of radar data, and controller personnel statements conducted by ZID did not indicate any primary or secondary radar returns were displayed.

0856:32 ZID controller attempted to contact AAL77, "American seventy-seven, Indy." There was no acknowledgement. ZID also tried to communicate with AAL77 through American Airlines company radios.

0858:14 ZID controllers began coordinating with other controllers to protect the airspace and altitude of AAL77's filed route of flight.

0909:00 ZID notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AAL77 due to the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.

0915:00 This time is approximate based on personnel statements from ZID. The ZID Operations Manager requested that the Traffic Management personnel notify Air Force Search and Rescue of the missing and possibly downed aircraft. The Operations Manager also contacted the West Virginia State Police advising them of a possible downed aircraft and asks if they have any reports of a downed aircraft.

0920:00 This time is approximate based on personnel statements from ZID. The ZID Operations Manager contacted the Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZAU) and advised the ZAU Operations Manager of his concern that AAL77 may have been hijacked and that he (ZAU Operations Manager) should be on the look out (based on events occurring in New York)..

0924:00 Great Lakes Regional Operations Notified Washington Operations Center of the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.

0925:00 Between 0925:00 and 0930:00, this time is approximate based on personnel statements from Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control (IAD).Several IAD controllers working radar positions in the facility observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed. Note: The unknown aircraft in this and all following times was later confirmed to be AAL77.

0933:00 This time is approximate based on personnel statements from IAD.An Operations Supervisor at IAD advised the White House Office of the United States Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House, fast moving. Meanwhile a controller was providing the same information to controllers working at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower (DCA). The IAD Operations Supervisor also provided continuous updates on a critical event teleconference established at the Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters building.

0933:00 This time is approximate based on personnel statements from DCA.An Operations Supervisor at DCA was advised by IAD of the unknown aircraft. The Operations Supervisor at DCA immediately notified the White House Office of the United States Secret Service of the unknown aircraft's location and provided continuous updates.

0936:00 Personnel at DCA issued traffic advisories on the unknown aircraft to a military C130 aircraft that had departed Andrews Air Force Base. when the C130 aircraft (GOFER06) reported the unidentified aircraft in sight, the pilot was instructed to follow the unknown aircraft.

0938:00 GOFER06 reported that the unknown aircraft had crashed into the western side of the Pentagon.
Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001, Sept. 17, 2001

AAL77 Flight Path Information, September 17 2001

Our office has been asked to provide analysis on the flight path of beacon code target 3743 (AAL77) from September 11, 2001. Specifically, we were asked to analyze any data available frm the time of the loss of a transponder response (approximately 12:56:19Z, Point A) and the time that a plausible "primary" radar target was identified (approximately 13:04:32Z, Point B). Although our office holds no certification in analyzing radar data, we periodically compile and analyze this form of data in reviewing HOST/NAS performance.

Several of the specialists from this office, contractors and AF personnel conducted a manual analysis and plotting of radar data available. The results from this activity include a depiction of the route of flight that is supported by the data available and is deemed to be most likely by the participants. The attached depiction is a manual reconstruction of this analysis. This reconstruction is an approximation and is not intended to give the exact flight path.

At the time the transponder stopped responding, the radar sort box area for the flight was QHY (Higby, WV) which is a "beacon only" site and does not report "primary" radar data. Once the transponder stopped responding, QHY could not provide any radar data on the flight. The secondary source of radar data for this radar sort box area was QR1 (Lynch, KY). QR1 did not provide conclusive primary radar data in ascertaining the aircraft position or flight path.

The most useful data used in this activity was derived from data recordings of the QBE (Bedford, VA) radar site. QBE reported a radar reinforced beacon target up until the transponder stopped responding. At the time the transponder stopped responding, QBE reported a primary target that is consistent with the expected radar values and matches the route of flight, which would be expected, given the approximate location of the plausible "primary" radar target observed at Point B,

The approximate location of the plausible "primary" radar target is derived from the SATORI analysis and other supporting data, which indicate a "primary" radar target displayed to the Air Traffic Control Specialists at Point B of the depiction. The availability of a "primary" target display to the ATCSs at Point B is likely the result of better data being available from QRI radar at that point. Between the time of the lost transponder data (Point A) and the time of the "primary" target being displayed (Point B), no radar data was available to the Air Traffic Control Specialists. The reconstruction attached was only possible through the compilation of other radar data sources not ordinarily displayed to controllers under these circumstances.

1 ZID 26 Memorandum AAL77 Flight Path Information

...contrary to the claim that the Indianapolis Center did not know of previous hijackings, Boston flight controllers, according to stories in the Guardian and the Village Voice that appeared shortly after 9/11, had at 8:25 notified other regional centers - one of which was Indianapolis - of the hijacking of Flight 11. That this notification was common knowledge was confirmed by the aforementioned NBC program narrated by Tom Brokaw, which said that at 8:30AM, "Boston Center supervisors notify the FAA and other air traffic centers about the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11."
Debunking 9/11 Debunking - David Ray Griffin

8:25 a.m. Boston flight controllers notify other flight control centers of the Flight 11 hijacking, but supposedly they don't notify (NORAD for another 6 or 15 minutes (see 8:31 a.m. and 8:40 a.m.). [8:25:00, Guardian, 10/17/01] Why isn't NORAD also notified at this time? Note that this means the controllers working Flights 77 and Flight 93 would have been aware of Flight 11's hijacking from this time. [Village Voice, 9/13/01]
http://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/main/flight11.html

8.25:00 The control tower notifies several air traffic control centres that a hijack is taking place.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/17/september11.usa

In addition, The New York Times this morning reports the controllers at Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center who handled American Airlines Flight 77, which hit the Pentagon knew about the hijacking of American Flight 11 even before it crashed. But there apparently were no attempts at intercepting Flight 77.
Village Voice

BROKAW: (Voiceover) Zalewski immediately asked for an assistant to help listen to the transmissions coming from the plane, and puts the frequency on the speaker so others can hear. And he notifies the supervisor there is a hijacking, the first one on a US carrier in more than a decade.

(Controllers working; computer screen; controllers working)

Mr. MARTINS: And then the supervisor came over, and that's when we realized something was serious. And he headed southbound towards New York at a high rate of speed.

BROKAW: (Voiceover) As Boston Center supervisors notify the FAA and other air traffic centers about the hijacking, Zalewski anxiously listens on the frequency, thinking the hijackers might try to make contact.
America Remembers

8:28 A.M., Boston Center called the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia (Herndon Command Center) to advise management that it believed Flight 11 had been hijacked and was heading towards New York Center's airspace. By this point in time, Flight 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York and Cleveland Centers to allow Boston Center to provide situational awareness to the centers that adjoined Boston in the event that the rogue aircraft entered their airspace.
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/research/9-11/staff-report-sept2005.pdf

Robin Hordon, speaking as a former air traffic controller, says...

"The system would be notified about a hijacked aircraft... [The notification about AA 11] would be sent out around 8:27-28 AM and without doubt the entire air traffic control facility network would be reading and relaying it no later than 8:30 AM. This would be the hottest news in a decade. It would fly around the ATC community."

The same view has been expressed, moreover, by General Mike Canavan, former associate administrator for civial aviation security at the FAA. "As soon as you know you have a hijacked aircraft, you notify everyone," he says. "[The notification] gets broadcast out to all the regions."

Accordingly, when the flight controller at Indianapolis saw AA77 go off course and then lose its transponder signal, he would immediately have suspected that the flight had also been hijacked . In light of this information, the Commission's claim - that he did not notify the military because he assumed that the plane had crashed due to electrical or mechanical failure - is ludicrous.
Debunking 9/11 Debunking - David Ray Griffin

It was just after 9 a.m. If the FAA's version of the story is correct, air traffic controllers should have known at 8:20 a.m. that at least one hijacking had taken place - and that the hijacked jetliner had then struck the Trade Center's North Tower at 8:46 a.m.

But last week's transcripts reveal that air traffic controllers at La Guardia were still in the dark even after the North Tower was hit. In one exchange, with the North Tower in flames and just before a second hijacked jetliner struck the Trade Center's South Tower at 9:03 a.m., an unidentified man at La Guardia's control tower asks: "Do you guys know what happened at the World Trade Center?"

A second unidentified man at the control tower answers: "We are listening to it on the news right now. Do you know anything further? What happened, a plane hit it?"

"We heard a bomb hit it," the first man says.

"We heard that a plane hit it," the second man answers, adding that he is just turning on the TV news. "We are trying to get an update."

"But you don't know anything," the first man says.

"We don't know," the second man says. "We're looking at it on Channel 5 right now."

If that conversation was between two ordinary people, it wouldn't be all that disturbing. Indeed, it probably echoes many conversations that day between ordinary citizens trying to find out what was taking place in lower Manhattan. But that conversation was between two people who should have been on top of the information - people in an airport traffic control tower. Why were they in the dark?

The transcripts reveal that even at La Guardia air traffic controllers were still allowing jetliners to take off after the first plane struck. Only after the second plane hit did the FAA order all commercial jetliners grounded across America.

Such a delay raises yet another question: Did the FAA dismiss that first hijacking report at 8:20 a.m.? How else to explain the delay in notifying the military, the delay in notifying air traffic controllers at La Guardia, and even the delay in grounding commercial jets in the New York area and beyond?

Put another way: Just what was the FAA doing?
NorthJersey.com

911myths: The 9/11 Commission Report tells us that Indianapolis didn't know anything of the other hijackings at 8:54, and so assumed the missing Flight 77 had crashed. However it's argued that this cannot be true, that the entire air traffic control community would have known about the hijacking of flight 11 within a few minutes of first being notified, perhaps 8:30 or so.

Scoggins: People in the cafeteria may have had the info first, probably from seeing it on CNN, if they had the channel up. I doubt at 8:54 they knew, My guess is they would have known about some time later like maybe 5 or 10 minutes. The OMIC probably would have known next, I assume someone would have let him know. I'm not sure when he recieved a report of the hijacks. My guess as soon as they did, they were probably questioning themselves almost immediatelly wondering if their potential crash was instead a hijack. I can imagine it was pretty emotional for them if they thought their plane had crashed.

911myths: But is there some mechanism where an individal might hear what had happened?

Scoggins: We don't have news source whatsoever in the operational room, and the news is so much real time. During the war in Kosovo, we had just received notice on a classified document that had just been declassified regarding some stealths (F-117) going overseas, CNN already had them airborne prior to us getting the unclassified message. We wouldn't know any earlier unless it was happening in the sector you were working. My guess we had controllers in our Center that didn't know anything for up 30 minutes if not more.

911myths: You say "My guess we had controllers in our Center that didn't know anything for up 30 minutes if not more." Do you mean “up to 30 minutes after the first notification” – so, someone knows of the hijackings at Boston at 8:20-something, it takes 30 minutes or more for everyone at Boston to hear about it, and then other sectors might hear the news some time after that?

Scoggins: Easily, we have five Areas, there would no reason for someone in Area D to know about AAL11, it never hits their airspace, the only way they would know is if someone told them when they were on break, or they overheard them talking about it on break. On a day shift each area has about 15 controllers on in the morning. Each Area has their busy time periods. It was a gorgeous day, there were probably 15 to 20 controllers on break and of that 5 to 8 were probably outside of the building taking walks, its not uncommon to see that many walking around for exercise during their 20 to 30 minute breaks.

The Commission's tape-based story is also challenged by the existence of many published reports indicating that officials knew about flight 77's hijacking some time before the Pentagon was struck. In the FBI section of the Arlington County "After-Action Report" on the Pentagon attack, for instance, we read: "At about 9:20 AM, the [FBIs] WFO [Washington Field Office] Command Center was notified that American Airlines Flight #77 had been hijacked shortly after takeoff from Washington Dulles International Airport." The 9/11 Commission simply treated all such reports as if they had never been written.
Debunking 9/11 Debunking - David Ray Griffin

At some point between 9:16 and 9:26 AM, Barbara Olson, a Flight 77 passenger, called her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. Olson spoke to his wife for about one minute before the call was cut off. She reported that the flight had been hijacked...

After this call, Ted Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft. He contacted the Department of Justice Command Center and requested that they send someone to his office. He also told the Department of Justice Command Center that his wife's flight had been hijacked and gave them the flight number.

By no later than 9:18 AM, FAA centers in Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Washington were aware that Flight 77 was missing and that two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center.
9/11 Commission Staff Report, We Have Some Planes

One poorly kept secret about 9/11 was that even if the FAA had failed to notify the military about Flight 77, the Secret Service would have known everything the FAA knew. Dick Cheney came close to revealing this fact during his interview on Meet The Press five days after 9/11. He said "The Secret Service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open lines after the World Trade Center was..."- at which point Cheney stopped himself before finishing the sentence.

In his book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke added another detail. After saying that Brian Stafford, the director of the Secret Service, had slipped him a note that said, "Radar shows aircraft headed this way," Clarke added, by way of explanation: "Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what FAA's radar was seeing."

In 2006, Barbara Riggs, who had just retired as the Secret Service's deputy director, referred explicitly to the Secret Service's awareness of Flight 77. Riggs, who was in the Washington headquarters on the morning of 9/11, said: "Thru monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA, the Secret Service was able to receive real time information about... hijacked aircraft. We were tracking two hijacked aircraft as they approached Washington, D.C. One of the two aircraft to which she referred would have been American 77. Her statement made explicit, therefore, a point that was already implicit in the statements by Cheney and Clarke.

If people had been widely aware of this fact, the 9/11 Commission would have had to claim that although the Secret Service knew that Flight 77 was heading back towards Washington, it did not inform the military. The Commission did not need to make this case, however, because it did not mention the Secret Service's real-time awareness of the flights.
David Ray Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking

At 9:33, the tower supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked up a hotline to the Secret Service and told the Service’s operations center that “an aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us.” This was the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White House. No move was made to evacuate the Vice President at this time. As the officer who took the call explained, “[I was] about to push the alert button when the tower advised that the aircraft was turning south and approaching Reagan National Airport.”

American 77 began turning south, away from the White House, at 9:34. It continued heading south for roughly a minute, before turning west and beginning

to circle back. This news prompted the Secret Service to order the immediate evacuation of the Vice President just before 9:36. Agents propelled him out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker.The Vice President entered the underground tunnel leading to the shelter at 9:37.
The 9/11 Commission Report

Thru monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA, the Secret Service was able to receive real time information about other hijacked aircraft. We were tracking two hijacked aircraft as they approached Washington, D.C. and our assumption was that the White House was a target. While the White House was evacuated, the Secret Service prepared to defend the facility.
http://pccw.alumni.cornell.edu/news/newsletters/spring06/riggs.html

Stafford slipped me a note. "Radar shows aircraft headed this way." Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what the FAA's radar was seeing. "I'm going to empty out the complex." He was ordering the evacuation of the White House. Ralph Siegler stuck his head into the room. "There has been an explosion in the Pentagon parking lot, maybe a car bomb!"
Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies

Available to us at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11... If you tell the military you've told the military. They have their own communication web... [I]n my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military.

[I]t is a fact-there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr Sliney said. They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA's Air Traffic Organisation in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on.

These testimonies to the existence of military liaisons contradict the 9/11 Commission's claim about Flight 77 - that although Flight 77's troubles were known at Herndon and FAA headquarters, they were not known by the military. The 9/11 Commission dealt with this contradiction by ignoring it. Like the FAA memo sent my Laura Brown, the testimonies given by Sliney and Belger about military liaisons were not mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report.
David Ray Griffin, 9/11 Contradictions

MR. GORTON: On 9/11, the Command Center effectively was the nerve center for information on suspicious aircraft. Yet as I understand it the Command Center had no defined role with respect to obtaining military assistance, fighter assistance. Is that correct? And, if so, why weren't those authorities combined?

MR. SLINEY: Available to us at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.

The normal protocols for the events that were transpiring then -- that is to say hijacked aircraft, which requires a notification to NORAD -- those, at least I was given to understand, were made promptly -- the notifications on each hijack. The --

MR. GORTON: You understood that they were made promptly?

MR. SLINEY: That's correct.

MR. GORTON: It wasn't you -- it wasn't your responsibility to do so?

MR. SLINEY: That is correct. I believe I am correct in stating that that responsibility devolves upon the air route traffic control center in whose jurisdiction that hijack occurs. I was given to understand that all such notifications were made. I had no reason to believe they were not.

The -- I'm getting away from your question, though. You ask me if we had a procedure in place to deal with such an event -- is that what you're asking?

MR. GORTON: At the Command Center.

MR. SLINEY: With -- well, I just want to be clear on this aspect of it. Dealing with aircraft that would be hijacked and used as weapons?

MR. GORTON: No.

MR. SLINEY: No. Dealing with hijacked --

MR. GORTON: Dealing with direct notification to the military or request for assistance from the military.

MR. SLINEY: In direct response to your question was FAA headquarters primarily through the security organization to request assistance from the military. We had no process in place where a Command Center would make such a request for a military assistance. I believe the military was involved, and you know I suppose in hindsight it's too simplistic to say that they all look alike to me. If you tell the military you've told the military. They have their own communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military.

MR. GORTON: By the Command Center?

MR. SLINEY: Correct.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.pdf

...At 8:54 AM, the Commission reports, the flight [77] deviated from its flight path with a "slight turn towards the south." The Commission cites the controller saying he saw the aircraft "turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear" from the radar at 8:56 AM. According to this narrative, the controller had no inkling that Flight 77 had been hijacked. However, the Commission concedes that despite the fact that all radio contact had been lost, and the plane had not only deviated from its flight path but disappeared completely, no fighters were scrambled to intercept the plane in accordance with standard procedures. The controller, rather, "believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical and/or mechanical failure, and was gone." Despite the fact that the FAA notified its other internal agencies of the problem, the Commission claims that NORAD was not informed in the same manner. Instead, controllers apparently waited until 9:09 AM - 13 to 15 minutes - before informing the FAA regional center, which in turn waited another 15 minutes before informing FAA headquarters at 9:24 AM. Both these delays in themselves are inexplicable.
Chapter 10, The War On Truth, Nafeez Ahmed

Bowman comment: Dr. Robert Bowman, retired USAF pilot, notes that anytime an aircraft goes off course, or loses radio communication, or loses it's transponder signal, anytime any ONE of those things happen, the aircraft is supposed to be intercepted.

Scoggins: Then there wouldn't be enough planes to intercept them all. We have planes go NORDO all of the time, normally we get them back in several minutes, but at what time is the controller supposed to call for the intercept. Inflight emergenices don't last very long, if it is a seroius emergency then they are landing at the closest field possible. Why would I call up a scramble to intercept someone who just lost an engine or a fire on board, when the quickest thing we are trying to do is get them down. Makes no sense at all. Most of the emergencies I have worked were over in 10 to 15 minutes.

On the one hand, the Commission says that there was poor primary radar in that area -- but if the regional radar was poor and therefore unable to track the flight, then the Commission's initial admission that the FAA radar had indeed tracked the flight loses value. The Commission also blames problems due to the software's processing of the information - but if such problems are indeed inherent to the functioning of the software itself and its processing of radar data, then it would follow that the software itself is fundamentally flawed. In that case, the ensuing problem of primary radar not being displayed to controllers would be endemic, such that this problem would continually arise as long as the software is being used.
Chapter 10, The War On Truth, Nafeez Ahmed

142. Primary radar contact for Flight 77 was lost because the “preferred” radar in this geographic area had no primary radar system, the “supplemental” radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC software did not allow the display of primary radar data from the “tertiary” and “quadrary” radars.

Now examine what happens when an aircraft is beyond range of the surveillance radar system. This could occur by being below the horizon (elevation) of coverage of the radar or by being out of the range distance that the radar can cover. In both situations, the aircraft is referred to as “out of radar coverage.”

Basically, the ATC system cannot track and maintain ATC services on an aircraft that is out of radar coverage. How could it be expected to? There are significant geographic regions in the continental United States in which there is no radar coverage at all. In the less populated areas of the mid-west and northwest, there are many miles of airspace without radar coverage.

When an aircraft is flown in an area not covered by ATC surveillance radar, the pilot is required to set the transponder to the 4-digit transponder code of 1200. The number 1200 signifies a visual flight rules (VFR) operating aircraft that is not under air traffic control. Should one of these aircraft come within radar coverage range, the ATC display would show them as “1200” and the controller would know that he does not have the same responsibility for that aircraft as he does for the others. Similarly, when an aircraft is under ATC responsibility, if he elects to terminate ATC services, he will be asked to change his transponder “squawk” to 1200.
http://www.airborneinternet.com/AI1.htm

At some locations within the ATC en route environment, secondary-radar-only (no primary radar) gap filler radar systems are used to give lower altitude radar coverage between two larger radar systems, each of which provides both primary and secondary radar coverage. In those geographical areas served by secondary-radar only, aircraft without transponders cannot be provided with radar service. Additionally, transponder equipped aircraft cannot be provided with radar advisories concerning primary targets and weather.
http://www.airborneinternet.com/AI6.htm

...at 9:21 AM the FAA informed NORAD - according to the Commission - that a "hijacked" Flight 11 (not Flight 77) was "heading into Washington," prompting NORAD to send scramble orders at 9:24 AM to Langley Air Force Base. The Commission is "unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information." Langley fighters were then reportedly airborne at 9:30 AM. Moreover, NORAD was not informed by the FAA at all about the purportedly lost Flight 77 until 9:34 AM - 4 minutes before it crashed into the Pentagon.

This entire narrative is not only internally incoherent, but in contradiction to other authoritative accounts. For instance, the FAA clearly knew that a third plane was hurtling towards Washington, DC. But if controllers were not able to find Flight 77 on their primary radar such that the flight was effectively "lost," what radar data was being monitored by the FAA proving that a phantom "Flight 11" was speeding towards Washington, DC? Clearly, the FAA must have been monitoring the hijacked flight headed towards Washington, DC - Flight 77. Furthermore, given that the FAA was well aware that Flight 11 had already crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center, how could it have been presumed to have been the same flight now heading toward Washington, DC?
Chapter 10, The War On Truth, Nafeez Ahmed

NEADS ID2 = Senior Airman Stacia Rountree

BOS MIL = Boston military liaison Colin Scoggins

(Timecode begins 13:20:57UTC or 09:20:57EDT)

09:20:57 NEADS ID2: Huntress ID, Rountree, can I help you.
09:20:58 BOS MIL: Scoggins, military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards-heading towards Washington.
09:21:06 NEADS ID2: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?
09:21:08 BOS MIL: Yes.
09:21:08 NEADS ID2: On its way towards Washington?
09:21:10 BOS MIL: That was another-it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have.
09:21:12 NEADS ID2: Okay.
09:21:12 BOS MIL: I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
09:21:19 NEADS ID2: Okay. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right?
09:21:21 BOS MIL: No, he is a hijack.
09:21:23 NEADS ID2: He-American 11 is a hijack?
09:21:26 BOS MIL: Yes.
09:21:26 NEADS ID2: And he's going into Washington?
09:21:27 BOS MIL: Yes. This could be a third aircraft.
09:21:28 NEADS ID2: It could be a third aircraft going on to Washington. Do you have a MODE 3 [transponder code] on him, sir?
09:21:32 BOS MIL: No MODE3, we're trying to get an, a radial DME if I can. This is a report out from Washington Centre, you might want to get someone on another phone talking to Washington Centre, see if they have him tracked up.
09:21:39 NEADS ID2: Copy that. They-
09:21:40 BOS MIL: Then get maybe DC Guard or somebody up there on that, on the aircraft.
09:21:43 NEADS ID2: Okay, do you have a lat/long [latitude/longitude - position] right now on it?
09:21:45 BOS MIL: Uh, I'll try to get one.

09:21:46 NEADS ID2: Okay copy thanks.

Full DRM1_DAT2_Channel_7_ID2_OP.zip (84 MB)

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now.And I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.

09:21:50

NASYPANY: O.K. American Airlines is still airborne—11, the first guy. He's heading towards Washington. O.K., I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm—I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy down if I can find him.

Arnold and Marr approve scrambling the two planes at Langley, along with a third unarmed trainer, and Nasypany sets the launch in motion.

It's a mistake, of course. American 11 was, indeed, the plane that hit the first tower. The confusion will persist for hours, however. In Boston, it is Colin Scoggins who has made the mistaken call.

"When we phoned United [after the second tower was hit], they confirmed that United 175 was down, and I think they confirmed that within two or three minutes," Scoggins, the go-to guy at Boston Center for all things military, later told me. "With American Airlines, we could never confirm if it was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds."

An unwieldy conference call between F.A.A. centers had been established, and Scoggins was monitoring it when the word came across—from whom or where isn't clear—that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington. Scoggins told me he thinks that the problem started with someone overheard trying to confirm from American whether American 11 was down—that somewhere in the flurry of information zipping back and forth during the conference call this transmogrified into the idea that a different plane had hit the tower, and that American 11 was still hijacked and still in the air. The plane's course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward D.C. This was all controllers were going on; they were never tracking an actual plane on the radar after losing American 11 near Manhattan, but if it had been flying low enough, the plane could have gone undetected. "After talking to a supervisor, I made the call and said [American 11] is still in the air, and it's probably somewhere over New Jersey or Delaware heading for Washington, D.C.," Scoggins told me.
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608?currentPage=6

911myths: Why did you believe that Flight 11 may still be in the air?

Colin Scoggins: I was listening on a Telcon with some people at Washington HQ, and other facilities as well, but don't know who they were. Didn't know the people at FAA HQ either. It was some kind of security telcon. I was in contact with many people at that time, UAL175 had crashed. NEADS was interested in Tail Numbers of AAL11 and UAL175. I believe it was either Dan Bueno the Supervisor in charge, or Bo Dean who made some initial calls to the airlines requesting if their aircraft were down, and tail number information. UAL Airlines replied within minutes that they could confirm UAL 175 was down, and they had the tail number. AAL Airlines was totally different. They do what I think they are supposed to do, by locking down their computer after an aircraft crashes, but when they did that, they couldn't access passenger lists, route of flight, it locks everyone out. So we never got confirmation that the plane was down. Somehow this either got misconstrued, and ended up in FAA channels, indicating the plane never crashed, or what I think happened is that someone in HQ knew that AAL77 was missing, and when they were talking about AAL77 they may have dropped the numbers and were reporting that AAL was still missing or still flying but no one knew where. I think this ended up on the telcon as AAL 11 is still airborne. From my point of view the aircraft was heading south at low altitude and we had lost radar, my only guess was he was heading for Washington DC. I found out years later and I am 99% certain the person who made that call on the telcon was Dave Canoles, he has since retired. I took the information I received and called NEADS almost instantly, can't tell you who I told that to, I talked with so many people there the whole day.

911myths: Several 9/11 researchers authors have reported that the “phantom flight 11” was spotted on radar. Is that true?

Colin Scoggins: I have no idea where that came from. Once we lost the aircraft we never even had a hint of another target. I even called FACSFAC VACAPES which has radar up and down the coast, to look for targets, they didn't come up with any.

911myths: If it was never on radar, why say it was going to Washington?

Colin Scoggins: Again it was just my hunch, as where they were heading. The aircraft would have enough gas to get there even at low altitude, but if the aircraft was heading to Cuba, it would never make it at low altitude. Couldn't think of any other important targets on the east coast, so that was where my mind was. I also tried to guess where the aircraft would be at the speed it was traveling.

In fact, according to testimony under oath before the Commission under NORAD official on duty on 9/11, Col. Alan Scott: "At 9:24, the FAA reports a possible hijack of 77. That's some time after they had been tracking its primary target. And at that moment as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley." A minute later, according to Col. Scott, "American 77 is reported heading towards Washington, D.C."
Chapter 10, The War On Truth, Nafeez Ahmed

At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking news, and the general developing feeling about what's going on. And at about that same time, kind of way out in the West, is when America 77, which in the meantime has turned off its transponder and turned left back toward Washington, appears back in radar coverage. And my understanding is the FAA controllers now are beginning to pick up primary skin paints on an airplane, and they don't know exactly whether that is 77, and they are asking a lot of people whether it is, including an a C-130 that is westbound toward Ohio.
9/11 Commission Hearing