

9/11 Commission files

Team 7/ Box 1

Monte Belger

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IV NOTES

BELGER

Monte Belger

11/26/2003

Pru - 9-11 :

- Exercise
- '97
- Cochipet down
- FBI liaison
- Intelligence

9-11

- Box culture

Background: Started in '72 as an inspector in the Security program in Tampa. '78 - HQ Security Staff.
'79 went to Boston as Security division Manager
'80 Chicago - Security division Manager
'88 - Associate Administrator for Aviation Standards and Security.
Retired in 2002

Acting Dep. Administrator 1997-2002 - Was Acting A

January 2003 working for Lockheed Martin

- No significant domestic security event in 8 or 9 years.
- It appeared as though things were working OK.
- We had a profiling capability to counter the explosives threat
- Public and Congressional interest and FTH was a capacity and challenge
- We had a terrific Security team - and we had a great confidence in him

Weakness - Capability to detect everything was always a weakness
"The inability to detect everything all the time."

Weakness - Slow

- Get there
- Monte knew the ^{Sec.} people because of his background in AV sec.
 - Daily brief. Shirley Miller looked at it and told me.
 - AVSec had an open door to the Admin.
 - That was not many that Thrust level higher in the Summer of 2001
 - Knew he had ^{was} a license. No knowledge. → FBI
 - No one at Security at.
 - are we getting everything we need.
 - Domestic versus foreign →

Intell Retrospection → Shirley → Monte → Jane Garry.

If there was anything given to ~~the~~ ~~Sec.~~ that required action he would have learned about it.

Intell folks cover all bases as they do.

Is there a wolf problem.

UBL → Civil Aviation

Not aware of UBL →

Low probability but high concern.

- CAPPS I implemented. Zero in at those who

James Padgett is the expert at CAPPS

No discussion

If you met the profile through CTX;

If that's what happened, that was reflection
system

a constant effort to keep people alert and give
them the best tools.

100% detection would
always been a question to find the right
balance. in a system that fundamentally
built around schedule.

- never be perfect. -
- Thought that they were slightly wrong.
- emphasis on better equipment, better trained people.

Emitted - Crazy -
Criminal -
two parts -

That's a true statement about
U.S. domestic security was
designed to stop them.

Rule was

Irish pulled at back - there was ~~no~~ good
capability to quantify the history.

Threat Image Projection + history
works for the

Common Strategy

- Compliance and Enforcement Program -
 - Fine the carriers. → followed it.
- ALJ - quasi judicial

I'm not concerned about how the cases were resolved.

Recommendation
Assure
suppliers
follow the
rules.

[
Sens
Monte

- De Certification of the
- Severe Ports were shut down.

Common Strategy - Improved several times over the year. It wasn't designed to

FAA } know what the strategy →
FBI }
Carriers }

No role in →

FAM

people really didn't see a heightened domestic threat

domestic
threat

"These were thrown in"

→ FAA resources were at large. →

- Over the years there was a discussion

Flight Standard - Doors were supposed to be locked in flight
→ Safety consequences in the case of a decompression
post 9-11 that 7500 people did

We have sacrificed safety in order to. Right trade off
Prior to 9-11 we haven't been

{ Safety
Security
Efficiency } every decision has a trade off in among these areas.

Security did come late to the FAA (in the 1970s)
1972 - first Security regs. promulgated by the FAA.

FAA was given authority over hijackings because it was a "Safety" issues.

I don't think 10-9 was more "subjective".

- NAC

9-11

the way after

Was at work ... in a meeting in ATC. Was walking back to the office his assistant Shirley Miller greeted him at the door and said a plane had gone into the WTC. - She said lets go to the WCC

was on the phone. called to the Department to get Jane.
Had

I was in my office with John Flaherty when the 2nd plane
went in. John told him as they were talking when he
saw the 2nd plane go in.

Charlie but argued. Monte was running the
Show in the OPS Center.

Rosen Center and NYC were only decision and
ground stops. Instruction

Glad they didn't follow the guidelines. They do have the
authority to issue Ground Stops. Super. called NORAD
on them in Michigan.

- When I was in the OPS Center. They were in the
process of setting up the Normal Net.

Primary Net - all principal players PAA; DoD; FBI
open net to talk to Strategically

Tactical Net - (lower level) talking

Deliverables

will check out
the OPS Center check list

I didn't know the NMCC →
wasn't on

9:20 → we were talking about a national ground stop
the people at Herndon were making the same decision
Command Center in Herndon.

trying to figure out which aircraft hit the

ToDo Didn't know if the Nets were recorded.

check other agencies to see if they have tapes of the Power

Even
American
United
brought

a lot of confusing reports. a lot of reports about a crash on the Indiana / Kentucky border.

AA 77 crash.

We were tally to both Delta and BAH.

I talked to Bob Baker and Russ Chen. Jane called to Dan Curtis into United.

We were tally about shutting the system down.

I was tally to send the FAA and airlines.

First among equals - Russ Henry or Lee ~~that~~
Senior Langmuir

I didn't know that NORAD had responded until after Penbagen

Lee would have been the senior Security Person. NORAD

→ Had assumed →
that it happened → NORAD was notified

Crash of Penbagen →

Dan remembers ~~how~~ I knew who told me but I was told. Both Jane and I were on the phone with the Secretary.

over attention turned to monitoring the system.

12:15 - got word everything had been grounded.

I was told of the United flight shortly after it had crashed.

It seems like he did tell us about flight attendant calls. We couldn't get

Confirmation that it was an AAL.

The only thing that I was told in regards
"box office" and ~~the~~ storming the cockpit

News reports → primarily in
Didn't remember anything about injuries.

Didn't know anything about an executive

have heard a word about "guns."

Some discussion. It was all over the news!

- Did FAA ever have you write a statement - No.

There was a lot of speculation early on that the
weapons were planted. -- on screens.

There was no evidence to say that the weapons were
planted.

→ we turned our attention to coordinate w/ the airlines where
the aircraft were.

→ Concern about what we had to do

What do the pilots do.

I wasn't concerned about controller panic.

Hubs of Activity



→ ~~For~~ ^{Five} Washington Operations Center (10th Floor)

→ Administration Office (10th Floor) →



in Jeff
Griffith

Lee Longini

Claudio

→ ATC had their own communication ~~hub~~ Hub (10th Floor)

→ Working room ACS (3rd)

→ ACT watch (3rd)

9/11
Working-le
Employee

If anyone was in contact with the military it would have been ATC, not

Evolved that day. They were together all day.

Went down-

→ People were very concerned about relatives/family members

She was there.

No second thoughts about Jane Gurney. Keeping things under control.

Jane spent a lot of time talking to the airlines.

But that was appropriate.

Not sure

After Achen - not a formal.
In retrospect, we could have done better. Hardly
discussions w/ ATC.

We knew the FBI was investigating the event, so on thought was
let the FBI do their thing first.

Recommendation.

← Everything was
going to come
out. →

~~##~~
Same table top
exercise

~~##~~ Once a year.
Either of these.

~~Command~~ Ops Center
did a Comm.
Even broader than the
FAA →

Yes, remember →

False hijacked alerts

- Ops Center.

- Net would get activated

Public:

Spring of 2000 - Summer of
2001 the pressure was
on capacity.

Look at the News
Stories; Cong.

hearings.

Congress; delays
to be more collaborative in

Spring 2010 program - Institute

DOT has a Consumer hotline.
DOT tracks delays by carrier
and track all kinds of consumer
complaints.

Database
Significant increase in
complaints about delays

DOT Gen.
Cavilly
office

They publish
a report
every month

Not a day went

- domestic security seemed to be well in hand.
 - Irish was a recognized leader.
 - Curran came with a great reputation.
 - wasn't as knowledgeable as Flynn.
- Had to assume he was comfortable. His agenda was
- 107/108 → no major intentions.

Jane surprised me.

Recommendations

- ① ~~There~~ There was a protocol and **MOA's**
We aren't sure of how. We don't have clear lines of authority.
TSA/FAA/DOJ need to put together some protocols and practices to assure everyone.
- ② → Tim not worried
Fundamental issues that they are supposed to deal with.
- ③ CAPPSTII - Some type of capability to further ID who the bad guys are.
You need to know about people focus on
* Need exercises between FAA/DOJ.
* Orders to shut down
rather than
The good guy with a knife is not a threat, the bad guy

~~was~~ as a threat w/ his bare hands.

Intell sharing. -- knowing who everyone is who enters
the country.
Share info. -- still not sure if there

③

maybe someone other than the owner of the
info.

Monte^{R.} Belger

11/24/03

(1) Background

- Started in 1972 Inspector in Tampa Security Staff in 1975-1978
- 1978 Boston New England Regional Director, Mr.
- 1980 Great Lakes Security Dir. Mr.
- 1983-4 Airports Mr. in Chicago
- 1986 Dep Dir. for Great Lakes
- Sept. 1988 Assoc. Administrator for Aviation Standard (incl. Security)
- 1988-2002 DC
- 1997-2002 Deputy Administrator
- Sept 13, 2002 Retired
- 2003 - Lockheed - Martin

(2) Strengths

- no significant domestic security event for 8-10 yrs
- no intl. events affecting U.S. carriers
- appeared things were working ok
- Profiling to counter explosives threat
- In years prior to 2001, primary public Cong, FAA focus on congestion
- good security team - had much confidence in Flynn

(3) Weaknesses

- Screening, detection always a weakness
- sharing of intell (more apparent since 9/11)

(4) Security Info

knew people easy to go to them
Daily ~~Intell~~ ^{Intell} Briefing (classified)
Flynn had open door whenever necessary
comfortable he was getting info
Shirley Miller looked at daily brief,
who would bring necessary info to
Belger, who would bring necessary
info to Garvey
highest threat was international,
and explosives

(5) Liaisons

- work problems w/ FBI liaison ~~1998~~
wasn't brought to his attention
- FAA dependent on intelligence gatherers -
- always a worry about whether they
were getting intell they received
- no doubt they had more on foreign
than domestic
- couldn't

(6) Documents

- didn't recall seeing, 1998-99, 2000
docs
- confident that FAA intell would
have taken necessary action
- would have seen
- intell folks cover all bases
- was aware of info sharing

Belger — 3 —

- (7) Bin Laden awareness
 - limited info re 9/11
- (8) 2001 Plotting - had been underway for years - rec'd threat analysis -
~~Bojinka~~ Bojinka-like event: low probability, high concern
- (9) Profiling / CAPPS
 - CAPPS I - intent was to zero in in more precise way on threat
 - profile geared toward bombers
 - ~~threats~~
 - selection meant they had to be cleared
 - change in consequences related to change in perceived primary threat
- (10) Screening
 - w/ constant effort to keep folks alert and do the job
 - to get to 100% detection you'd bring system to halt
 - find right balance between detection and keeping schedule,
 - FAA data on screening showed some improvement, but weren't acceptable
 - emphasis on better equipment, better trained people

(11) Screener Certification

Flynn pulled back Find Rule because
of lack of quantitative way to test
system - writing on TIP -

(12) More dedicated, trained individual, more
likely to detect it - U.S. domestic
system wasn't designed to detect it
by weapons which were not
prohibited

(13) Security resource allocation decision,
driven by Flynn, improved intell in
1990s - intell also did vulnerability
assessments - not aware of
risk management^{te} (Flynn responsibility)

(13) Finer

Experience at many levels
Compliance & Enforcement program
Compliance is overriding goal
Emphasis on penalties has varied
- when pilot performance was major
concern, was heavily used
As Inspectors followed fine through the
process - got sense that others
didn't do this -
Not concerned about final settlements -
Involved in several compromises, such as
more \$ for screening
Publicity more effective

Common strategy today

Belger - 5

Didn't recall any instance of de-cert.
threatened for security violations, did
recall screening checkpoint closures

(14) ~~Common Strategy~~

Common Strategy - developed and improved
several times - not designed to counter
9/11 - didn't recall any such
scenario planning - obviously had to
be re-thought and replaced - made
to make all parties aware of what
to do

(15) FAM -

at time, people didn't think there
was a domestic threat - based on
reports from Flying Caravan
died over years because of resources
(lower priority)
10 yrs. since last domestic hijacking

(16) Cockpit Doors

not aware of serious look - were
discussions over years on securing
door - Flight standards issues about
safety consequences (in case of
decompression) "startlingly complex"
- FAA cert. folks did marvelous job
post 9/11 in minimizing safety
implications - increased risk of safety failure

Pre 9/11 wouldn't have made trade-off
FAA about safety, security and
efficiency, trade-off

(17) Safety v. Security

Security didn't come to FAA until
1971, first security regs.

Congress made decision in early 1970
to make FAA lead agency (because
of safety) in hijacking - worked
well then

disputed accuracy of NRC assertion
of safety v. security - FAA set
standards only for safety - not
fundamentally different -

Safety standards more precise; harder
to apply to security - in safety,
weren't trying to detect enemy -

generally, industry paid more attention
to safety than security concerns,
(the former being much more prevalent)

(18) Cockpit Keys

- wasn't a good idea to have one
key fit all, but not seen as
significant risk pre 9/11

Belger

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(18) 9/11

- was in meeting in Air Traffic
- went back to office, Shirley Miller took to Ops Center, after 1st plane had crashed, but before 2nd crash
- In Ops Center for a few minutes to start getting figures out who knew who
- Thought it was GA - didn't think it was commercial
- was told of ATC picking up transmissions (not sure if before or after 2nd crash)
- on phone, w, Govey who was in way - w, people in Minute Office
 - o on phone w/ Flechty when 2nd plane hit
 - o trying to figure out which aircraft
- went back to Ops Center, to take charge
- Boston, NY Center started imposing ground stop then - good decision as hadn't been practiced -
 - o sled they didn't follow all rules/reg's in place (ex NORAD contact) for example

doesn't know if they were recorded

- Tactical net - lower level
- Primary net principal players: FAA, ATC, DoD, FBI (NMCC should have been on

- Around 9:20, discussed national ground stop (no take-offs) - Hendon makes some decision
- Trying to figure out which aircraft hit the WTC
- At this point, he hadn't talked to carriers but Garvey had (he thinks)
- Between 9:20 - 9:45 - confusing reports on aircraft unaccounted for
 - o heard of 1st crash, maybe # 77,
 - talking w/ United, Airline
 - o talked to Biker, Chew, United
 - Garvey talked to Carter, United
- No discussions of communicating to secure cockpit, but were considering ordering landing of all planes (within FAA)
- On primary net, Longmire in charge
 - o routinely, coordinated military response
 - o not aware NMCC wasn't on line
 - o her impression military was on line at some point
 - o wasn't aware of NORAD response until after #77 crash (subsequently learned that Bob, NJ had called them earlier)
- Hijack Coordinator would have been senior security person present

Belger - 9 -

- Learned of ~~#93~~ crash into Pentagon w/ Gurney, talked to Mineta, who decided to bring everything down (around 9:45), ~~at~~ which was done - monitored system - everything down by 12:15
- Told of #93 crash shortly after it hit
- very confusing about what a/c hit Pentagon; UAL and AAL weren't sure what planes hit where (Baker at AAL, someone at UAL, ~~2~~ carriers ~~at~~ looking for info)
- took a long time to confirm what a/c hit Pentagon -

(19) Weapons / Tactics

- used boxcutters, stormed cockpits - based on news accounts, Baker reports (not knives) - all over the news - not sure if Baker
- didn't see Exec. Summary on 9/11
- didn't recall any discussion of guns,
- some discussion of #93 saying bombs on ATC
- still doesn't know for sure what weapons they used

Speculation about how weapons got on board later on 11th, 12th - Security folks, perhaps, thought they couldn't have succeeded -
- never any evidence that the weapons were planted, or insider job

Once planes brought down (no SOP), turned situation to coordinating w/ airlines - where they were - many in Canada - he had many discussions, w/ Canadian authorities - concerns about how to handle people - figure out what decisions needed to be made to re-start

Doesn't recall discussions of screening de-planing passengers, or exam of manifests

Concern about what could be told passengers w/o panic - didn't think pilots/ATC would panic
- thinks airlines put word out
- in retrospect, wouldn't have been a bad thing for FAA to do

(20) Center of Activity - FAA

not recorded

Ops (Baker) Center - 10th Flr. - ACI with (Clandon)

Bellevue/Garvey Office - 10th Flr

ATC Comm. Hub - 10th Flr. ()

AC Security Ops - 3rd Floor (Lee Longmire)

9/11
Working-level
Employee

Jeff Griffith

Belger

- 11 -

Herndon - ATC

Communications w/ military - ATC, Herndon,
Ops Center

Didn't have primary radar in certain
sectors - after fact became aware
of impact on tracking #77

- (21) Garvey role - was at Sec. office originally,
then came back - ~~was~~ w/ Belger almost
all day, except when she went down
to console people in bldg. (later in
PM) - appropriate thing to do -
she was making decisions along w/ him
his nature to take charge - no reservation
about her role on that day - never
heard anything negative -

"think we did a pretty job" of keeping
things in office under control -

Garvey spent more time talking to airlines

- (22) No formal, consolidated after action report,
- in retrospect, could have done better -
- hourly discussions w/ ATC about specific
measures (i.e. coordination w/ DoD), which
were done within days

doing daily self-critique -
Knew FBI was investigating, instructed
everyone to give FBI everything -
followed by JFC

- (23) Table Top Exercises - some over the years,
mostly via telephone
- Some security (some broader than FAA)
 - ~~communication~~ check ~~check~~
 - Some hijacking
(had seen false hijack alerts which
tested system)

- (24) Context
- From Spring 2000 - Summer 2001,
focus on capacity, congestion, delays
(news reports, hearings, WTT interest)
- Spring 2000 program (initiative w/
airline, to be more collaborative
w/airline, weather, etc.)
 - DOT Consumer hotline (Counsel's office
- DOT tracks ~~delays~~, customer complaints
incl. security complaints)
 - Passenger Bill of Rights in this period too

(web-site) *

"not a day went by that delays
domestic weren't" Belger, Garry priorities
Security seemed in hand - Flynn well-
respected -

Cavanaugh had great reputation - was in a
knowledgeable as Flynn - didn't have
scoop of FAA system - didn't recall any
expressions of discomfort

Belger

- 13 -

Common priorities, some of everyone, intl.
threat, 107/108 rocketing, bombing

(25) Recommendations

(a) ~~Common~~ strategy - one well understood
before 9/11; clear roles - no
confusion of roles - not the
case today, especially w/ more active
DoD role - TSA, FAA, DoD put
together, practice scenarios of
roles -

- TSA should retain lead role for
in-air hijackings

(FAA and TSA did an exercise,
per Belger, Nov. 2002, on
hijack coordination)

- concern about DoD "aggressiveness"

(b) CAPP, ~~if~~ some type of capability to
further ID bad guys absolutely
needed - never get to 100% detection
better off to know who people are
(threats)

"good guy w/ knife not a threat,
bad guy w/ bare hands is a threat"

- seen to be heading in right direction

(c) Intell sharing - better idea of those
who enter the country - fact that
so many hijackers were here so
long "air-touring"

- need to be better shared
- don't think we have a common database

(d) "Veil of mystery" - in response to Q, - maybe have an outside authority (than TIA) to make decision to release data for public discussion

JAC

Belger 9/25/01 Testimony

"We ordered the evacuation of every airport terminal for the airports to be inspected. Every aircraft was fully inspected before any passenger was allowed to board."

"It is very possible that these items (i.e. hijacker weapons) did not go through the screening check point... I think there was a newspaper report that after they did a thorough overhaul of one of the canceled flights, they found one of these box cutters or paper cutters in one of the seat cushions of the plane, and there is no telling whether a passenger brought it on board or it was planted at this point."

"One of the problems we had ~~in~~ setting (the Screener certification) rule out sooner, was the fact that there was no real objective way to test the screeners other than to test objects that our inspectors use, which ~~was~~ really is not a good real-world way to test."