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A: MFR: FOLLOW-UP

TASKS TO DO

(Subject to Prioritization)

U] Stevens said that security violations levied against American, like all other carriers, were logged in the WEBAIRS database which has been archived. (GET THESE TO ASSESS THE AIRLINES)

UNDERWOOD: [U] Underwood said that there was a department-wide emergency response exercise two weeks before 9-11. He indicated that after the Cole bombing there was a higher sense of alert, and that the feeling in the summer of 2001 was that something might be going on in the Middle East

NEWARK: We have not interviewed the security manager at Newark (Susan Baer was the General Manager). Security manager, Bob Cody

Team 2: Manno mentioned the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism which was a forum for the IC and non-IC agencies to meet and share information and assessments. The IICT did produce written threat assessments. (DID WE GET THESE)

United Airlines: IV ED BALLENGER

Federal Air Marshal: As per SULLIVAN: [U] Federal Air Marshals have a chat room on the Internet called a FAM BOARD. He says the cite is publicly accessible and gives information about security that terrorists and other criminals don't need to know. Mr. Sullivan will provide the URL for us. (Check site and see if this is a problem)

United: STUDDERT: He remembers that Craig Parfitt of AAL and Mike Barber of UAL were talking back and forth. (DID WE GET THESE DATA POINTS)

TSA/KORMANN—Show him the 1993 ICF mentioning aircraft as a weapon.

TSA/KORMANN—Give him the name of the

TSA/KORMANN—Have him check out the name of

AA/UA: Prior to 9-11 someone taking pictures of the cockpit would not have been alarming or suspicious. The company's jump seat policy was under the jurisdiction of the Vice President of Flight. (GET THE POLICY)

AA: American: He remembers that Craig Parfitt of AAL and Mike Barber of UAL were talking back and forth. (FIND OUT ABOUT THIS CONVERSATION)

Intelligence Community: (SSI)

Everyone was concerned. (COULD BE THE ANSWER TO THE FAMILY QUESTION)

TSA: (SSI) [redacted] said he certainly was aware of an April 2001 Intelligence Community report that UBL was interested in using commercial pilots as terrorists. He cited the fact that one of Ramzi Yousef's confederates was a trained commercial pilot and that part of the Bojinka plot was to smash a plane into CIA headquarters. (GET THE DIS FROM THIS DATE AND THE IC ASSESSMENT AND WRITE IT UP).

TEAM 2: (U) [redacted] was asked how FAA transmitted its CAS intelligence needs to the FBI. He said that the tasking on collection for international intelligence was already in place when he got there. (DO WE WANT THESE OR SHOULD IT BE TEAM 2)

TEAM 2: [redacted] She indicated that she had never seen security at the airport as rigorous as it was on the morning of 9/11 (prior to the attacks in the United States). She said that the authorities double and triple checked passports. (SHOULD COMMISSION LOOK INTO STATUS OF FRENCH ALERTNESS. TEAM 1 or 2).

TSA: CARRIE RILEY who has been the crisis management expert at FAA for a long time. She can talk about the process of how the crisis management system was supposed to work. (TEAM 7 & 8 SHOULD INTERVIEW HER).

TSA & NEW YORK: MORSE: The 4-inch standard was set in part because knives of shorter length were legal in all of the U.S. (except New York state which had a 3 inch threshold) and were thus not regulated. (WAS THIS 3" THRESHOLD ENFORCED IN NEW YORK AND IS THIS WHY THEY DIDN'T CHOOSE THOSE AIRPORTS).
JR TO DO: Check notes and compare with MFR on AA SOCC

TSA or TEAM 2: Look into Marcus Arroyo's comment that during the NY landmark bombing trial the Blind Sheik said something about airports and that "people would be coming." (POSSIBLY SEND TO TEAM 2).

TSA: Talk to James Padgett and Gore Commission about the original intent of CAPPS 1

LOGAN: Buckingham was not aware until her she left Massport of a reported FAA proposal to do joint testing at Logan with Massport, which Massport reportedly turned down. Check this out.

TSA: Canavan was asked if he recalled a Table Top exercise conducted by the FAA when he first arrived at the FAA in 2000 involving a Fed Ex plane being commandeered by a suicide hijacker. CHECK THIS WITH MIKE WEICHERT.

AAL: We need to talk to Chris Bidwell to see if he asked Clarke about the gun story from the FAA

DULLES: Cox did receive reports from an ADT (the company which managed videotaping for the airport) employee (Steve Kimberly) who, after 9/11, viewed an airport videotape with the FBI showing the hijackers lost in the B Terminal on 9/10. Reportedly, the videotape shows the hijackers paying special attention to emergency exits. [redacted] indicated that all of the hijackers, as well as the other passengers, were videotaped going through the screening checkpoint on 9/11.) HAVE WE SEEN THIS FOOTAGE YET?

GAO: Review the GAO studies on: FAM; R&D; Passenger Screening; CAPPS II

CIA: Look at the 1995 NIE

FBI: Ask [redacted] if he remembers a briefing requested by GARVEY with the FBI on what we learned from 9-11.

FBI: Send QFR's

TEAM 2: PADGETT: (SSI) [redacted]

[redacted] The subjects addressed were broad. FAA Intelligence continuously "banged the drum" for more intelligence from the intelligence community. The assumption made on the part of the intelligence community was that FAA was only interested in terrorists targeting planes or specific mentions of aviation.

AAL: GONZALES: 4 four and a half minutes were recorded because the recently installed recording system in the Raleigh office had such a time limit on its tapes. (FIND OUT WHY).

AAL: FIND OUT WHAT "keying the Mike" means and whether it had any significance or a signal.

GORE: [U] Hallett stated that ATA prepared an eleven-point plan for the Gore Commission, including enhanced use of K-9 bomb sniffing units and an increased air marshal program. GET THIS PLAN AND HAVE GORE ASKED ABOUT IT). Also ask Gore about CAPPS consequences.

ATA: Hallett recommended that the commission talk with Susan Rork at ATA who is expert on CAPPS.

ATA/FBI: CHECK INTO THIS: HALLETT: On the morning of September 12, Hallett received a phone call from a Deputy Director of the FBI indicating that he had a list of individuals that should not be allowed to fly and that he wanted the list distributed to the air carriers. Hallett said that the list included "significant" terrorist figures who they found were ticketed to fly in the days following 9-11. The FBI asked the industry to do

three things with the list: 1) See if any of the individuals are ticketed 2) top the individuals from boarding a plane 3) Notify the FBI if any are ticketed or stopped

TSA: Look at the Moussaoui ICF.

TSA/LOY: On Friday (December 12, 2003) I'm going to convene a leadership team to determine strategic goals for DHS, including that paradigm (DID THIS EVER HAPPEN)

UAL: Lubkemann told the flight attendant on UAL 93 to stay on the line as long as she could as he tried to transfer the call, but he could tell from the computer monitor that the manager was on another call. A supervisor/manager then came over to his desk and took over the call with the flight attendant from UAL 93. He never heard from or talked to the flight (NOTE: WHO TOOK OVER THE CALL).

TSA: check with McDonell if the 1996 increase to AVSEC III was brought about by Unabomber; the Olympics; Yousef Trial; Blind Sheik Trial; 1995 NIE;

FAA: Check on passenger loads on Tuesday to see if they are lighter than the rest of the week.

TSA: Roll-up produced by FAA on what we knew about 9-11 hijackers and their tactics.

DOCUMENTS TO OBTAIN

(Subject to submission review; need to have and prioritization)

TSA: Janet Riffe's Notes from 9/11

UA: UNITED BRIEFING: [U] Commission staff requested a sample of ACARS messages sent between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. that morning from dispatchers to their respective planes. (DID WE EVER GET THIS?)

UA: UNITED BRIEFING: Commission wants to get all recorded communications from the SOC that day.)

AA: AHERN: [U] AAL maintained a "Company Events Reporting System" to log suspicious behavior and security concerns identified by AAL employees. (NEED 2001).

FBI: [REDACTED] Her job was more liaison than investigative. This information might be in the Bureau's Manual of Investigation and Operation (MIOC). (GET THIS FROM FBI IF IT HAS HER JOB DESCRIPTION IN IT).

TSA: Mr. SULLIVAN suggest we obtain the following documents:

- 1) Quarterly Review and Status Report for the Northeast Division, including the employee attitude study.
- 2) Comprehensive inspection survey for 1998 and 1999.
- 3) Lawless memo on undercover system assessment
- 4) List of dropped cases at Boston CASFO that were never looked into.
- 5) An ACI document discussing extremist Islamic organizations operating in Boston
(NOTE: 2/26/04—Pat McDonnell said this was a chart done for a briefing saying where cells were operating. It was derived from FBI threat assessments. He will get it for us).
- 6) Order the Assessments from ACI
- 7) Employee attitude survey of Boston CASFO

UNITED: Twice a year Hank Krakowski and Ed Soliday would prepare a safety and security report as part of a larger analysis of the state of the airlines that Studdert would not preview or edit. (SHOULD WE GET THESE FOR 2000 AND 2001)

UNITED: SOLIDAY: Note: UAL is providing this time-date information to the commission. This should be helpful data about the situational awareness of the airline because the lock-out time will be precise, and it was in the interest of the airline to lock-out the flight information as quickly as possible after learning it was in trouble). Soliday reconfirmed his belief that the time of UAL's lockout of Flight 93 was about the time of the 77 crash.

DULLES: The log shows that the FAA told Dulles about the downing of Flight 77 at around 1:05 pm.

AMERICAN: Lock out times (DID WE GET THESE).

TSA: PARKS: Mark Randol headed the effort to produce an "after action" report with Beth Reno in the lead. (DID WE GET THIS)

TSA: Parks stated that each airport including Dulles would have to undergo a comprehensive annual assessment on its checkpoint screening operations by the FAA. In addition, each checkpoint was checked-out twice per month by the FAA through testing.

FBI: [U] [] said that in 1998 she started holding conferences so that aviation stakeholders (including carriers, airports and aviation unions) and the Bureau (particularly agents assigned to the airports) could network and share information. The first conference was held in Chicago (1998); Quantico (1999). In 2000 there was no funding for the event. In May 2001 the conference was held in Phoenix. The conference kept growing in participation and communications were improving. She said there was an effort to provide a summary of the conference, which may have been posted in the form of an FBI EC (Electronic Communication). (SHOULD WE GET THE MINUTES).

FBI: [] The first grouping of these assessments was supposed to be completed in May of 1999 (including assessments for Boston, Dulles and Newark Airports) [U] [] said that the terrorist threat assessments accompanying the JVA's included information on what groups were present in the areas surrounding the airport. (DID WE GET THESE FOR THE FOUR AIRPORTS)

TSA: SSI) Osmus stated that an evaluation assessing the hijack threat concluded that a FAM program should be continued. A written report was produced. By the mid 1990's FAM flights were all international based on the threat assessment. Osmus said that the FAA didn't perceive a huge hijacking threat. She referred us to Greg McLaughlin who could discuss with us the size adjustment decisions. (GET THIS STUDY). (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell doesn't recall such an assessment. He said to ask the FAM's if they have it).

TSA: MORSE: Questions they needed answered pertained to what kind of cargo the flights had on board, whether or not any law enforcement people were on board, the physical lay-out of the planes, the amount of gas in the tanks. (SHOULD WE GET THIS)

TSA: Get Logs for ACS working room mentioned by Penny Anderson

TSA: See if we received the "annual work plan" for the Security Division manager for the Eastern and New England Region (See the Arroyo MFR).

TSA: This Consortia was a coordinated effort set up after the TWA 800 crash. She said the Federal Security Manager (FAA regulatory role) participated, as did the CASFO on occasion. Local law enforcement and the FBI would also brief the group from time to time. Minutes were kept of these meetings but they were never detailed.

UAL: BELME: He took one set of notes he took when he talked to flight attendant (contemporaneous). He made another set of notes after-the-fact. He turned one set over to the FBI and he can't find the set he kept. Did we get these?

LOGAN: When Buckingham arrived at Massport, she made it a priority to develop a business plan. She hired an outside consultant who produced such a plan a year later (in 2000). Did we get this?

CRS: Any report on FAA Security Fines.

TSA: Canavan said that when he took over as ACS 1 in December, in January he and his top people got together and wrote a five-year strategic plan for aviation security. He said that to his knowledge it was the first one that had ever been written. Have we gotten this?

AAL: Suzanne Clark says she gave her notes from the day to Larry Wansley. Did we ever get these.

DULLES: Consortium notes.

NEWARK: Consortium notes.

TSA: (SSI) Pitts indicated that under the airport's FAA-approved Emergency Operations Manual (now called the Airport Emergency Plan) there was an incident command procedure pursuant to Part 139 of the Code of Federal Regulations, including for hijackings. In fact, the FBI had conducted a hijacking exercise at Dulles (involving a "traditional" hijacking with hostages), with Dulles providing some operational support. The airport was required to do training exercises every three year, and "table top" contingency exercises every year. (DO WE HAVE THIS MANUAL)

TSA: DYER: Rich Stevens instructed someone to start a log/book to note times and events at the Operations Center. He said this log was kept on butcher block paper. Dyer believes the paper was given to Mike Morse at the FAA for the Congressional Joint Inquiry. All of the 9-11 CASFO and ROC stuff was put into white binders and given to Mike Morse --Did we get these notes from Morse?

TSA: DYER: The CASFO followed the directions of FAA's Crisis Management Manual which contained roles and checklists. (DID WE GET THIS)

TSA: DYER: Mike Perry took notes of what happened at the CASFO on 9-11. (Did we get these.

GAO: Get the GAO OIG investigation on the shooting on AA11. (MR. PAT SULLIVAN AT GAO).

ATA: Hallett stated that ATA had a security council comprised of the security directors who met quarterly. Were there minutes of these meetings.

TSA: HAWLEY: Hawley said that a strategic assessment was published on 9-11-01, in the strategic assessment, "if they conduct a hijacking domestically, it will be a suicide hijack." Duane Mercer wrote an intelligence note on Ressam (UBL connection) that said in the last paragraph "it was significant that Ressam chose a domestic airport." WE NEED TO GET THIS. (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: HAWLEY He also noted a presentation titled the "ACS: Conspiracy to destroy US airlines flying in Asia," delivered by Pat McDonell to a conference. (GET THIS) (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: HAWLEY: Recently, he moved from Virginia Ave. to Rosslyn. He was asked to go through all files he didn't need anymore because there was too much stuff to move. The files were jointly owned by his predecessors. He found some interesting stuff sent to the attention of Claudio Manno on the Manila Plot; the first trade center bombing; and the investigation of PAL 434. He also noted a presentation titled the "ACS: Conspiracy to destroy US airlines flying in Asia," delivered by Pat McDonell to a conference. (GET THIS STUFF) .

LOGAN: KINTON: Lawless and the other senior airport staff were given an annual performance appraisal which listed "5 or 6" priority goals and objectives for that year.

FBI: Kinton learned that flight manuals and the Koran were found in Atta's bag that didn't make his flight from Portland. (GET THIS EVIDENCE LIST)

LOGAN: Kinton recalled the September 19, 2001 charter flight to Logan to pick up Bin Laden family members. There was much confusion at that time with respect to air space and he wanted to make sure everyone that needed to know was involved (State Department, FBI and the State police). The FBI advised him to let the flight come. He remembered that the flight came out of Los Angeles going on to Orlando, Dallas, Boston, Gander and London, that a police officer got off in Boston, and that the FBI and Customs were there to meet the airplane. He saw the manifest, and will provide a copy to the Commission. (DID HE EVER PROVIDE IT).

LOGAN: LAWLESS: He remained in the office for another 20 minutes taking and fielding calls.

Lawless said that a log was made of the phone calls. (DID WE GET THIS LOG)

LOGAN: LAWLESS: They had a specific protocol and were following it (DID WE GET THIS).

LOGAN: LAWLESS: make sure we receive MASSPORT Business plan, data on Logan parking garage, and the EOC log)

LOGAN: LAWLESS: The CASFO requested transactions on the access control doors. MASSPORT supplied them with that information (STAFF NOTE: WE WANT TO SEE THIS DATA).

DULLES Dunn indicated that he had pulled the screener logs in the aftermath of the groundings.) He recalled that United, American and other carriers had requested a security sweep of their grounded aircraft, and that knives were found on some of these, including a box cutter on a flight from Raleigh. However, the FBI took the lead in reviewing de-boarding passengers. Pitts said that on 9/11 he worked with operations to clear people out of the terminals. They have a log that shows Pitts' activities. (DID WE GET THE SCREENER LOGS AND THE LOG OF PITTS' ACTIVITIES?)

TSA: [U] Longmire did not recall the 1992-93 FAA study on knife use in hijackings. He did recall that the 4-inch standard (for prohibition of longer blades) was derived primarily from state standards. (DID WE EVER GET THIS) (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: [SSI] Manno cited the 1995 intelligence estimate and the 1997 update as important documents about the level of threat that helped convince air carrier executives and security directors that the threat to civil aviation was real and substantial. Manno also mentioned that Air Carrier security directors would come into ACI for classified briefings, and that ACI would hold sessions for Ground Security Coordinators and other security personnel. (DO WE HAVE THESE)

FAA/TSA: MORSE: Morse and his staff acted as a central repository for all essential and relevant records related to the attacks. Issue papers, records, including all of the email traffic, were saved. (DID WE GET ALL OF THIS).

AAL: Did we get the slides from the SOCC presentation in Dallas

TSA/ARROYO: When he received indication that one of the flights had left Newark, he started pulling the information together for an incident report. Did we get this material?

TSA/ARROYO: An employee he sent to Home Depot came back with every box cutter she could buy. He tested them at the brand new magnetometer in the lobby of the FAA building. Did we get this data?

TSA: Have we gotten the WebAirs reports on the checkpoints and the screeners.

NEWARK: From Baer: Commission staff requested that Port Authority results of SIDE-ACCESS (SIDE X) challenges be provided to the Commission, dating back to 1998. Did we get these?

WOODWARD: (Note: Mr. Woodward still has his notes and agreed to forward a copy of them to the Commission). (DID HE EVER SEND THEM).

TSA: [SSII]

9/11 Classified Information

(NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: Kormann's paper on the emerging Bin Laden threat. (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: Kormann: ACI's 1998 letter to NSA asking for more Intelligence data because of the UBL threat(NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: Kormann: 1994 ACI baseline assessment of threat to Civil Aviation (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA/IC: 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)—including textbox on the CAS threat

TSA: 1998 ICB

TSA: ACI 1998 assessment of the emerging UBL threat(NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: ACI 1999 Hijacking Assessment

TSA: ACI 2000 assessment of the hijacking threat which was rolled into a larger IC assessment of hijacking(NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: 1997 Update of 1995 NIE

FBI/CTC: KORMANN: CTC did a study of the JTTF's and did a report on terrorist presence and activity in the United States and issued a report which the FBI found embarrassing and tried to suppress. (NOTE: 2/26/04 GAVE TO TEAM 6 FOR FOLLOW-UP)

TSA: KORMANN Language of the May 2000 hijacking IC that NSC vetoed. (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: KORMANN March 2000 assessment to look at the prospects of UBL conducting a hijacking to bargain for the release of prisoners. (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

DIA/TSA: KORMANN DIA hosted Forum held in the summer of 2000 to discuss trends among hijackers learning about aircraft avionics.

TSA: Moussaoui ICF

TSA: UBL ICF

TSA: KORMANN: MOA between FAA and IC on access to databases (TIPOFF Web). (NOTE: 2/26/04 Pat McDonnell is looking for it)

TSA: LUONGO: Luongo noted that Pete Falcone asked for a plan for the year in the early 1990s but it wasn't a regular requirement.

LOGAN: LUONGO: Annual tabletop exercises were conducted to train for emergencies, such as a car bomb in front of the terminal (before 9-11). In these exercises he went through all the existing Av Sec measures that were prescribed in the aviation security program and then some. He recalled that in the ten years he was an FSM, hijacking scenarios were practiced. He said that none of the scenarios used in table top exercises or other training involved the hijacking of a plane to be used as a weapon

TSA: LUONGO: Al Hudson (it was his first day on the job at Logan) listened to the net and took notes. He was a cargo security guy or hazmat official at the time. He still works for TSA/FAA. (Beyer will try to locate his notes for us).

TSA: [U] He doesn't know if the calls were recorded. CASFO did written statements after the fact.

QUESTIONS

UA: UNITED BRIEFING: At 8:21 a.m. (CT) - Ballenger got a "pirep" (pilot report) from UAL 93 that was routine. (DOES THIS REQUIRE THE PILOT TO DO SOMETHING AFFIRMATIVE OR IS IT AUTOMATIC?)

UA: WANSLEY: He did not recall receiving a CD Rom presentation from Pat McDonnell in the latter part of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, dealing with the hijacking threat to civil aviation, including domestic suicide hijacking. (HOW ABOUT SOLIDAY AND THE COO'S)

AA: Who was the Director of the System Operations Command Center on 9-11 Parfitt or Bertapelle?)SEE AA SOCC MFR

AA: Parfitt called his brother at United Airlines who reported that they also had some planes missing. (WHAT WAS THIS CALL ALL ABOUT)

UA: Parfitt called his brother at United Airlines who reported that they also had some planes missing. (WHAT WAS THIS CALL ALL ABOUT)

AA: WANSLEY: [U] Wansley stated that AAL had a Domestic Security Program that it started in 1999, which it used to improve passenger screening, and other security measures including access control. The program was designed to ensure that AAL was doing everything it could and should be doing; that the screening process was as effective as possible; and that AAL was complying with FAA regulations. (WAS THIS THE PROGRAM REQUIRED BY THE ACSSP OR THEIR OWN INITIATIVE?)

DULLES: There had been a 9/10/01 report on an attempted access breach (unrelated to the 9/11 hijackings). (WHAT WAS THIS? COULD IT HAVE BEEN THE ERIC GILL ISSUE?)

AA/UA: How and when did AA and UA notify ATC/FAA of the problem as they understood it on the various flights (as required by law and their own protocol).

AA/UA: Who were the GSC's for the four flights.

TSA: What were the SEA's in the two years before 9-11 to show what the system was concerned about. Because "SEA's were derived from Washington Threat Information" as per Arroyo.

TSA/ARROYO: Arroyo said he would look into the change in consequences of CAPPS I and get back to the commission. Has he done this.

TSA: Turano received a page from the FAA Regional Office's Operations Center of a possible hijacking on a flight from Boston. Was this ops center always open or only in emergency.

TSA/MANNO: MANNO: ACI tasked the IC to look for capabilities and intentions to target civil aviation. Is this correct?

UA: UNITED BRIEFING: Commission staff told the UAL representatives that in the morning ATC had heard a transmission from AA 11 that "we have planes." The UAL representatives confirmed that they were not told this by ATC. They also confirmed that UAL 175 and AA 11 were on the same frequency that morning. (DOE THE DISPATCH LISTEN TO THE RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM AND TO THE PLANE. I.E. DO THEY MONITOR THE FREQUENCY?)

TSA: WANSLEY: [U] Wansley stated that when hand-wanding a passenger, the checkpoint screener must identify the item that alarmed the magnetometer, not merely hand-wand the passenger and then approve the passenger to proceed if the hand-wand doesn't alarm. (WHAT IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR HANDWANDING RECONCILIATION?)

UNITES/SOLIDAY: WHITELEY: At around 8 a.m. Pacific Time he received a SAT 7 call on 9-11 from a Boeing 747, 767 or 777 aircraft (most likely the latter) of unknown registry. Whiteley's notes from that day have since been "shredded." He commented, "Six months ago, I was told this issue was over." [U] He said the conversation with the plane was about 7-8 sentences; and it was not tape recorded. The call came up as "registration number unknown." He knew, however, it was a Sat 7 phone call because the background noise was characteristic of that type of satellite call. Typically, Boeing 777s or 767s make Sat 7 calls. Sat communication is expensive and each call is itemized when paid for. "There has to be a record of the call somewhere," (ASK ED ABOUT THIS AND SEE IF THEY CAN GET THE RECORD).

B: MFR ROUND-UP BY ISSUE

AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Arroyo said that an after action report was completed but it took Newark longer to get that done. Russell and Nora did it and forwarded it to Washington. He does not remember seeing it. Did we get this?

AHERN: he did not hear anything about the use of mace, pepper spray or fake bombs by the terrorists. (Why wouldn't the Top Security person know what their own flight attendants reported)!!!

Belger stated that there was no formal, consolidated after action report on 9-11, and in retrospect this could have been done better. He was never asked to write a statement about what happened on 9/11 from his perspective.

Buckingham: Buckingham does not believe Massport did an after-action report as such. That role was quickly taken over by the Carter Commission appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts.

Garvey: Sometime in October, she asked the FBI for an intensive briefing on their recommendations as to what needed to be done, based on their investigation of the hijackings. The FAA's liaison to the FBI [redacted] was involved in the briefing.

GARVEY: Belger did a review and focused on such issues as the composition of the Operations Center staffing and the notification of NORAD (which she learned was initially done at a "low level"). As a result, certain FAA policies were changed very quickly.

GARVEY acknowledged that the FAA did not do a very good job of documenting the lessons learned, and while one could see the results of what they learned in the many actions taken in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, she wished they had done more in this regard.

MANNO: indicated that ACI did not conduct any after action reports of the office's performance leading up to and on 9-11. He stated that their threat assessments were still valid.

MARQUIS ET. AL: American did do an after-action "lessons learned event." This included how to provide for better reaction in the SOCC to any such future incident, but was mostly related to the need to update the "Common Strategy" to deal with this new form of hijacking. The systems for Positive Target Information (PTI) and SOCC activation did not change.

[Redacted] Pat McJannet

MORSE: No comprehensive After-Action Report was ever completed by the FAA. Everyone was working day and night on emergency measures. The potential for other attacks was real. Months later (March/April), an attempt was made to complete a report, but the creation of TSA was underway and it was increasingly difficult to get all of the principles in one place to discuss what happened and generate "lessons-learned." Morse reported that Larry Bruno, the security regulatory manager, was initially tasked with writing the 9/11/01 After Action report. He found it impossible because people could not make time to cooperate. Willie Gripper than tasked Morse with the assignment, at which point Morse indicated that to accomplish the mission would require that higher level officials made it a priority.

In Morse's opinion, rapid congressional action quelled the FAA's internal enthusiasm for identifying lessons-learned.

PARKS: Mark Randol headed the effort to produce an "after action" report with Beth Reno in the lead.

RANDOL: The after action report prepared by WDC CASFO on AAL #77 was carried out pursuant to a directive from Regional manager Marcus Arroyo. There was also a written checklist in the FAA Crisis Management SOP which covered such reporting.

AIRCRAFT AS A WEAPON/SUICIDE HIJACKING/SUICIDE TERRORISM

[U] Stevens said that the practice of PPBM pre 9-11 exemplified that fact that the FAA didn't believe that suicide attacks were in the terrorist playbook for aviation.

PADGETT: (U) Padgett reported that there were reports pertaining to suicide missions: Algerians over Paris; a report of crashing an airplane over CIA; and there might have been something like Bojinka about exploding an aircraft over a populous us city. However, he did not specifically recall anything other than suggestions.

CANAVAN: Canavan does not remember talking a lot about aircraft as weapons. He said that, historically, hijacking did not involve using aircraft as weapons.

[SSI] [Redacted] 9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive [Redacted] (WERE THER ICF'S

ON THESE).

MORSE: When asked how he assessed the possibility of a suicide hijack mission, Morse said that in the back of his mind, he was aware of the possibility of the event (based on incidents in the 1970s and 1980s), but he stressed that he never saw any specific intelligence on a suicide hijacking plot.

(U) [Redacted] called the "theme of crashing airplanes into buildings" something that was inevitable because of the high profile nature of civil aviation. [Redacted] said he didn't want

to criticize Secretary Mineta or Administrator Garvey but that he couldn't believe they would ever say that "we never conceived of the use of aircraft as weapons." Logic dictated that such a possibility was a concern. In fact, in the summer of 2001, FAA did a great presentation for the airline security directors highlighting the potential for suicide hijacking.

SUICIDE ATTACKS

McDONNELL: Said in an offline TELCON that Alis Chiricanas Airlines hijacking was blown up by the hijacker, he believes.

 HAWLEY: Mike Sheehan of CTC gave a presentation on suicide terrorism that Pat McDonnell tasked Hawley to follow-up on--"Countering suicide terrorism" --he brings it to our attention because suicide hijack was on the radar screen. He raises the point because it shows international suicide terrorism was on the radar of the ACS.

HAWLEY: Strategic threat vectors took suicide hijack off the list.

 HAWLEY: Hawley said that a strategic assessment was published on 9-11-01, in the strategic assessment, "if they conduct a hijacking domestically, it will be a suicide hijack." Duane Mercer wrote an intelligence note on Ressam (UBL connection) that said in the last paragraph "it was significant that Ressam chose a domestic airport." This report was published on 9-11-01. "There was recognition within Intelligence and that they are targeting domestic airports; Ressam was clearly tied to UBL. Hawley said it would be a suicide hijack. (Hawley didn't elaborate on this point. What was he inferring? Or did the assessment say "suicide hijack?")

Manno indicated that suicide hijacking was "on our mind" after 1998 and was included in a 2000 and 2001 CD ROM presentation on the terrorist threat to civil aviation, but again no specific, credible information was available. The Air India and Air France hijackings were the basis for the concern about the suicide tactic.

SOLIDAY: [U] At a 1997 George Washington University conference, Soliday raised the issue of suicide attacks, but the "mantra" was non-suicide bombing with positive passenger bag match as the answer. In response to his specific question, an Israeli expert indicated that suicide attacks on civil aviation were not a threat. After 9/11, Soliday indicated that participants in the conference admitted that they missed that call.

WANSLEY: He did not recall receiving a CD Rom presentation from Pat McDonnell in the latter part of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, dealing with the hijacking threat to civil aviation, including domestic suicide hijacking.

PADGETT: (SSI) The FAA Intelligence Division had looked at the idea of "suicide attackers." Padgett set up a conference call with the analysts in his division to talk to a leading authority on suicidal terrorism, Dr. Ariel Murari, sometime before September 11th. He had given a talk on that subject at the international conference hosted by the

Belger: He agreed that the system was designed to stop crazies and criminals, but not the dedicated terrorist.

Butterworth viewed **potential threats to CAS** in several groups: The first group refers to the professional terrorist with financial backing, possibly state-sponsored. In Butterworth's words, "All civil aviation security can do is to get this hijacker to pause for a minute. It is impossible to design against these people. One can't shake down everyone at the airports. It's not workable."... "deadly and dumb people,"... The third group were "the nutcases;" individuals that try to walk onto a plane with a 38-caliber gun or a ticking briefcase, for instance. He indicated that the security system had better be able to stop this group.

CANAVAN: He said that in terms of hardened cockpit doors, hardened containers and the screening rules, the air carriers would either delay or kill the reform.

Canavan agreed with Irish Flynn that the system was built for the crazies and criminals, but not really terrorists who could always find a way to defeat the system if they really wanted to. (NOTE: BOTH ACS 1's AGREED THE SYSTEM WASN'T BUILT FOR TERRORISTS).

OSMUS: The weakness of the system is the "human factor" that with so many people churning through the system, and so few incidents, complacency sets in.

SOLIDAY: On flight safety, Soliday indicated that the airlines have to have "10 to the minus ninth redundancy" in mitigating potential hazards, but he has not been able to convince the industry to work toward some definite and analogous level of security risk to mitigate toward. The goal in security should also be to reduce risk via redundancy of counter-measures; no single tool is 100% effective.

[U] In Soliday's view, the thinking underlying the Common Strategy was that there were three kinds of potential hijackers to deal with: (1) crazies (whom the system could likely stop); (2) crooks (who won't kill you); and (3) well-trained and funded terrorists (who the system couldn't stop but who were few in number, especially those who the desire and ability to attack in the U.S.).

LUONGO: Leading up to September 11th, the FAA was conducting Special Emphasis Assessments (SEAs) at the airports to address priority security issues.

[U] Underwood said that his primary measure of success was incidents.

AVSEC TODAY (SEE ALSO RECOMMENDATIONS)

HALLETT: The list of new security measures were listed in FAA Security Directive 108-01-03A issued on September 12 at 4:23 pm.

[U] Longmire indicated that TSA currently has inadequate resources to meet the law's (ATSA) requirements for cargo and perimeter screening, and therefore has been compelled to largely keep in place the old system.

Morse does not see the evidence that the newly federalized aviation security system is being tested and examined with the same rigor that it was before 9/11/01. He said critically, "TSA is being expected to inspect itself;" implying that one agency cannot be expected to perform both functions very well.

MORSE: He worries that the new structure has minimal knowledge of aviation and little expertise in regulatory affairs. His initial impression is that TSA is doing a worse job in regulation and inspection and "in many respects, security is now worse." He believes that TSA's expedited rulemaking authority is a good thing, but that the agency needs a better management focus to fix problems with inspection, enforcement and compliance.

ROBINSON: He stated "we don't want to do to aviation, what the terrorists are trying to do."

9/11 Closed by Statute

ROBINSON: Industry demands and Congressional mandates have continued to prevent TSA from focusing on areas that admittedly need improvement, such as research and development of better equipment and better utilization of known intelligence.

ROBINSON: a more accurate number should be determined based on a strategic assessment of the number of flights per day and of what nature. Robinson indicated that he has "no idea" how the current force level for the FAM program was derived.

ROBINSON: He said the current policy is that no "selectee" will have anything further than electronic scrutiny of their baggage.

Robinson indicated that cargo security, an area not touched on earlier in the interview, is the greatest area of vulnerability

ROBINSON: a targeting tool is needed to identify what type of cargo should be inspected, and then an assurance must be met that 100-percent of that type of cargo is inspected 100-percent of the time. T

ROBINSON: hardened-cargo compartment program because of the high cost.

ROBINSON: research and development program needs more focus to create the "airport of the future."

[REDACTED] He said that KSM is Ramzi Yousef's uncle and that if Ramzi were interested in bojinka, KSM might still be.

SOLIDAY: He cited two companies had been working on a technology called "quadropole" which Soliday thought had great potential but it was denied certification. Soliday believes that there could be a huge reduction in human factors problems for screening if and when it or some equivalent "Red Light/Green Light" system is implemented which reduces the reliance on checkpoint screeners.

RED TEAM BRIEFING (SSI)

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RED TEAM BRIEFING: IAPR representatives also felt that budget constraints have hampered their operations. FSDs are struggling with space constraints, outdated security equipment, and the need for more EDS machines at major airports. IAPR would particularly like to see more funding for their cargo, general aviation, and tarmac projects.

BIN LADEN FLIGHTS OUT

BUCKINGHAM: Her recollection was that it happened on September 19th, after the airspace was reopened. She recalled that there still may have been a restriction on aircraft flying in from certain countries. Buckingham wanted to make sure it was properly cleared and her concerns were over who was to fly out and whether the security rules were being flouted. She recalled that the flight came to Boston from Canada. Kinton called the State Department etc and the response he got was to "let them go." She was also told there was going to be FBI "observation" of the flight. Later she read that the flight had made many stops around the country.

KINTON: Kinton recalled the September 19, 2001 charter flight to Logan to pick up Bin Laden family members. There was much confusion at that time with respect to air space and he wanted to make sure everyone that needed to know was involved (State Department, FBI and the State police). The FBI advised him to let the flight come. He remembered that the flight came out of Los Angeles going on to Orlando, Dallas, Boston, Gander and London, that a police officer got off in Boston, and that the FBI and Customs were there to meet the airplane. He saw the manifest, and will provide a copy to the Commission.

CAPPS I

[U] Riffe said that when FAA went to computerized passenger pre-screening. Some of the smaller airlines and airports continued to use Manual Prescreening. She stated that while the consequences of selection by CAPPS was solely explosives screening of checked baggage, selectees of the manual system continued to be subjected to a secondary hand search of carry-on baggage. She said the PSI's wondered why the FAA

wanted two different standards for the consequences of selection. Riffe felt that CAPPs was intended to get rid of the human element in prescreening to make it more consistent. She believes that diminishing the consequences of selection for those carrier that went to computer assisted prescreening was a decrease in security.

AHERN: [U] Ahern said that CAPPs was designed for a bombing threat more than anything else.

Arroyo said that the "procedure of escorting selectees and 'dumping their carry-on at the gate'" generated a lot of pushback from the ACLU and the Justice Department (pg 4 of Arroyo MFR

Belger stated that the intent of CAPPs was to zero in more precisely on the threat posed by bombers.
SSI)

BUTTERWORTH: Butterworth said that searches of carry-ons for pre-CAPPs I selectees were dropped in 1997. Such a requirement had been in effect via a Security Directive since 1996 (explosion of TWA 800). The security directive requiring the enhanced searching of selectees and carry-on luggage was allowed to expire in 1997.

Canavan thought that CAPPs I gave FAA a pretty good idea of who might be a risk to the aircraft based on the profile that had been built over the years. Canavan said that CAPPs I was going after explosives because it was among the top two or three Threats.)

Flynn indicated that at its inception, CAPPs was a system designed to supplement the EDS machines by "rationing" their use.

GARVEY: There were also concerns raised by the Arab-American community about being targets of security measures. She recalled a similar complaint on behalf of Arab-Americans from at least one Member of Congress. In response, Garvey went to Detroit to meet with the Arab-American community there.

HALLETT: Hallett said that the purpose of CAPPs was to find who might intend to do something bad to the United States, whether through bombing or hijacking.

[SSI]

9/11 Closed by Statute

HALLETT: However during the interview she was shown a copy of an ATA document to the FAA stressing that the only additional screening that CAPPs selectees should

undergo should be an explosives screening of their checked bags. They didn't want intrusive checkpoint screening to deter people from flying.

HALLETT: "the civil libertarians were winning the game in fashioning a CAPPs systems.

SSI Longmire stated that the original purpose of the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPs) was to insure that terrorists were not able to place a bomb in checked-in baggage. The selection criteria were based on that goal.

United has a letter from FAA chastising UAL about making sure that CAPPs wasn't discriminatory.

Osmus said that the CAPPs program was developed specifically for checked baggage because that's where the threat was perceived.

Osmus said it was envisioned that CAPPs could play a larger role than just baggage screening but that Admiral Flynn would have made a determination on this point in the 1996-1997 time frame.

PARKS: 1997 SD allowing selectee screening of person/carry-on to lapse. [SSI] Parks was asked if he recalled that in 1997 FAA determined that prescreening selectees would no longer have to undergo additional screening of their person and carry-on. He did recall that change in policy and he's wondered many times why that was allowed to happen.

(U) [] agreed that it was imprudent to stop the physical search of "selectees" and their carry on in 1998 at a time when the threat was going up.

Soliday reported that United was the first to "turn on" the CAPPs program in February of 1997. Part of the reason for Soliday's support for CAPPs was that, after a test (which he agreed to because of the human factors involved), he wasn't convinced that Positive Passenger Bag Match (PPBM), which was the main alternative to CAPPs, really mitigated risk. However, the Department of Justice objected to deployment of CAPPs because it felt the program was discriminatory. Justice demanded that the airlines keep a tally sheet on who was selected in order to prove non-discrimination, but Soliday felt this was unacceptable, and he offered to allow audits by the Department instead, which was agreed to. The audit standard became that if the bags of three or more individuals of the same ethnic background were selected within a limited time frame, CAPPs was having a discriminatory effect.

SOLIDAY []

[] 9/11 Closed by Statute []
[] Soliday reported he had to fire the people responsible. Soliday felt that one weakness of CAPPs was that it failed to use its built-in capacity to alter its criteria.

WANSLEY: [U] Wansley also noted that there were always concerns about the potential for discrimination in regard to prescreening programs.

PADGETT: The Gore Commission came along and endorsed the automated pre-screening concept in its final report in early 1997.

PADGETT: (SSI) Padgett further reported that since 1995, they have been telling the trained agents how to prioritize the signs, what to look for, etc. What the U.S. put in place overseas is largely an outgrowth of the Israeli method. It was the air carriers that came to the FAA in the late 1980s asking for permission to create a system that would generate far fewer selectees than what FAA's system was generating at its international locations.

SEE FULL PADGETT MFR

PADGETT: (SSI)

9/11 Closed by Statute

PADGETT:

9/11 Closed by Statute

PADGETT: (SSI)

9/11 Closed by Statute

Gore Commission in late January of 1997. In the conference call, he said that throughout all of his research, he had not found a single instance of a suicide attack carried out on aviation. He thought it was unlikely for psychological reasons related to the extended time between the "point of no return" and the execution. He certainly did not raise the possibility of multiple hijackers willing to kill themselves.

AIRLINES

JENKINS: [U] As PSI he evaluated the air carrier by the result of its inspections.

HAWLEY: The Security Directors, for the most part, had law enforcement backgrounds. All of them maintained contacts in that community. If the FAA issued a directive that required certain changes in response to an intelligence report, the SD would confirm or discredit the information through their own channels of verification. This mentality exhibited by the SDs made it that much harder for the FAA to regulate the industry.

MORSE The airlines were all unwilling to absorb the overhead in such a highly competitive market and they were never very good at doing security. "They were happy to contract out screening to the lowest bidder" and didn't like all the data entry time and cost of working the CAPPs system. Furthermore, long-term considerations seemed to not have much impact on the airlines' behavior with respect to security.

OSMUS: Cost was a big issue to the air carriers, and given the absence of problems they were reluctant to take costly action.

OSMUS: Another problem identified by Osmus was that the Security Directors for the air carriers were former FBI and DIA folks who would call colleagues from their former agencies. Often the information they received from their former colleagues would undermine the FAA's assessments.

OSMUS: Whereas an air carrier could lose certification because of safety issues, security was not a certificate issue. She concurred that the industry generally viewed security measures as "intrusive" to their operations.

SOLIDAY: after the finding of accidental cause of the TWA 800 crash implementing 100% baggage screening became again a huge controversy in the industry.

American

JENKINS: Driving force for American was on time departure

[U] Jenkins indicated that FAA's position was that the goal of checkpoints was to **detect** deadly or dangerous items (enforced by use of test objects), while American emphasized the standard of **deterrence**. Jenkins observed that one could not really test or enforce **deterrence**.

JENKINS: [U] United's testing program went beyond FAA requirements in that its audits were conducted (like FAA) by experienced corporate security personnel rather than by the individual stations, which produced higher quality audits than at American (or the industry norm). However, these audits were more administrative (bag match procedures, CAPPS operation, SIDA training, etc.) than performance tests, and like the other airlines, United mainly left checkpoint performance testing up to the FAA.

JENKINS: What the company stressed to their Ground Security Coordinators (GSC's) at the airports, and through them to the screening contractors, was on-time departures.

JENKINS: [SSI] According to Jenkins, American had "average" performance results both overall and for checkpoint screening (with a detection rate for FAA test objects). Among American's screening contractors, Argenbright was slightly better than the others. Jenkins recalled that American launched several initiatives (including performance awards and other incentives) to improve screener performance and circumvent FAA fines, but these didn't produce a significant impact.

JENKINS: He recalled that this airline challenged "everything" FAA tried to do with respect to security, and communicated their objections and protests in a variety of forms, including letters and e-mails. He categorized their general position as "obstinate" with respect to security matters and reported that they "never wanted to strengthen anything." However, Jenkins indicated that all of these categorizations applied to domestic security measures, and stemmed from American's view that there was not a serious domestic threat. By contrast, he felt that they had one of the strongest overseas security programs, and cited particularly their cooperative work with Customs on drug interdiction.

[U] Riffe believed the reason that their domestic security program lagged was because the carrier was influenced by the absence of domestic incidents. She said that American didn't believe the threat was domestic, and that it all came down to money. She said that they didn't want to spend money when no security incidents had occurred.

[U] Riffe stated that American did have an exceptional International Security Program but that its domestic program was lacking. The carrier's creation of its Domestic Security Program was the result of its being put on probation by EPA and FAA Hazmat for improperly storing hazardous materials. This problem is why the carrier created the position of Vice President for Safety, Security and Environmental (Tim Ahern).

[U] Riffe said that American was definitely concerned about fines. When she was assigned to be the PSI for American, the carrier was involved in a global settlement of its many fines. As part of the settlement, FAA wanted to put out a press release to announce the agreement, but American was adamantly opposed to doing so because the company feared the bad publicity.

[U] Overall, Riffe said that when it came to security American was a 5 on a 1-10 scale. She cited US Airways as an example of a top performing company on security who she would score as an 8.

[U] Riffe stated that American Airlines, like other carriers, tended to question FAA security rules and wanted to know what specific threats justified the particular measure that FAA was requiring. She said they would question, but would ultimately comply as required.

AHERN: When Mr. Baker took over as Vice Chairman they changed the structure so that Ahern and the security function reported directly to the Office of the Chairman (Carty and Baker). [U] Under this structure the security function had a direct line to the Office of the Chairman, rather than falling under the jurisdiction of the top operations officer (Arpey as of 9/11).

AHERN: The AAL general manager at individual airports was responsible for the day-to-day security performance at his or her facilities, and for making sure the airline was meeting FAA requirements.

WANSLEY: [U] Wansley stated that AAL had a Domestic Security Program that it started in 1999, which it used to improve passenger screening, and other security measures including access control. The program was designed to ensure that AAL was doing everything it could and should be doing; that the screening process was as effective as possible; and that AAL was complying with FAA regulations.

AHERN: [U] Ahern said that none of the information he received from the Domestic Security Program assessments indicated broad-based systemic problems. The issues were mainly with individuals who needed remedial training or some other adjustment. Many of the problems were related to record keeping.

[U] Stevens said that American Airlines was definitely a "bottom line" company. They would comply but not step out front on security issues, and would cut a corner if they could. As an example he cited an FAA requirement (through an SEA) that the air carrier have a person present at their checkpoints during certain periods of the day to ensure that operations were being conducted according to standard. He said that American wouldn't really cooperate with that requirement.

[U] While Stevens believed that Larry Wansley (American's security director) was committed to security, open to suggestions, and not contentious, Wansley's predecessor Jack Bullard was a bulldog hired to argue with the FAA, particularly about security violations and associated fines cited by the FAA. Bullard was very vocal, and in Steven's opinion hired to pushback at FAA.

[U] Stevens said that Bullard wouldn't so much dispute that the violations occurred but rather downplayed their importance because he said "there wasn't a threat." Stevens said he found it ironic that AAL headquarters where the executive offices were located had very tight security and one had to have an ID to get into and around the building, yet Bullard would argue that ID rules weren't important when it came to the Air Operations Area and SIDA areas because of the absence of a threat.

United

[U] With respect to performance on FAA tests, the SEA's for United were "pretty good" on the whole (though some were not). Checkpoint results were "average" but where the company personnel were directly involved (including checked bag screening and CAPPS), United was above average.

SOLIDAY: testing CTX machines, which United was the first to undertake.

SOLIDAY many airlines staffed key security roles with former law enforcement officers, whereas United chose him, with primarily an aviation background, which made him more inclined to closely examine risks.

Soliday created his own internal audit teams that "roamed" the United security system to monitor training and compliance with FAA standards.



[U] Soliday cited as erroneous information Team 7 said they may have received from the air carriers to the effect that UAL had no means of communicating with all of their dispatchers simultaneously for the purpose of issuing a blanket cockpit warning to UAL's flights in the air

STUDDERT: He is not aware of any issues the FAA had with UAL on the security front.

STUDDERT: He was not aware that the intelligence community perceived a greater threat in the summer of 2001, or that it was a time of higher alert. (NOTE: Either was ARPEY OR BELGER—CHECK GARVEY)

Studdert stated his belief that UAL's checkpoint operations, operated by subcontractors, were effective. Studdert did not respond to the fact that many of the shortcomings of checkpoint screening were presented in public hearings before Congress.

[U] Jenkins reported that United Airlines was similar to US Airways in being pro-active and having a good corporate security department. In fact, United helped the FAA out and "volunteered for just about everything they could" with respect to security. For example, United was at the very forefront of CTX deployment.

[U] United's testing program went beyond FAA requirements in that its audits were conducted (like FAA) by experienced corporate security personnel rather than by the individual stations, which produced higher quality audits than at American (or the industry norm). However, these audits were more administrative (bag match procedures, CAPPS operation, SIDA training, etc.) than performance tests, and like the other airlines, United mainly left checkpoint performance testing up to the FAA.

AVSEC IN GENERAL (PRE 9-11)

9/11 Closed by Statute

PADGETT: He said that there's no question that the original intent of the program was to identify terrorists. [Redacted]

PADGETT: [SSI] Padgett said he was personally disappointed that CAPPs consequences were narrowed in the guidance documents.

CAPPs II

Belger: We will never get 100% detection so we are better off knowing who the people are (threats). "The good guy with a knife is not a threat. The bad guy with bare hands is a threat."

CHECKPOINT SCREENING

JENKINS: (CONTINUOUS HAND SEARCHES) [Redacted]

9/11 Closed by Statute

[U] Jenkins indicated that resolution of magnetometer or hand-wand alarms required the screener to determine the specific cause of the alarm.

[SSI]

9/11 Closed by Statute

[SSI]

9/11 Closed by Statute

JENKINS [U] An explanation of how this was to be done was provided in a series of questions and answers prepared by Fran Lozito that were made available to carriers and their screening contractors on the world wide web. (Jenkins noted that TSA has discontinued the use of these question and answer "boards.") The PSI's (including Jenkins) made these requirements clear to the carriers during 2001, and the latter should have been fully aware of them on 9/11.

[U] Riffe described the testing that FAA used to conduct on checkpoint operations. Checkpoints were tested twice a month to see how well they were detecting test objects.

new fly supposed to do hand search true checked

Get
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The checkpoint received one comprehensive assessment per year (looking at training, equipment etc.) and three supplemental tests per year.

[U] Riffe agreed that the ACSSP and Alert Level III required carriers to randomly conduct hand searches of carry-on bags on a continuous basis and that this meant a hand search was supposed to be going on at all times except for when the screener was transporting the bag from the x-ray machine to the table for the hand search. Riffe said that the random/continuous hand search was not practiced the way it should have been. In fact she said when FAA tested this requirement, they found that the carriers/contractors did it only about 50% of the time. She recounted an incident in which she observed American checkpoints at DFW failing to conduct the random/continuous hand searches and called American's corporate office to complain. She also notified the CASFO.

[U] Riffe also stated that the ACSSP required the Ground Security Coordinator (GSC) to frequently monitor checkpoint performance, but that this was not properly practiced. After 9-11 a Security Directive was issued requiring air carrier supervisory staff to monitor checkpoint operations at all times.

BOIVIN: The test results were "disastrous," with only small performance variations among the various checkpoints. The biggest problem was that the screening system appeared to

CANAVAN: He pointed out that you can never get to 100 percent detection but that anything over 90 percent was pretty good.

FLYNN: a façade of screening just for deterrence sake was unlikely actually to deter in the long run. (THIS IS IMPORTANT IN THE DETERRANCE VERSUS PREVENTION PIECE).

GARVEY: There needed to be recognition that it was virtually impossible to get a "foolproof" system.

HALLETT: She stated that we hadn't had any hijackings in a long time and that the magnetometers and x-ray equipment at checkpoints that processed all passengers, whether or not they were selectees, seemed to be doing the job.

HALLETT: She said the primary issue (with poor screener performance) was "boredom."

LONGMIRE: 100% detection would require extra time for processing passengers, and greater intrusion into the personal belongings of passengers, and would "shut down the transportation system."

9/11 Closed by Statute

LONGMIRE: "the only things we got them to pay attention to" were the things FAA tested, including access control, screening test objects and baggage acceptance. If an item was not tested, compliance went down, and conversely testing brought compliance rates up. According to Longmire, "It was human nature. People are going to focus on what you are testing them on."

LONGMIRE: [SSI]

9/11 Closed by Statute

MORSE: He candidly admitted that screening at the checkpoint did not do a good enough job to prevent it, observing that "screening is inherently tough." The deployment of EDS machines marked the FAA's best effort to address the problem that it saw as the biggest, most probable threat to the industry.

Morse remembers that ATA was particularly focused on prohibiting or restricting items which looked "menacing." The COG drew the line at 4-inch blades because that was enforceable, and such items

9/11 Closed by Statute

Parks stated that each airport including Dulles would have to undergo a comprehensive annual assessment on its checkpoint screening operations by the FAA. In addition, each checkpoint was checked-out twice per month by the FAA through testing.

9/11 Closed by Statute

CASFO always shared information on testing results at the consortium meetings, but he wouldn't give advance warning of the testing so as to avoid invalidating the results.

WANSLEY: [U] Wansley said the airline's security and "screening" system was based on "deterrence."

WANSLEY: [U] Wansley agreed that federal rules about what constituted a prohibited weapon were vague.

WANSLEY: [U] Wansley stated that when hand-wanding a passenger, the checkpoint screener must identify the item that alarmed the magnetometer, not merely hand-wand the passenger and then approve the passenger to proceed if the hand-wand doesn't alarm.

AHERN: The AAL general manager at individual airports was responsible for the day-to-day security performance at his or her facilities, and for making sure the airline was meeting FAA requirements.

AHERN: [U] Ahern said that none of the information he received from the Domestic Security Program assessments indicated broad-based systemic problems. The issues were mainly with individuals who needed remedial training or some other adjustment. Many of the problems were related to record keeping.

AHERN: [U] In regard to the findings of the Domestic Security Program specifically for Dulles and Logan prior to 9/11, Ahern said that he recalls that Dulles was "quite good."

AHERN: He said that well before 9/11 AAL had fired the security contractor for poor performance at Logan. After the change of vendor the reports improved. Ahern said he doesn't believe from an AAL standpoint that anything stood-out at Boston or Dulles that would indicate to terrorists they were particularly vulnerable.

[U] Ahern said that the focus of checkpoints was "deterrence." In regard to FAA/IG/GAO audits of checkpoints, he remembers seeing results for his cities that were actually quite good. He said that from a goal-setting standpoint, you are striving for 100 percent deterrence. He said that as far as he was concerned, that when you look at all the customers that checkpoints served they "did their job" and "deterrence was there." [SSI] Ahern said that the Checkpoint Operations Guide, which listed items considered as "deadly or dangerous" weapons was developed by the industry and reviewed by the FAA. Checkpoints were just one of a number of circles of deterrence, and that in the 10 years leading up to 9-11 the checkpoints were quite successful in "deterring."

Ahern was asked about the portion of the Air Carrier Standard Security Program calling on carriers to use "common sense" about what items to allow passengers to carry into the cabin of an aircraft. The ACSSP provided an example as follows:

9/11 Closed by Statute

Ahern

responded that it didn't work that way. There wasn't that kind of discretion.

Ahern said he didn't think the FAA intended to be vague in their directions to the air carriers. To his knowledge there was nothing (i.e. intelligence information) presented to the FAA or the air carriers that told them they should do something other than what they were doing at the checkpoints, at the gates, or on the aircraft to counter an expected threat.

[U] Underwood explained that there was some discussion of federalizing the screening function prior to 9-11 but it had been deemed too expensive.

COCKPIT DOOR

AHERN:[U] Ahern said that a hardened cockpit door on 9-11 wouldn't have done any good because the "common strategy" was to cooperate. The common strategy was a policy established by the FAA for the industry.

BELGER: An impregnable door can be a safety concern in the even of decompression.

BOIVIN: With respect to cockpit door hardening, this effort began with a 1998 or 1999 request by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee request in order to try to implement an ICAO pronouncement "urging," but not requiring, such action. According to Mr. Boivin, the airlines were adamant that it couldn't be done in a cost-effective manner.

CANAVAN: rules required the pilot to keep the cockpit door closed and locked. By hardening it you could protect it better (even though it went against the common strategy).

GARVEY: After Desert Storm, she discussed the subject with Israeli authorities, who had implemented more secure cockpit doors in response to the terrorist threat. Garvey reported that, while at the FAA, she struggled with the issue because of Flight Standards' safety concerns about decompression. For the Israelis, the terrorist threat clearly outweighed the decompression risk, but this was not clear in the U.S. prior to 9/11.

MARQUIS: They never got a real feel for how the hijackers got in the cockpit but they reported that the cockpit doors were "pretty flimsy."

SOLIDAY: U] ALPA had "teed up" the issue of cockpit door strengthening several times in the late 1990s, but never as a priority issue. Soliday didn't recall much work being done on the issue until after 9/11, and feels he would have known if such had occurred because United took the lead in doing the post-9/11 engineering work for more secure cockpit doors.

COCKPIT KEYS

[SSI] 9/11 Closed by Statute. She thought that this was a questionable practice, but there was no regulation prohibiting it, and any attempt to regulate it wouldn't meet the cost/benefit requirements of federal regulatory law.

[SSI] 9/11 Closed by Statute

MARQUIS ET. AL.: With respect to keys to the cockpit, the AA flight standards manual calls for flight crewmembers to guard their key carefully.

9/11 Closed by Statute

9/11 Closed by Statute

SOLIDAY:

9/11 Closed by Statute

WOODWARD:

9/11 Closed by Statute

COMMON STRATEGY

AHERN:[U] Ahern said that a hardened cockpit door on 9-11 wouldn't have done any good because the "common strategy" was to cooperate. The common strategy was a policy established by the FAA for the industry.

Arroyo: "hijacking was always thought to involve negotiation and conflict resolution.

BOIVIN: The whole system adhered to the "mantra" that in a hijacking the goal must be to appease hijackers and get the plane on the ground.

CANAVAN: the strategy—to get the plane on the ground somewhere and negotiate it out. The idea was to cooperate, get the plane on the ground and go from there and hopefully it will turn out all right.

CANAVAN: Canavan said that they didn't discuss the need for a great domestic air marshal program because the threat was overseas. He cited the fact that there had been no hijackings in quite some time and those that had occurred happened overseas.

FLYNN: The protocol in the case of a hijacking was to appease the hijacker and divert the plane. They didn't consider suicide hijacking a credible threat.

LONGMIRE: they thought they could handle hijackings, either by letting the hijackers go to their destination of choice or by having the FBI launch a hostage rescue operation.

MORSE: The strategy, which he indicated was "easily misunderstood," was many years old, dating back to around 1980, and was also the subject of an FAA/FBI MOU which had last been updated in 1997.

Morse said that over time, history had shown that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it was to have a peaceful resolution. One reason for this might be that the hostages had time to develop relationships with the hijackers.

Morse indicated that the training materials developed by American Airlines "mocked" the Common Strategy, apparently in an effort to use humor to get the point across. Commission staff has not viewed the American Airlines training materials.

MORSE: The FBI came back and said that the substantive content of the video was not, in fact, irrelevant; it was pretty good. However, it agreed the tape could use updating for the benefit of the viewers. The idea of suicide hijackers never entered their discussions. Looking back, Morse realizes now that in their discussions, key factors weren't considered such as the communications improvements over the years (air phones, cell phones, ACARS messages, etc). It goes without saying that on 9/11/01, these communication tools were instrumental to our understanding of what happened that day. In late 1999 or early 2000, the topic of updating the training materials for the Common Strategy was raised at a meeting at ATA Morse attended with the airline security directors. The FAA needed the air carriers to invest in the project. Morse reported, "It did not go well;" no one wanted to help. For instance, no airline wanted to loan a plane to the project for filming, and there was little enthusiasm from ATA. In spite of this reaction, FAA proceeded with plans to update the Strategy, primarily through planning on use of current plane outfitted with current communications devices (including ACARS and cell phones). In response to a question, Morse indicated that at this time (2000 and early 2001) he was "not so sure" the basic doctrine was still sound.

MORSE: In the summer of 2001, the joint project to update the Common Strategy was underway and they began filming the new training video. A highjack exercise was conducted in collaboration with the Miami FBI Field Office, Miami Dade County Police Department, the SWAT team, and Varig Airlines, utilizing a 767. The underlying doctrine was still under development at this time, and was not finalized before 9/11/01. The video and all of the materials have been turned over to TSA. (IS MORSE SAYING THAT THEY WERE RECONSIDERING THE DOCTRINE).

(SSI)

9/11 Classified Information

SOLIDAY: [U] The Common Strategy for dealing with hijackings was driven by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) according to Soliday, and had been around for a long time. It was based on the traditional "quid pro quo" (where hijackers wanted something in exchange for the release of the aircraft and passengers). The probability of any other kind of scenario was very low.

[U] In Soliday's view, the thinking underlying the Common Strategy was that there were three kinds of potential hijackers to deal with: (1) crazies (whom the system could likely stop); (2) crooks (who won't kill you); and (3) well-trained and funded terrorists (who the system couldn't stop but who were few in number, especially those who the desire and ability to attack in the U.S.).

Hallett said that she lobbied for the creation of an aviation desk at the FBI to improve intelligence about terrorism. Hallett believes not following through with this was the single biggest mistake bearing on aviation security.

HALLETT: (travel by hijackers) Within an hour, ARC created a report and gave it to Hallett. The information could be flush with leads about the hijackers, and possibly accomplices with whom they traveled. The FBI never asked for such information. Hallett gave the information to the FBI and CIA (one of Tenet's deputies) but she does not believe anything was done with the information.

HAWLEY: There were also reports that Hawley thought the FAA should receive from FBI that were not shared. He said that he came across circulars with specific names that [redacted] (the FAA liaison to FBI at the time) thought were not significant to the FAA. Hawley suggested that [redacted] was "firm about it; he didn't want to discuss it."

Hawley's only criticism of [redacted] was that he "was so long out of the office that he may have lost touch with his FAA roots." Sometimes, the press was the first source of information FAA received of potential threats that FBI was working on.

MANNO: [SSI] Headquarters

9/11 Classified Information

MANNO Weaknesses: While intelligence sharing had improved by 2001, the FBI and other members of the Intelligence Community did not fully recognize the need for FAA to have the information it wanted. The FBI was not as interested in developing intelligence as in investigating it.

[redacted] In May of 1998 thru October of 1998 he split time between the FBI and State Department. In October he was assigned to the FBI full time and was originally assigned to the counter-terrorism assessment and warning unit. In December of 1998 he was asked to join the team investigating the Africa bombings in the Usama Bin Laden (UBL) unit, specifically the East African Intelligence unit. He remained in the Usama Bin Laden unit and the Radical Fundamentalist Unit. During this time when he wasn't doing FAA work he was conducting threat analysis for the UBL unit. He was responsible for every significant issue affecting civil aviation.

[redacted] said that the FBI regarded him as a detailee. The FAA saw him as a liaison, the FBI saw him as a detailee and he tried to do both (i.e. "serve two masters"). about 60% of his time on FAA liaison and 40% on FBI tasks (U) [redacted] was responsible for any threat to civil aviation/airports whether in the context of criminal investigations or national security intelligence. He was also available to work with FBI legal attaches on issues affecting civil aviation overseas.

(U) [redacted] was unable to describe standing orders to field offices about how to share civil aviation issues with either his office or [redacted]

[redacted] said the he learned about the Phoenix memo after September 11, 2001

(U) [redacted] was asked why we tasked the intelligence community to track individuals seeking aviation skills overseas but we would not undertake that task domestically. [redacted] replied that on a case-by-case basis if a person was a concern they would look into it, but there wasn't a "collection" requirement in general about flight schools.

[redacted]: (U) When presented with information from the Joint Inquiry that the FBI had asked 24 field offices in 1998-1999 to monitor flight training schools, [redacted] said he was not aware of it, but the information should have passed through him.

(U) [redacted] stated that there was no effort to cross-reference airmen certificates with terrorist watch lists nor was there any discussion of such an effort that he was aware of.

[redacted]

[redacted] (U) If an issue is "specific" "credible" and "counterable" it would be issued in a security directive.

[redacted] When she first assigned to work on civil aviation security, it was only on a part-time basis.

[redacted] The first grouping of these assessments was supposed to be completed in May of 1999 (including assessments for Boston, Dulles and Newark Airports). In May of 1999 [redacted] insisted that she be able to work full time on the civil aviation account and she was assigned full time. The first group of JVA's was completed sometime toward the end of FY 1999. A report was supposed to be produced for each airport once every three years. the FBI decided to do 1/3 of the JVA's each year and then start the cycle over in order to maintain the appropriate pace of reporting.

[U] [redacted] said that the terrorist threat assessments accompanying the JVA's included information on what groups were present in the areas surrounding the airport.

[redacted] said that she told [redacted] that if anything were specific, credible about a threat to civil aviation domestically the Bureau would share it with the FAA. While [redacted] was confident that she would hear about any such threats from the Special Agents assigned to airports, she couldn't be sure she got all information that was provided to FBI headquarters. On the criminal side she did not check the Automated Case File for aviation related issues.

[redacted] referred to [redacted] as a "detailee" rather than a liaison

[REDACTED] was not familiar with the tasking of FBI investigation into flight schools in 1998 or with the "reading requirements" given by the FAA to the FBI guiding what categories of intelligence the Bureau was expected to provide to the FAA.

[REDACTED] was not familiar with the Phoenix EC on flight training or the Moussaoui case until September 12, 2001.

[REDACTED] said that she didn't receive FAA intelligence assessments, but if she had she would have gotten them out to the FBI's airport liaison agents.

[U] [REDACTED] said that the FBI was not certain of its role in Civil Aviation Security. She said that this might still be the case.

PADGETT: (SSI) Padgett felt that the process worked extremely well for the CIA, and that NSA, DOD and State were well aware on several occasions. However, FAA intelligence heads were continually concerned about what they were and were not receiving from the FBI. There was the issue of protecting aspects of ongoing criminal investigations that prohibited the Bureau from sharing information with the FAA.

PADGETT: Padgett said that the FBI did not want to take the lead in information collection in such cases. Normally, one agency takes the lead on particular cases, and because the focus was domestic, Padgett naturally assumed the FBI would have the lead. He expressed his concern at the time that no other agency was ever given the official lead on collecting information on domestic threats.

PADGETT: (U) The only continual problem he was aware of was the reporting from the FBI.

FINES

[U] Stevens stated that American like to have penalties accumulate and then negotiate them down in a global settlement. As part of this strategy American would delay the case so it got old, making it harder for the FAA to make its case before an Administrative Law Judge or in court because the trail was cold or the employee had moved on. He said that American's primary concern was whether the violation would be made public. The company feared bad publicity more than the cost of the fine, which he said they factored into their cost of doing business. Stevens said he was never involved in a case in which American did not push to make sure the violation wasn't publicized. In 1996, FAA changed the rule requiring that any fine or aggregation of fines over \$50,000 had to be reported publicly. Stevens said he remembers that in 1993 nearly 162 cases had been written against AAL totaling nearly \$6 million in fines. AAL and the FAA negotiated the fine down to \$75,000 which FAA agreed to because many of the cases were so old, and therefore difficult to prove.

[U] Riffe stated that FAA General Counsel's office would negotiate the fines in order to avoid having to go to court with the airlines.

BUTTERWORTH: Administrative law judge had said that you couldn't actually prove if the screener would be able to find the test object in the screened bag if there was something in the bag obstructing the screener's view. This ruling dated back to 1990-91 and heavily influenced FAA's regular testing. Butterworth indicated that, because of the ALJ ruling, it would be difficult for the FAA to seek a civil fine if the test that the screener failed was not clear-cut.

Butterworth was asked the 9/11 family question with respect to the lowering of fines. Butterworth said they were lowered as a result of the negotiation settlement between FAA and the air carrier. The two lawyers would hash it out, and ultimately fines were lowered. Fines were lowered as a result of the negotiation settlement. Two things the carriers care about: Where the airline was in relation to the rest of the pack (United was always way ahead), and deflecting negative publicity. The longer it took to resolve the issue the colder the trail got on the evidence of the carrier/screener malfeasance which made throwing the book at them difficult.

Flynn said the airlines considered civil penalties for infraction/violations of FAA directives as "a cost of doing business."

Flynn said those negotiations were conducted counsel and counsel and that he had no role.

GARVEY: Ms. Garvey could not recall any instance in which she was involved in making decisions on fines.

GARVEY: Ms. Garvey recommended that the whole system of fines and enforcement should be reviewed. She believes that the airlines did regard the fines as just a cost of doing business.

MORSE: Morse felt that fines and other enforcement mechanisms were not an effective tool in producing better performance. The airlines and airports saw penalties as a "cost of doing business," and Morse quoted one airline security director as commenting that, "We plan for these violations like bad weather." Frequent reductions in the fines frustrated the security inspectors, lowering their morale.

STUDDERT: The board needed to know about expenses (including fines) above a certain amount, but given the cost of the fines for such a large company it wasn't a major issue.

FLIGHT SCHOOLS

HAWLEY: The Manila plot was the first indication of flight school angle.

HIJACKER SURVEILLANCE

[U] Buckingham learned, but not until after 9/11, that the hijackers had apparently undertaken prior surveillance of Logan. Afterwards, one of the hijackers' cars was discovered in the parking garage and the electronic record kept by the airport disclosed that the car had been in and out of the garage on several occasions. (GET THE SPECIFICS)

HIJACKING VERSUS BOMBING

FLYNN: Hijackings weren't a priority during his tenure as ACI because there were very few of them.

GARVEY: Garvey noted that the last domestic hijacking had been in 1991. She felt that in traditional hijackings, the aviation security system had a greater sense of "control" (via negotiations) than in the case of explosives, and the latter also generally produced greater consequences. She did not believe, pre-9/11, that suicide hijackings rose to the same level of potential threat as either a traditional hijacking or sabotage.

INTELLIGENCE

PADGETT: (SSI)

9/11 Classified Information

The assumption made on the part of the intelligence community was that FAA was only interested in terrorists targeting planes or specific mentions of aviation.

PADGETT: (SSI) Padgett felt that the process worked extremely well for the CIA, and that NSA, DOD and State were well aware on several occasions. However, FAA intelligence heads were continually concerned about what they were and were not receiving from the FBI. There was the issue of protecting aspects of ongoing criminal investigations that prohibited the Bureau from sharing information with the FAA. On forums that focused on activity in the United States,

PADGETT: Padgett said that the FBI did not want to take the lead in information collection in such cases. Normally, one agency takes the lead on particular cases, and because the focus was domestic, Padgett naturally assumed the FBI would have the lead. He expressed his concern at the time that no other agency was ever given the official lead on collecting information on domestic threats.

PADGETT: (U) The only continual problem he was aware of was the reporting from the FBI.

Arroyo said he remembered the chatter, and that there was nothing on hijack with boxcutters or knives; nothing to heighten us, to set the magnetometers at a more sensitive dial.

Arroyo: "Terrorists were operating in this area." (listen to tape to be sure).

[REDACTED] said that the FAA continuously complained that they weren't receiving intelligence on the domestic front.

Susan Baer: Nothing suggested that terrorist communities were active in her area. (compare this to Arroyo's viewpoint).

BELGER: FAA ACI produced a daily intelligence briefing (classified). The briefing would be read by Shirley Miller (Belger's assistant). Anything necessary would be called to Belger's attention by Miller. Belger would then pass anything he thought necessary up to the administrator.

He also recalled FBI agent John O'Neill's testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee wherein he was unwilling to corroborate FAA claims about credible threats to civil aviation.

Canavan said that he would talk security with Monte Belger, the Deputy Administrator, but that he didn't talk to Garvey about it. She was very busy. If he had an issue he would talk to Monte.

Canavan doesn't remember hearing any problems about the ability of FAA's liaisons with the IC to obtain the access and information they needed. He said he talked personally to Cofer Black and Dale Watson and told them just to give FAA everything that had anything to do with aviation. They agreed to do so. Canavan said he took it on "good faith" that this was what was happening.

FLYNN: Richard Clarke was present when Flynn urged the intelligence community to provide FAA with more intelligence affecting civil aviation in order to step-up security at airports.

Flynn represented the FAA at meetings of the National Security Council's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that pertained to civil aviation security.

Flynn reportedly had a much better appreciation of what was going on in Beirut than in Detroit,

(SSI) Flynn received a daily intelligence brief produced by Pat McDonnell's office (ACI).

FLYNN: The system's greatest weakness was the failure to monitor domestic groups that posed a threat to aviation in spite of Flynn's repeated requests for more information from

the Bureau and other law enforcement agencies. Flynn characterized the information on domestic threats as "wooly."

Ms. Garvey indicated that Irish Flynn had a "pretty direct line" to both her and Deputy Administrator Belger whenever he needed to discuss anything. She did not receive daily reports, but relied on Flynn to keep her informed and anytime he needed her attention he got it.

GARVEY: she didn't think she had initiated specific briefings on security with the Secretary.

HALLETT: The industry never felt as if it was getting enough information about intelligence, and depended completely upon the FAA for threat information.

HAWLEY: Potentially prompted by the USS Cole bombing, an updated list in 2000 (sent to the JIC) was delivered to the intelligence community.

HAWLEY: CIA resisted efforts to share any information with FAA on UBL (Usama Bin Laden).

HAWLEY: To change policy, the intelligence division needed to support the proposal with "credible and specific" reports.

HAWLEY: The hijack of India Air that eventually landed in Kandahar took place exactly as Matt had forecasted. Hawley said of Korman: "He was right on the money" and everyone knew it. (NOTE: This substantiated the notion that hijacking would be a hostage taking at a friendly location).

HAWLEY: He said he never saw that the Phoenix memo, and he thought the FAA still doesn't have a copy of it to this day.

KINTON: He recalled that before 9/11, it was all about keeping bombs off airplanes, and many were still debating Lockerbie.

MANNO: ACI tasked the IC to look for capabilities and intentions to target civil aviation.


MANNO: He said that his colleagues used to say to the IC "You guys can tell us what's happening on a street in Kabul, but you can't tell us what's going on in Atlanta."

[SSI] Manno cited the 1995 intelligence estimate and the 1997 update as important documents about the level of threat that helped convince air carrier executives and security directors that the threat to civil aviation was real and substantial. Manno also mentioned that Air Carrier security directors would come into ACI for classified briefings, and that ACI would hold sessions for Ground Security Coordinators and other security personnel.

MORSE: In 1986, he moved to the FAA where he assisted in the establishment of an intelligence division for civil aviation security. He named Richard Clarke, Oliver North, and William Vincent as three members of the Administration who were instrumental in establishing an intelligence division for FAA because of their perception that FAA needed help in its overseas intelligence.

 MORSE: The Inter-agency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) was sponsored by the National Security Council. The FAA Intelligence division had a seat on the Committee. The Committee discussed guidelines for the intelligence community as a whole. It defined terms and priorities, functioned as a nexus point for the different agencies, and fostered analyst-to-analyst exchanges. It also did periodic threat assessments.

(U)  said there were "so many" UBL threats about using aircraft. It had been a consistent theme over the years, but he doesn't remember a specific threat by UBL to smash a plane into a U.S. airport.

 (SSI)  He cited the fact that one of Ramzi Yousef's confederates was a trained commercial pilot and that part of the Bojinka plot was to smash a plane into CIA headquarters.

[U] Soliday recalled that the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate had indicated that the threat to civil aviation was rising. In 1996 he was named to the FAA's Baseline Working Group (BWG), which concluded the same thing as it sought to raise the security baseline for civil aviation.

 KORMANN: In 1996, the Baseline Security Working Group was established in response to a NIE statement that listed group identities and locations of terrorists, and that specified a terrorist threat to civil aviation.

UNDERWOOD: [U] Underwood provided a daily security briefing to Sec. Mineta (SEIB); FAA put out a daily intelligence digest and USCG put out a daily Intelligence summary. He said Mineta was always very interested in intelligence and security.

KNIVES

 ARROYO: Arroyo said that a 1992 memo went to the 700's that knives were the primary weapon of choice for hijackers.

BOIVIN: In 1993, "Ort" Steele had wanted to ban knives, but Boivin told him he could try, but that in practice they would be too hard to find, which he proceeded to demonstrate via a demonstration at Dulles, where he asked Steele to find knives hidden in bags passed through the x-ray equipment. Boivin added that it wouldn't be hard for

9/11 Closed by Statute

Furthermore, pre-September 11, 2001 it was believed to be implausible hijackers (unlikely to be suicidal) would use knives given the technology available at that time. It was impossible to prevent someone from getting a knife on the plane. The prohibited items list for airliners reflected items that were deemed "menacing" (presenting a clear and obvious threat). That distinction represents the difference between a box cutter a small knife (a tool) and a switchblade (menacing).

Hawley did not recall the 1992 memo from ACI to the "700s" concerning the use of knives in hijackings by terrorists. He said that John Harris was on the day watch, and he might recall such a memo.

[U] Longmire did not recall the 1992-93 FAA study on knife use in hijackings. He did recall that the 4-inch standard (for prohibition of longer blades) was derived primarily from state standards.

MORSE: The 4-inch standard was set in part because knives of shorter length were legal in all of the U.S. (except New York state which had a 3 inch threshold) and were thus not regulated.

Morse remembers that ATA was particularly focused on prohibiting or restricting items which looked "menacing." The COG drew the line at 4-inch blades because that was enforceable,

9/11 Closed by Statute

Osmus said there were two factors leading to the 4" standard. 1) Traditional hijackers used weapons such as guns, explosives and large knives. Small knives were not part of the equation. 2) Sometime in the 1980's FAA conducted an informal survey of state laws to determine what was and wasn't legal to carry. The 4" standard was drawn from that canvas.

9/11 Closed by Statute

Testing protocols were issued by the FAA and there were "very tight procedures" for how inspectors would conduct their testing.

RANDOL: box cutters were a common item around aircraft because they were used by maintenance personnel.

RANDOL: "no matter how good the screening was, if those (short-bladed knives) were detected they would have to give it back" to the passenger. In Randol's view, September 11th was not a screening failure.

LOGAN AIRPORT

[U] Stevens said that the LEO's at Boston were very well trained and professional. He said that because Logan paid overtime the job was coveted and everyone wanted to do a good job so they didn't lose their position.

[U] Stevens also said that Joe Lawless was very professional. He said that politically Logan may have needed to make a change after 9-11 by transferring Lawless but operationally Lawless had not dropped the ball at all.

Buckingham: Logan Airport, Hanscom Field, Worcester Airport and the Port of Boston.

Buckingham: For example, runway expansion at Logan has been an issue on both of these fronts for the past 30 years.

Buckingham: Massport's instituting finger-printing for background checks around 1998.

Buckingham: Her major pre-9/11 security concerns with respect to the airport were: 1) runway safety (they did yearly drills to enhance); 2) perimeter security (with water on three sides of the facility); and 3) bombs (especially a bomb-carrying car at the entrance).

Buckingham: Lawless had done a memo on Logan vulnerabilities, including screening, and another on the general terrorist threat.

Lawless did raise a concern with Buckingham that the FBI was not being a partner in sharing information relevant to Logan, a problem which he and she felt was not unique to Boston.

Buckingham reported that the Massport Chairman of the Board, Mark Robinson, wanted to determine how to lessen the time spent going through security at Logan in order to improve customer satisfaction. In response, in late 2000 Massport staff developed a Guaranteed Passengers Standards program, which established goals for passenger processing times based on the airlines' own standards, and devised a system for Massport to monitor the airlines' performance.

Buckingham: She was aware that sometimes they were concerned about him "going too far," for example with extensive background checks (about which FAA sent him a letter asking him to stop).

Buckingham: Both the family assistance center (for victims' families) and the emergency Operations Center were operational by 9:30 AM.

Buckingham: Massport had its own checklist on top of the FAA requirements. Logan was finally re-opened at 5AM on the 15. When did the Bin Laden flights leave?

[U] Buckingham learned, but not until after 9/11, that the hijackers had apparently undertaken prior surveillance of Logan. Afterwards, one of the hijackers' cars was discovered in the parking garage and the electronic record kept by the airport disclosed that the car had been in and out of the garage on several occasions. (GET THE SPECIFICS)

Buckingham was aware of the story about a Middle Easterner who was given a tour of the Logan tower and that it had been investigated and discounted. She cited it as an example of something that had nothing to do with 9-11. He was a pilot innocently given the tour and they found him and talked to him after the fact

KINTON: Massport is a multipurpose port authority covering bridges, maritime facilities (including containerized cargo and cruise ships), several airports, and a development department that handles properties around the waterfront.

KINTON: The Governor appoints the Board to 7 year terms (staggered). Kinton's immediate supervisor is the CEO.

KINTON: (above and beyond) finger-printing for those seeking access badges prior to the federal requirement for the same, its hiring of more canine teams (for detection of explosives) than required), and its development of a "laser" team of 5 or 6 state police officers with a specific assignment to check airport security (via ID checks, SIDA challenges, door checks, etc.). This last was in place by 1999. Finally, though more a safety than security matter, the fire department was required to have a volume of foam and water triple the federal standard and to be able to get to the end of the furthest runway in 2 minutes or less.

KINTON: FBI approached Massport about members of Hamas and Hezbollah working at Logan for Massport and an airline, as well as about a cab driver at the Airport associated with the Cole bombing.

KINTON: Lawless and the other senior airport staff were given an annual performance appraisal which listed "5 or 6" priority goals and objectives for that year.

Kinton believes that the Lawless memo to Buckingham (on the security threat to Logan) was the basis for contracting with CTI for the security audit and the results of that audit and the Rafi Ron report were the roadmap for the later improvements. Kinton also felt that the Carter Commission report recommendations were useful.

KINTON: Lawless and Freni gave him a briefing which included information on the discovery of Atta's rental car at Logan, and on the call from the American flight to a Supervisor in Boston which had reported that box cutters had been used, that a passenger and crew members had been stabbed, and that the aircraft was flying too low and too fast over New York City.

Kinton indicated that the CS Initiative had nothing to do with security. It was aimed at opening up more screening lanes; it was a problem of lack of staffing. He stated that Massport didn't invent the standards, but used the ones set by the airlines themselves.

LAWLESS: Early in 1994 Lawless was approached by a special agent out of the FBI's Boston field office who wanted to talk about an employee at MASSPORT who official suspected was a member of Hezbollah. The subject was working (temporary) as an interpreter greeting passengers at the international terminal.

LAWLESS: In February 1996, the FBI again approached Lawless, this time about a U.S. Airways baggage handler who was a member of Hezbollah who had been trained at a paramilitary camp in Lebanon. The subject had been issued an airport badge that gave him access to the Air Operations Area (AOA)

LAWLESS: In 1999/2000 Lawless was contacted by the Mass. State Police regarding a cab driver who frequented Logan. He later read in the newspaper the person was connected to the Cole attack and a plan to bomb an embassy. MASSPORT was asked to search records on him. Lawless said he felt as though the cabbie was surveying the airport. The individual's name is Riad Hijazzi. He believes he is now in Jordanian custody.

LAWLESS: Lawless attended various briefings conducted locally by the FBI field office, and established a good relationship with the bureau. He also attended classified briefings in DC where there was general discussion of terrorists living in the Boston area. On April 27, 2003, wrote a memo to the leadership at Massport regarding security at the airport. Lawless said the memo was prompted by a number of factors including:

- 1) his familiarity with links between Logan and individuals associated with Hezbollah group (including the cab driver mentioned in the memo as well as a news report about another suspicious cab driver)
- 2) his review of the Tenet memo on the terrorist threat that he obtained through the Internet and downloaded on 4/19/01
- 3) incidents that had occurred at Logan including the youth that had allegedly climbed an airport fence and stowed away on a flight the Heathrow, as well as an individual who had climbed a fence and was found standing on an aviation fuel tank,
- 4) A security expert had surveyed the airport and found weaknesses in the perimeter,
- 5) An April 2001 briefing by Pat McDonnell Lawless attended in DC.
- 6) Stories that appeared on the local news exposing vulnerabilities in security at Logan.

LAWLESS: His requests to have CCTV funded were not approved over a five year period, until 2001 when money was set aside to conduct a feasibility study.

LAWLESS: While Logan had a consortium for some period of time, eventually it was melded into the LAMCO meeting process. Lawless said he thought this was more effective because the decision makers would attend LAMCO meetings, while Consortium

meetings were usually attended by underlings. FAA expressed no concern that the LAMCO meetings were held in-lieu of consortia

Lawless said he has read media reports that the hijackers visited Logan over 20 times prior to 9-11, but that he has no personal knowledge or evidence of that being the case. He said that he would have been made aware of any indications or records of such surveillance, but that he had nothing (Staff Note: Lawless was not asked about the parking lot records that allegedly shows one of the hijacker's car in the facility every day for four days prior to 9-11).

LAWLESS: He remembers that a mechanic reported to the FBI that he saw Atta conducting surveillance at the airport earlier in the year. Lawless also remembers reading a report of a woman spotting Atta at the airport as well.

LAWLESS (APPEARS TO BE THE FIRST MASSPORT HEARD OF THE PROBLEM) Freni said he had talked to AAL and that they were reporting a phone conversation with a flight attendant who mentioned a stabbing of a flight attendant. The flight attendant said something about seeing a building and then the line went dead.

Lawless said he activated the Emergency Operations Center about 10 to 15 minutes after the second aircraft struck the WTC. This declaration initiated a series of notifications.

LAWLESS: He remained in the office for another 20 minutes taking and fielding calls. Lawless said that a log was made of the phone calls.

LAWLESS (EMERGENCY PROTOCOL ON 9-11) they had a specific protocol and were following it

LOGAN BRIEF: On 9/11, the only surveillance cameras at Logan were located at the Airport ATM's and in some areas of the parking lot.

LOGAN LAWYERS: In the spring of 2001 he was dissatisfied with the background checks being done by the air carriers on their employees. He didn't want to accept the certification of the air carriers. The FAA told Lawless to "butt out" because that was their jurisdiction.

LOGAN LAWYERS: The counsels indicated that an agreement was reached between FAA, MSP, and MASSPORT in June of 2001 to do a better job of checkpoint oversight. (IS THIS TRUE—ASK TURANO)

LOGAN LAWYERS: The counsels said that CTI was engaged initially in a port/access assessment, but when Sept. 11 happened and the study's scope was expanded.

AHERN: He said that well before 9/11 AAL had fired the security contractor for poor performance at Logan. After the change of vendor the reports improved. Ahern said he

doesn't believe from an AAL standpoint that anything stood-out at Boston or Dulles that would indicate to terrorists they were particularly vulnerable.

LUONGO: [U] Logan airport was focused on assessment and remedial action with respect to access control.

LUONGO: Logan officials were waiting on the FAA to complete the re-write, but finally decided to move forward with updating security at Logan on their own initiative. This began at least a year before 9-11.

Luongo pointed out that Electronic Finger Printing at Logan was in place before mandated by the FAA; that was up and running before 9-11.

LUONGO: The construction pace at the airport was "feverish" at that time. Everything was in flux - the perimeter of the airport and the gates were changing - it became a full time job for someone at to keep up with it.

LUONGO: "MASSPORT went above and beyond in a lot of places" when it came to security.

[U] Luongo mentioned the Joint Vulnerability Assessment conducted by the FAA and FBI on Logan that concluded there were no specific threats to the airport.

 [U] Luongo does not recall a story about five Middle Easterners trying to get a tour of the Control Tower on 9/8/01. Joe Davies was the tower manager at the time.

LUONGO: Logan Customer Service Program which in part tried to enforce timely processing through security (with the threat of taking a carrier's gate away for poor throughput for passengers) "was all customer service related stuff." He was not consulted on the program and agreed that the act of timing people through the checkpoint could diminish effectiveness of security procedures if that occurred

LUONGO: [U] Prior to the FOX News Show revealing security problems at Massport, the SEA program was finding a lot of violations. They were working to address these problems

LUONGO: [U] Checkpoint screening was a weakness. Because Logan was an older airport with more screening checkpoints than the average airport (he thinks 15), screeners presented a greater vulnerability.

LUONGO: [U] He thinks CCTV would have been a good idea to have before 9-11. He remembers in '95-96 talking about how many TVs they would need to install. At the time, MASSPORT didn't see a need for the expense. It was mainly a budget issue.

MOUSSAOUI

Check JI Report and Entire [REDACTED] MFR

[SSI] Manno said that the first he heard of the Moussaoui case was when ACI received a cable from the FBI on September 4th, 2001 that laid out the fact that he was in a flight school and that the FBI was seeking a warrant to search the subject's computer. On September 5th ACI prepared its DIS to ACS1 and ACO1 highlighting the information.

Manno: He indicated that he's unsure whether [REDACTED] ever talked to him about Moussaoui. Manno learned about the issue from the September 4th cable

NEWARK AIRPORT

Arroyo: "Terrorists were operating in this area." (listen to tape to be sure).

Susan Baer: Nothing suggested that terrorist communities were active in her area. (compare this to Arroyo's viewpoint).

Susan Baer: There exists a record of every officer dispatched at the airport. The Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the investigation that took place immediately after 9-11, captured that information. Begley said he may have to reach out to the Task Force on behalf of Commission to obtain the police record of suspicious activities prior to 9-11. Baer felt confident that report was already done. She added that the PA police has a fairly sophisticated system of record keeping in place. She said that Karl Lunan has been in contact with the police and would know that information.

PILOT TRAINING

[REDACTED] (SSI) [REDACTED] He cited the fact that one of Ramzi Yousef's confederates was a trained commercial pilot and that part of the Bojinka plot was to smash a plane into CIA headquarters.

[REDACTED] was not familiar with the tasking of FBI investigation into flight schools in 1998.

[REDACTED] was not familiar with the Phoenix EC on flight training or the Moussaoui case until September 12, 2001.

[REDACTED] [SSI] He said they were aware of pilot training by Al Qaeda but thought it was for transportation purposes.

PADGETT: (U) Padgett reported that flight training was not a skill set for terrorists that was followed by FAA Intelligence.

RULEMAKING

According to Arroyo: Tom Kelly, the Security Director of ATA prior to Susan Rork, once said (according to Arroyo), that OMB would "Fight you like a junk yard dog," if you do anything to raise the ticket prices.

FLYNN: chisel out improvements in the "unyielding granite" of the regulatory process.

FLYNN: Flynn described the FAA rulemaking process as "hideous and deliberately slow." OMB also would push back on cost-effectiveness grounds, with its resistance to checked baggage screening requirements given as the example.

LONGMIRE: For a security rule to even proceed through the process required that it make it to a "top ten" list of agency-wide regulatory priorities, which were determined by formal review committees.

LONGMIRE: In Longmire's view, safety was the biggest concern for the agency, and it was uncommon for security proposals to top safety as rule-making priorities.

Longmire stated that almost all security rules (including, for example, on background checks) "went to the bottom" of the priority list, but that the FAA was able to use Security Directives to implement specific security requirements.

Longmire expressed the opinion that cost-benefit analysis was one of the hardest parts of security rules.

MORSE: Given the cumbersome rulemaking process, Security Directives and to a lesser extent Information Circulars became chosen methods of tightening security measures and increasing threat awareness to the airlines, airports, and all other significant parties. As these instruments (particularly Security Directives) became more common, they became less "popular" with industry, and this in turn led to a slowing down of the process of issuing them. In this time period (late 1980s-early 1990s), Morse indicated that government leadership sometimes became frustrated with the aviation security process because of the lack of threat specificity and the accompanying difficulty of "selling" the remedies to industry, to Congress and to the public.

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING

[U] Stevens said there really wasn't a central repository where all suspicious activities were logged and tracked. The airport LEO would write a report and pass it on to the FSM but there was no requirement for the FSM to report it elsewhere. The FSM did produce weekly reports on the significant events that occurred at their airports. This reporting was captured in the WEBAIRS program. In addition, FAA/ACO would create an Operations Security Summary highlighting events.

Susan Baer: There exists a record of every officer dispatched at the airport. The Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the investigation that took place immediately after 9-11, captured that information. Begley said he may have to reach out to the Task Force on behalf of Commission to obtain the police record of suspicious activities prior to 9-11.

Baer felt confident that report was already done. She added that the PA police has a fairly sophisticated system of record keeping in place. She said that Karl Lunan has been in contact with the police and would know that information.

AHERN: Prior to 9-11 someone taking pictures of the cockpit would not have been alarming or suspicious. The company's jump seat policy was under the jurisdiction of the Vice President of Flight. (Note: Commission staff will review the CERS entries from 1998 through March 2002).

 (Unc) Cox (DULLES) was aware of a summer 2001 incident in which police were called to the C and D terminals to investigate a Middle Easterner-appearing individual who was filming gates and United aircraft. He recalled that one of the gates may have been D-1, which generally is used for West Coast bound flights.

Cox (DULLES) indicated that the airport had no systematic suspicious incident reporting system, but police records of such reports would have been kept. The problem is that such reports are not easily searchable.



 HAWLEY: unconfirmed report from a Delta Airlines flight attendant claiming she saw Mohammad Atta riding in a jump seat on a Delta flight prior to 9-11. She knew specific details of his biography that matched Mohammad's. He told her he as an American Airlines pilot. Hawley told the FAA about the report from the flight attendant. The FAA liaison to the FBI was not aware of the report, even though the Bureau had a "302" documenting the story.

[U] Manno was asked how suspicious activities at airports and on aircraft were reported to ACI. He indicated that when ACI received such information from a Federal Security Manager or CASFO an ICF would be opened on the incident.

MANNO: ACO may have had a suspicious activity report from air crews, but ACI didn't see it. (CHECK ON THESE).

[SSI] He was not aware of any report that a Middle Eastern individual was filming gate operations at Dulles in the summer of 2001 (a report received by the commission from the Dulles Security Director Ed Cox).

 [SSI] Parks said that there was no database specifically for logging suspicious activities at Dulles airport, but that FAA's AIRS database, which usually contained the FAA's AVSEC testing data nationwide, had a function where a "supplemental" report could be filed on suspicious activity, but it wasn't used for that purpose.

 She indicated that she had never seen security at the airport as rigorous as it was on the morning of 9/11 (prior to the attacks in the United States). She said that the authorities double and triple checked passports. The atmosphere was tense and the security people appeared to be on a high level of alert.  said, "They obviously knew something was going on."

(U) [] reported that as the plane was being boarded a man was taken away from the terminal area by guards.

RANDOL: (Unc) Reports of security-related incidents generally went first to the FSM, who didn't always share the information with the CASFO.

Randol stated that the FSM received information on suspicious activities and Randol was confident that all suspicious activities would be reported to him, and he would pass it along up the FAA chain as appropriate. (THIS IS CONTRARY TO WHAT LUONGO SAID WAS THE PRACTICE IN BOSTON).

AHERN: [U] AAL maintained a "Company Events Reporting System" to log suspicious behavior and security concerns identified by AAL employees.

[U] Luongo does not recall a story about five Middle Easterners trying to get a tour of the Control Tower on 9/8/01. Joe Davies was the tower manager at the time.

THREAT EVALUATION

POINT: All the AAL people in their ops center said the intelligence information pointed to a foreign threat.

POINT: Neither Arpey nor Studdert nor Belger perceived any extraordinary threat during the summer of 2001

[U] Underwood was asked if hijacking was ever an issue. Underwood replied that "it appeared we had won that one." (Meaning the battle against hijacking).

[[U] Underwood said they had no specific intelligence about 9-11, and that they never conceived of the aircraft as weapons scenario. He said that speaking personally of 9-11, "he didn't have the diabolical mind" that the terrorist had in order to conceive of such a plot. He said that everyone was still focusing on IED's.

UNDERWOOD: U] John Raidt asked Underwood his views about why the text of FAA published AVSEC rules in the federal register cited terrorist cells active in the U.S. and the vulnerability of transportation, while the AVSEC leadership viewed the threat to aviation as an overseas phenomenon. Underwood said he has asked himself that same question hundreds of times.

PADGETT: U) Padgett reported that there was a massive effort to get procedures in place here that were already in effect abroad to guard against the possibility of a bomb in checked baggage here. The FAA had begun "sounding the trumpet" for greater aviation security after the "National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)" came out in 1995 (which the FAA participated in). This estimate greatly strengthened the FAA's hand to institute such changes. The airlines fought them every step of the way. Prior to the release of the

estimates, they had claimed the FAA was overstating the threat. The air carriers wanted to know where the FAA could point to these "things" taking place in the domestic arena.

PADGETT: Padgett indicated there was a greater concern to prevent bombs because a) they were believed to be more likely because it was a highly publicized vulnerability, and b) there were more measures in effect to prevent hijackings than bombings (so it was believed), specifically the screening checkpoint.(SSI) [REDACTED]

BOIVIN: [SSI] After the destruction of TWA 800 (1996), the attention and money for security "came back again, as usually happened after such a disaster. In late 1996, Special Assessments was directed to shift its focus to the testing of Explosive Detective Systems (EDS) because of a statutory mandate to the FAA to certify that such systems met prescribed standards and could function in an airport environment.

BOIVIN: Special Assessments was asked to replicate the SEA tests, and did so in the period 1997-2000. Much of this work centered on baggage screening.

BELGER: He stated that at the time, people didn't think there was a serious domestic threat, citing the absence of a serious domestic aviation security event in the 10 years leading up to 9-11

Belger: said that the FAA saw aviation threats overseas and the use of explosives as the biggest problem facing AVSEC. He was not aware of any increased threat in the summer of 2001.

Belger: He was not aware of Usama Bin Laden prior to 9-11. (compare this to the fact that in his own words he was the gatekeeper for intelligence to Garvey).

Canavan said that they didn't discuss the need for a great domestic air marshal program because the threat was overseas. He cited the fact that there had been no hijackings in quite some time and those that had occurred happened overseas.

In Cox's view, the hijacking threat was "low." In fact, prior to 9/11, he had only been involved in one hijacking incident at Dulles in his entire 20+ years at the airport.

FLYNN: Commission should not underestimate the influence and impact the National Security Council staff (particularly the National Security Council's former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke) had on Flynn's work in aviation security at FAA.

FLYNN: He said the threat at home was perceived as present but low while overseas the threat was present and high.

Flynn reported that staff of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee asked the FAA, the DCI and the FBI for a briefing on threat indications regarding civil aviation. Despite the

few indications the FBI had received (of an individual who tried to get a job with airport access at LAX, for instance), the answer they supplied the congressional staff with was no; they were not aware of any significant terrorist threats to the aviation industry

GARVEY: At the time, the emphasis was on the overseas threat, particularly in the Middle East (which was also a reflection of her own "suspicions" as to threat).

HALLETT: She stressed that, in general, the view was that any attacks would occur overseas...

HALLETT: Hallett stated that in all of the times she met with FAA/DoT she does not remember either Garvey or Mineta raising the issue of security as a problem. Usually the subjects that were the priority dealt with safety. At least once a year the Secretary of Transportation (Slater or Mineta) would meet with ATA and the CEO's and that security issues never came up.

HAWLEY: During the Summer of '01, there was a sense within the intelligence community that "something was going to happen." He felt certain of it. He was looking abroad, particularly focusing on the Middle East and Near East. [

HAWLEY: The view was we were on a high state of alert because of CIA reporting. June and July of 2001.

HAWLEY: The suicide concept surfaced with Air France.

KINTON: During the summer of 2001, Kinton didn't have a feeling of a heightened threat. There was nothing that alarmed him or made him more vigilant.

LAWLESS: The FAA warnings indicated something outside of America that summer,"

LONGMIRE: He believed the FBI assessments that the domestic threat was under control, with a greater threat overseas.

Manno said that when he would ask the FBI prior to 9/11 what the domestic threat is they would say "low." (IN WHAT FORM WERE THESE ESTIMATES MADE NIE'S/JVA's what?)

 Manno indicated that the analytical judgments were made by James Padgett and his group. The Strategic Analysis Division as a group discussed what threats demanded what actions using judgments.

Manno was not aware of any formal effort to connect threat with vulnerability to determine countermeasures.

MANNO: The main hijacking threat that ACI perceived was that terrorists would hijack a plane to a third country to try and release the Blind Sheik or try to blow-up the plane over a city (such as with the Air France hijacking).

MANNO: the historical pattern, pointed to a greater threat overseas.

MORSE: When asked what he thought the mission of civil aviation security was before 9/11/01, Morse said it was "to keep bombs off of planes... Before Pan Am 103, all we could talk about was hijackings." After Pan Am 103, FAA Security was concerned most about the possibility of a sophisticated explosive device getting on a commercial flight.

OSMUS: Another problem identified by Osmus was that the Security Directors for the air carriers were former FBI and DIA folks who would call colleagues from their former agencies. Often the information they received from their former colleagues would undermine the FAA's assessments.

Osmus said that the CAPPS program was developed specifically for checked baggage because that's where the threat was perceived.

Osmus stated that an evaluation assessing the hijack threat concluded that a FAM program should be continued. A written report was produced. By the mid 1990's FAM flights were all international based on the threat assessment. Osmus said that the FAA didn't perceive a huge hijacking threat. She referred us to Greg McLaughlin who could discuss with us the size adjustment decisions.

Soliday described the "Burger King" theory under which foreign terrorists or other would be hijackers would be so attracted by American material well-being that they wouldn't undertake the hijacking operation and have to leave the country. In addition, there was a general feeling that nothing could be done onboard to mitigate a Bojinka-type plot; the only hope was detecting the device with an ETD. A scenario like 9/11 was never on the discussion table.

WANSLEY: [U] Wansley said that all of the threat concerns he heard prior to 9-11 were international.

WANSLEY: He said that domestic hijacking wasn't "on the scope" because the whole culture was based on "it's an over there problem."

WANSLEY: [U] On the issue of domestic hijacking he said that the absence of hijacking resulted in an approach of: "if it ain't broke don't fix it."

[] [U] Up until 9/11, the FBI's assessment of the terrorist threat to domestic aviation was "low" in general, and at each of the airports that the Bureau assessed. FAA did not object to the assessment or take issue with it.

[REDACTED] said that FAA didn't push for a "low" assessment but they were clearly relieved about the designation. [U] [REDACTED] said that beginning in 1999 the FAA presented the FBI with a comprehensive matrix about how to determine the level of terrorist threat to civil aviation. She thought the matrix was very well done and had nuanced scoring to assess varying levels of specificity and credibility of threat reporting. This matrix is how the FBI determined the low threat to aviation.

[REDACTED] was shocked to learn that the airlines received as many bomb threats as they did. She said that the standard of requiring specific, credible, and actionable intelligence to be passed onto the FAA was valid and important.

[SSI] Ahern said the data that was provided to the airlines in the summer of 9/11 pointed toward an overseas issue, not a domestic problem. He said that nothing was given to American Airlines that raised concern about an increasing threat at the domestic level. Moreover, he never heard from the FAA that they felt "blind" about what was going on with terrorists domestically.

[SSI] Ahern said that he remembers in the summer of 2001 that most of the threat information was pointing to the Middle East and that AAL didn't have operations in the area. All of the FAA's Information Circulars pointed to areas outside the areas served by AAL.

[SSI] Ahern was not aware of any presentation by the FAA in 2001 to the airline industry about the terrorist threat to civil aviation, which mentioned the possibility of suicide hijacking in the United States but discounted the probability of such an event because no evidence suggested that anyone was thinking along those lines.

[U] Ahern was not aware of an FAA assessment indicating a serious threat to civil aviation domestically, which was published in the federal register as part of an FAA rulemaking in the summer of 2001.

PADGETT: (U) During the summer of 2001, there was a focus on the increase in "chatter." He was not involved in the Indications and Warnings side of things. He remembers that the intelligence community was very concerned with the reports about Al Qaeda; they were beyond the planning stages for a big event.

[U] Riffe stated that she knew of UBL, al Qaeda and its interest in aviation prior to 9/11 but considered the threat they posed as an overseas threat.

THREAT RESPONSE & RISK MANAGEMENT (PRE 9-11)

[U] Manno stated that the process of vulnerability assessment is underway at TSA. Pre 9-11 ACI was responsible for threat assessment. Vulnerability assessments were done elsewhere (ACO/ACP) and he wasn't sure how the two were combined within the FAA.



Osmus identified one of the strengths of the system as the emergence of automated data systems, that did tasks such as organize inspection data and conduct trend analysis. She cited the work of Mike McCormick to quantitatively assess threats and identify weaknesses in order to aid in the development of countermeasures.

(U) [] said he was never briefed on what FAA was ordering the air carriers to do to provide security, but he was sure that the air carriers were complaining about the cost of security.

 PADGETT: There was limited enthusiasm for this on the part of the Director of Intelligence because it pushed FAA towards quantifying threats. (SSI) Padgett and the Intelligence division offered scenarios that were the likeliest. Butterworth wanted to determine where it would make most sense to do testing on the system. He identified 26 different threat scenarios that were based on other methods used in previous attacks, or on adaptations of other attack methods too obvious to ignore. (QUESTION: WAS THIS AN AVERSION TO RISK MANAGEMENT PRE 9-11. WAS IT FOR GOOD REASONS?)

 PADGETT: (SSI) Padgett felt uncomfortable quantifying threats because a number of distortions came into play. [REDACTED]

9/11 Closed by Statute

PADGETT: (U) Padgett did not recall some earlier product that quantified or placed emphasis on certain threats over others.

TRANSEC AND DHS – TODAY AND TOMORROW

[U] Jenkins reported that when TSA came into being, the agency didn't really know or understand about the role of the PSI, and all of the FAA's PSI's departed, except for Jenkins. Jenkins believes this was a loss, and that the PSI role continues to be an important one in analyzing the air carrier perspective in civil aviation security.

[U] Jenkins said senior people are leaving in droves.

[SSI] [REDACTED]

9/11 Closed by Statute

Furthermore, these results are classified, and unlike the case with FAA testing Jenkins cannot see the results. There is no question in his mind that he is receiving less information now than he was at the FAA.

[U] Jenkins feels that TSA has focused all of its time and money on checkpoint screening, with inspections and testing secondary. Access control may also be suffering. He also believes that former FAA employees now at TSA are seen as being "tainted," and while he said that it is "heart-breaking" for him to see senior former FAA people leaving, he thinks those who have departed are better off than the ones who have stayed.

RIFFE: [U]

9/11 Closed by Statute

[U] Riffe also stated that there's a lot of confusion about roles and missions at TSA. Operations doesn't talk to policy. There are too many layers of management. We don't know who we are supposed to go to for answers. She believes that TSA is still caving in to special interests. The regulated industry is still telling us what we can and can't do.

[U] RIFFE: TSA has hired a lot of former air carrier people with a mindset of customer service rather than security.

LOY: On Friday (December 12, 2003) I'm going to convene a leadership team to determine strategic goals for DHS, including that paradigm (DID THIS EVER HAPPEN)

LOY: TTIC and TSC, which are performing functions the law had supposedly given to DHS and IAIP.

LOY: Weekly port security council meetings are held, where the Coast Guard port captain convenes with key local stakeholders, including sheriffs and other law enforcement representatives

LOY: And all of this must meet the initial challenges and deadlines driven by 33 priorities set out by Congress.

MANNO: [SSI] TSA's Intelligence office is focused on all major modes of transportation. Manno indicated that the office is authorized to double the number of analysts to [] but that good, experienced analysts are hard to find, so that the office is not yet fully staffed.

MANNO: He stressed that none of the IC agencies are healthy with respect to intelligence personnel.

9/11 Closed by Statute

MANNO: Independent shops at TSA; BICE and CVP. One of the points of analysis is to determine whether these other shops should be folded into IAIP. Manno believes there is value in maintaining a unit with a focus on transportation threats.

[U] Manno stated that the Office of National Risk Assessment (ONRA) is under TSA (Admiral Loy). He stated that ONRA is setting up its own SCIF and will have its own analysts. TSIS is not being consulted on the set-up of CAPPs II.

PADGETT: [U] Padgett is concerned what will happen if his unit has to start focusing on other modes of transportation, because "we're still a small staff." He said that ACI felt that they probably should not dedicate analysts only to pipelines, trucking, rail, and merchant marine because we didn't see that we'd be able to hire enough analysts to cover everything, including domestic and transnational. He doesn't believe that the manpower increase was commensurate with the expanded portfolio of ACI.

BUCKINGHAM: While the Coast Guard is in charge of security on the water, the overall authority for port security is unclear.

VEIL OF MYSTERY

BOIVIN: The Baseline Working Group (1996) did have some success in getting security rule changes implemented, but this involved their usage of closed briefings on Capitol Hill to make their case.

Hawley said that bad guys get to read all about the vulnerabilities of our security systems in open sources and elsewhere. A GAO report was in a safe house in Afghanistan. Personally, Hawley believes they could have executed the plot at any airport. Brian Jenkins spoke about this in a PBS interview.

HALLETT: Another problem that Hallett saw was that too much information was public. Everyone was "blabbing" to the media about every aspect of our security system, so that the enemy knew everything we did to protect America.

KINTON: "ludicrous that we undress ourselves in the public arena" with respect to security vulnerabilities

PADGETT: (SSI) According to Padgett, "Terrorists were more likely to exploit a well advertised vulnerability."

WATCHLISTS

Longmire was not sure how the FBI and CIA generated the immediate post-9/11 list of names; however, he reported that to get on such a list – before or after 9/11 – the individual would have to pose a specific threat to civil aviation.

C: 9-11

9-11 CALLS FROM FLIGHTS

BELME: To the best of Belme's knowledge, Policastro, Belme and Lubkemann were the only people in the SAMC office to talk to someone on board a hijacked flight.

9-11 CONTACTING THE MILITARY

Belger stated that if anyone was in contact with the military it would have been ATC or the WOC.

9-11 FLIGHT 175

According to Belme, Policastro said "something like 175 was hijacked, the crew was killed, and they (the hijackers) have taken over the airplane."

BELME: Bradshaw told him on the phone that two hijackers were in first class at the curtain. They had attacked and killed a flight attendant. His notes indicated she had reported a total of three male hijackers.

BELME: She was in the back of the plane. Right after speaking to Belme, she called her husband

BELME: She told Belme the hijackers announced they had a bomb on the plane.

Lubkemann was not aware of any calls from the hijacked planes other than the two received by Policastro and himself (1 for 175 and 1 for 93).

LOGAN BRIEF: [U] UAL Flight 175 boarded and departed from gate 19, Terminal C at Logan Airport. Access to terminal C was through the security checkpoint at PIER B that served gates 11-21. (This checkpoint is at the far left of the terminal area and behind the ticketing counter area). On 9-11 there was no way to access Terminal C except through that single checkpoint. (SSI) On 9-11 the checkpoint was outfitted with two magnetometers and two x-ray machines. (Today the checkpoint has 4 or 5 magnetometers and 4 or 5 x-ray machines.)

United Airlines had custody of the checkpoint.

LOGAN BRIEF: A bank of phones between the checkpoint and the gate (on the right) as used by one of the flight 175 hijackers to call ATTA.

MILES: Miles did not receive any reports from the ATC system about communications with Flight 175 (including loss of radar). (He reported that typically, he would receive relevant information from the ATC system, but he didn't receive any on 9/11.)

POLICASTRO: He was getting ready to leave at about 5:55 a.m. when he received a call. Per standard practice, he immediately asked for the flight number. The man on the phone told him it was UAL 175. He assumed it was a flight attendant because Star-Fix calls are always made by the attendants. The caller told him the plane had been hijacked, both pilots had been murdered and a flight attendant had been stabbed. Furthermore, he believed that the hijackers were flying the plane.

UNITED BRIEFING: Barber noted that his log stated that at 8:20 a.m. (CT) UAL 175 was confirmed.

9-11 FLIGHT 11

STEVENS: He agreed that if Atta and al Omari were selectees under the manual selection program they would have undergone a hand search of their carry-on luggage. Stevens said that from the video he saw of Atta and al Omari going through the checkpoint at Portland, they did not have their carry-on hand searched.

[U] Stevens said that he dispatched agents to pull the checkpoint logs at Boston and Portland to be sure that the checkpoint equipment had been turned on, tested and operated in accordance with the rules. He said that the logs showed everything had been done properly at the checkpoints at both airports. He also acquired the checkpoint videotape at Portland.

[U] Riffe said that she pulled the cargo manifests for both American flights. AAL #11 had two ULD's of cargo, and one package of hazardous material: dry ice. AAL #77 had only mail and baggage. (NOTE: We want the cargo manifests).

RIFFE: Suzanne Clark provided the seat numbers and passenger names, and said that the aircraft was headed back to Kennedy Airport. She thinks she was told this information 15 to 20 minutes before the plane crashed into the WTC. Riffe stated that they had no reason to believe it wasn't going back to Kennedy.

AHERN: He does recall that the manifests for AAL 11 and AAL 77 were locked out and pulled right away. (Staff note: the time of this lock-out will help identify the airlines situational awareness because it was in the company's interest to do this as soon as trouble was identified. The lock out time is noted on the SOCC log and also should be time dated by the computer).

GONZALES: 4 four and a half minutes were recorded because the recently installed recording system in the Raleigh office had such a time limit on its tapes.

GONZALES: Ms. Gonzalez was read an 800 number that FBI records indicate was called from Flight #11, and she said that the number very well could have been the direct number that flight attendants know to call for reservations. She speculated that that number may have been the only one the flight attendants knew to call when the cockpit was unreachable. Ms. Gonzalez reported that the general reservation number routes incoming calls to the first available phone station, which certainly could have been the Raleigh office with respect to the Ong call. (NOTE GET THE TIME FROM THE RECORD).

HOUCK: Ms. Houck was at the Transcontinental Flight dispatch desk on 9/11, and was initially responsible for both Flights 11 and 77. Because of the lack of problems (including weather), she had no early contact with the Flight 11 crew, but she reported that this was not unusual under such circumstances.

HOUCK: At 7:20 a.m. Central Time, Ms. Houck was contacted by an American Seattle-Boston flight and told that ATC had asked them to try to contact Flight 11. Houck reported that such communications were routine, and she proceeded to try to reach #11 via the ACARS system. These communications were never acknowledged by the flight.

HOUCK: Some time after her unsuccessful ACARS transmissions, Houck was phoned by SOC Manager Craig Marquis, who informed her of a potential "security breach" on Flight 11. She then tried to "cell call" the flight crew via ARINC (a company that provided back-up communications capability for airborne flights) in San Francisco. At that point (approximately 7:30 Central Time), Houck was moved to another desk where she could "isolate" Flight 11, and focus all her attention on that one flight. Don Robinson took over her regular desk, and other flight assignments.

Halleck was told by ATC that the pilot's microphone on #11 had been keyed, and that a controller at the Boston center had heard threatening voices from the cockpit to the effect "do as we say or we will kill you."

MARQUIS: See transcripts from relevant 9/11 phone calls about AA Flight #11 and AA personnel, and a timeline from the System Operations Command Center (SOCC).

MARQUIS: He immediately started an active log on the incident, reporting it as a flight emergency. The form he began is called an "FI". To do so, he pulled up all the flight information on AA 11 available to him on the monitors at his workstation. At the outset, he was wondering where the flight was going to be taken to land.

Marquis indicated that contact and communication with air traffic controllers was the responsibility of either Bill Halleck or the other AA SOC Air Traffic Control (ATC) coordinators (Marino and Jacobson). Marquis went about briefing them immediately on Gonzalez' information from #11 flight attendant Betty Ong, yelling to the ATC coordinators, "Hey, contact ATC - Flight 11 is declaring an emergency."

Marquis: half a dozen incidents a day of pilots not responding to controllers for minutes at a time because there was always "lots of chatter on the frequency."
AAL Flight 11 boarded and departed from Gate 31 (now gate 35), Terminal B.

The hijackers went through the PIER A checkpoint which featured two x-ray machines and two magnetometers. (KINTON IS CHECKING TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANOTHER CHECKPOINT OPEN WHICH THE HIJACKERS COULD HAVE USED TO ACCESS THE TERMINAL "EAGLE CHECKPOINT?"—HE DOESN'T THINK SO).

WOODWARD: [U] Woodward said Amy told him something to the effect that there's a bomb in the cockpit. A doctor had been paged. Karen Martin, one of the flight attendants that had been stabbed, was on oxygen. Karen wasn't doing very well but Bobby Arestegui (the other flight attendant who had been stabbed) seemed to be OK.

9-11 FLIGHT 93

ARROYO: According to Marcus Arroyo the Newark terrorists when through Checkpoint 1 in Terminal A which has three lanes.

BELME: Andy Lubkemann took the 2nd call – the one from UAL 93

Lubkemann thinks the call he received from Flight 93 took place before the second aircraft hit.

Lubkemann told the flight attendant on UAL 93 to stay on the line as long as she could as he tried to transfer the call, but he could tell from the computer monitor that the manager was on another call. A supervisor/manager then came over to his desk and took over the call with the flight attendant from UAL 93. He never heard from or talked to the flight (NOTE: WHO TOOK OVER THE CALL).

Lubkemann was not aware of any calls from the hijacked planes other than the two received by Policastro and himself (1 for 175 and 1 for 93).

[U] Miles believes that the first awareness of a problem with UA 93 came in the Crisis Center, where they were viewing Aircraft Situation Displays and saw the plane turn around. Miles started focusing on UA 93 after receiving a call (between 8:30 and 9:00 AM Central Time, but most likely around 8:45) from the SAMC that was similar to the earlier call in reporting that they had gotten a call from UA 93 indicating that the flight had been hijacked.

9-11 FLIGHT 77

[U] Riffe said that she pulled the cargo manifests for both American flights. AAL #11 had two ULD's of cargo, and one package of hazardous material: dry ice. AAL #77 had only mail and baggage. (NOTE: We want the cargo manifests).

[U] Riffe's notes indicate that at 10:05 she talked to Tim Ahern who confirmed that AAL #11 and AAL#77 both crashed into the ATC. She said that American kept saying that 77 had gone into the WTC. There were several hours of confusion before they received confirmation that 77 was the flight that crashed into the Pentagon.

RIFFE: She said that the report of the Pentagon crash was the first they had heard of a problem on Flight 77.

AHERN: [U] Ahern agreed that AAL originally thought that the second strike of the WTC was AAL 77. AAL 77 had been lost on radar, or rather the transponder was turned off

AHERN: He does recall that the manifests for AAL 11 and AAL 77 were locked out and pulled right away. (Staff note: the time of this lock-out will help identify the airlines situational awareness because it was in the company's interest to do this as soon as trouble was identified. The lock out time is noted on the SOCC log and also should be time dated by the computer).

PEGGY CARSON (AAL EMPLOYEE WHO TOOK CALL FROM FLIGHT ATTENDANT'S PARENTS: Mrs. May said that Renee had told her mother, "We are being hijacked and held hostage." Carson said that when she took the call she was unaware there was any problem with flight 77. ...Mrs. May told Carson that Renee had reported that she was in the back of the plane and that they didn't know anything about the state of the pilots at that time.

PADGETT: a couple of people from his division who witnessed the attack on the Pentagon—Tom Kalina and Liz Smiley.

HOUCK: Ms. Houck was at the Transcontinental Flight dispatch desk on 9/11, and was initially responsible for both Flights 11 and 77

HALLECK: was asked at some point to call Washington center to inquire about Flight 77. He was told that ATC had lost it while it was westbound approaching Ohio, and that the transponder had been turned off. He later spoke with Dulles Tracon and was informed that it was tracking (via primary signal only) a fast-moving target.

HALLECK: At some point, Halleck was told that United was missing a plane, and he immediately called his counterpart at the United System Operations Center (SOC) but was told that UAL wouldn't confirm the loss. After that, Halleck called Herndon ATC command center and spoke with "Ellen" who reported that "we lost another one." Halleck told her that American personnel thought that #77 may have been the one which hit the second tower at the WTC, but they didn't know how it could have gotten to New York City. "Ellen" replied that there was another lost flight and it might not have been #77 that crashed into the WTC.

9-11 FLIGHT COLGAN AIR 5930

LOGAN BRIEF: AAL 11 hijackers Atta and Omari arrived at Logan Airport on the morning of 9/11 aboard Colgan Air flight 5390 from Portland Maine. The Colgan flight arrived at Gate B9A. From that gate passengers must go up an escalator and outside across a parking garage to enter into the main terminal B. [U] Kinton pointed out that Portland was the closest airport to Boston that would have gotten the hijackers into Logan early enough to catch AAL Flight 11.

PORTLAND: Colgan Air 5930 departing from Gate 11

PORTLAND: The flight had been moved from Gate 8 to Gate 11. Shultes said that both gates were leased by U.S. Airways (Colgan's parent company). The change of gate was routine and was not undertaken for any security reasons.

PORTLAND: The checkpoints were videotaped. The City representative said the surveillance cameras were more for liability reasons ("falls and spills") than for security. All tapes were handed over to the FBI. The airport did not retain copies of the tapes.

PORTLAND: Atta and Omari parked on the first floor, front row (facing the terminal) of the covered parking facility, walked across the street and into the airport. They went through the single security checkpoint at the airport which consisted of TWO MAGNETOMETERS and TWO X-RAY MACHINES. On 9/11, the Jetway had no EDS equipment or a ticket reader.

9-11 GUN STORY:

AHERN: [U] Ahern stated that he was in contact with Janet Riffe, the FAA Principal Security Inspector assigned to United Airlines, throughout the day. Ahern did not hear anything about the use of a gun or a shooting aboard AAL 11. Janet Riffe never mentioned any such allegation. Chris Bidwell, with AAL Security, never mentioned to Ahern that FAA had called AAL asking about the origins and validity of a gun report.

Buckingham: She never heard anything about the use of a gun.

HALLETT: Hallett said that the best information she received was from Bob Baker at American Airlines. He told her about the terrorist tactics on the hijacked flights. He related to her the information received by American Airlines from the phone call placed by the flight attendant aboard AA 11 that was received by the American Airlines operations center in Dallas. Hallett said that at no time did she hear any mention of a gun.

Longmire recalls asking for follow-up by the PSI (Janet Riffe) to clarify certain discrepancies, and he pointed out that it is not unusual for first reports to be inaccurate.

Morse recalled that Lee Longmire questioned Janet Riffe (sometime between 10 and 12) on her initial report of a gun being fired on one of the hijacked American flights, based on reporting from American.

Morse recalled that Riffe, at the time, indicated to Longmire that, "I think I got" the information on the gun, indicating some uncertainty on her part.

MORSE: Administrator Garvey informed Morse that she never saw the briefing book report on gun usage.

MORSE: The GAO Office of Special Investigations did an investigation on the gun issue. Morse recalled that the FAA had received a written response from them concluding that a gun on board Flight 11 was highly unlikely, given the information their investigators were able to uncover.

9-11 LEADERSHIP

Belger said that his leadership role on 9-11 evolved and was a reaction rather than a pre-planned procedure.

GARVEY: Once there, she was in communication with the Herndon Command Center (directed by Linda Schussler and Ben Sliney that day), which was handling most of the communications for FAA headquarters that day.

GARVEY Later, Ms. Garvey was made aware that there had been some confusion at the Operations Center at the outset, and that they didn't have the right training for such an emergency, which nothing in the recent past had prepared them to deal with.

LONGMIRE: Deputy Administrator Belger came to the Command Center shortly after Longmire, and then the second plane hit the WTC, but "we still didn't know what we had," according to Longmire. At this point, ATC was reporting loss of contact with other aircraft. Jeff Griffith (of ATC) was trying to work out what was going on. In such circumstances, Longmire's role was to run the FAA Command Center.

Longmire reported that it was primarily his responsibility to coordinate FAA's response to a hijacking, with ACS-1 (Canavan) working primarily with higher-level Administration officials, including the Secretary of Transportation. [U]

LONGMIRE: With respect to the military, Longmire indicated that it was standard procedure to pull the military into the communications link as soon as possible so they could monitor the aircraft. (He did not recall any pre-9/11 discussions of assigning the military with any hijacking role other than tracking the aircraft.) The linkup from the FAA Command Center was supposed to be with the National Military Command Center (NMCC). It was Longmire's expectation that both NMCC and the FBI should have been included in the communications link as soon as the Command Center was stood up. He later learned that this didn't occur, but he wasn't sure when the situation was rectified.

The FAA Watch was responsible for setting up the communications network. As to the taping of Command Center communications on 9/11, Longmire reported that the center was new and he was not sure if they the capability

9-11 NOTIFYING COCKPITS

BELGER: With regard to notifying flights in the air about what was happening at the WTC, Belger said they were worried about panic among passengers. He was not concerned that pilots or ATC would panic about what was going on. Belger thinks that the air carriers did put a warning to their aircraft. In retrospect, he believes it would not have been a bad thing for FAA to make sure that all aircraft knew what was going on so that they could secure their cockpits.

GARVEY: Ms. Garvey cited a concern that the order to land be given to the pilots in very clear terms and not confused with other issues, and thus there was no clear, system-wide order given to communicate to pilots to secure their cockpits.

LONGMIRE: Longmire did not recall any 9/11 discussions as to notification of the cockpits of other flights. Under the protocols then in place, during a hijacking ATC was to have said as little as possible. In retrospect, Longmire believes it would have made sense for there to have been discussions on this issue on 9/11 among senior decision-makers such as the Secretary, the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator.

[U] Soliday said he does not remember whether the dispatchers were ordered to contact their flights with a cockpit warning. He said that is the type of thing that, if done, was the kind of thing being done before he arrived at the crisis center.

[U] UAL staff at the SOC reported they did not receive a notification from ATC or ATA to notify all UAL aircraft of the hijackings. That would have come in the form of an advisory; which was not issued. ATA has never asked UAL to contact all its planes; There was no precedent for it.

UNITED BRIEFING: [U] At United, all transcontinental flights were notified after the first two attacks.

UNITED BRIEFING: [U] Rogers sent a message to the dispatchers on the floor, "additional hijacks are in progress – you should notify your flights."

UNITED BRIEFING: [U] Ballenger and McCurdy kept track of all the planes that were sent messages and their responses.

UNITED BRIEFING: [U] McCurdy added that the cockpit messages were sent to planes on the ground as well.

9-11 OTHER PLOTS

[U] Riffe said she remembers hearing on 9-11 that some passengers were supposed to be on a TWA flight in St. Louis, bolted and were apprehended. She believes that the CASFO in St. Louis or DFW made the report.

AHERN: [U] Ahern does not recall whether AAL or the FBI examined the manifest of flights in the air to identify additional security concerns.

HALLETT: At some point she remembers hearing from the ATA representative at the ATC command center that a flight from Dulles (not AA 77) had been delayed by mechanical problems and that a group of Middle Eastern men were seen bolting from the flight.

WANSLEY: [U] Wansley said that "everyone" was going through manifests, including, those of flights that were still in the air.

[REDACTED] was asked if she knew to what extent manifests for flights on 9/11 were checked to see if there were other plots. She did not know the full extent, but noted that the FAA could have mandated the airlines to do the 9/11 manifest check.

9-11 REVERSE SCREENING AND COCKPIT NOTIFICATION

[U] Kinton indicated that Massport received no directions from the FAA, FBI or anyone else about screening de-planing passengers or examining flight manifests. He recalled no evidence of further plots.

[U] Regarding whether passengers were screened when deplaning from aircraft grounded on 9-11, he said he never thought of doing so, and even if he had, he is not sure how he would have implemented it since he had no arrest authority. He doesn't remember the FBI suggesting that any reverse screening of passengers on flights grounded on 9-11.

DULLES: later that evening he got word of an FAA or FBI request to screen the aircraft and Dulles police assisted in that process.

BERTAPELLE (AAL): Bertapelle did not recall any discussions at the time as to what to do with respect to screening the passengers or the aircraft once they landed. Parfitt recalled that later on, there was much discussion on this point.

Marquis: AA did do security "table top exercises" from time to time, and these involved multiple departments from the airline, as well as outside entities. Marquis recalled one such exercise on a hijacking done with an airplane with full corporate participation as well as the FBI. (WAS THIS SUICIDE. LET'S ASK TSA FOR ALL HIJACKING SCENARIOS PRACTICED)

Morse speculated that the most senior level people in the secure video teleconference in the SCIF would have discussed procedures for the planes to follow once they landed.

Morse said that someone in the Command Center had spoken with ATA about what they could or should tell their members. Morse's experience in the past had been that ATA was helpful in disseminating information in emergencies, and that they would willingly take on such responsibilities.

(Unc) Randol did not recall receiving any instruction from FAA Headquarters or elsewhere on screening of grounded planes and their passengers on September 11th; this may have been something he was not directly privy to.

DULLES Dunn indicated that he had pulled the screener logs in the aftermath of the groundings.) He recalled that United, American and other carriers had requested a security sweep of their grounded aircraft, and that knives were found on some of these, including a box cutter on a flight from Raleigh. However, the FBI took the lead in reviewing de-boarding passengers. Pitts said that on 9/11 he worked with operations to clear people out of the terminals. They have a log that shows Pitts' activities.

9-11 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

JENKINS: He did recall viewing some such information on an electronic events log, which may have been projected onto a screen or may have been viewable only at the computer terminals.

FAA[U] She doesn't remember if the information was posted on an overhead projector but all the data points received in the WOC were entered into a computer by an "events recorder." She named George Keene; Bob McLaughlin and Chuck Guffie as people who had performed that role. They took turns logging information in the computer. She said that Longmire ran the WOC most of the time but that Pete Falcone and Willie Gripper ran it as well later in the day.

FAA/AMERICAN: Riffe said that the primary net was on a speaker inside the WOC. She does not believe that the ATC Command Center was on either the Primary or Tactical Net. She believes that someone in the WOC was on the phone with ATC on a separate line.

FAA: RIFFE: Bob McLaughlin came down and said that there was a hijack in progress on an American flight and that she needed to come to the WOC (Wash. Operations Center). She's not sure if Bob McLaughlin was the first at the FAA HQ to know about the problems that day but indicated that he might know who was.

LUONGO: Al Hudson (it was his first day on the job at Logan) listened to the net and took notes. He was a cargo security guy or hazmat official at the time. He still works for TSA/FAA. (Beyer will try to locate his notes for us).

AHERN: He does recall that the manifests for AAL 11 and AAL 77 were locked out and pulled right away. (Staff note: the time of this lock-out will help identify the airlines situational awareness because it was in the company's interest to do this as soon as trouble was identified. The lock out time is noted on the SOCC log and also should be time dated by the computer).

AHERN: Ahern said that on 9-11 he didn't hear any information that FAA ATC had heard suspicious transmissions coming from AAL 11 that the hijackers had "other planes." He doesn't recall hearing that ATC had passed on any information they obtained from communications with the cockpits of other aircraft.

Ahern said that AAL's nationwide ground stop quickly followed the AAL ground stop of the Northeast.

Ms. Buckingham recalled that it took hours for UAL 175 to be identified, but that they knew a lot about AAL 11 fairly quickly (mostly from the airline itself). Overall, she felt they weren't getting clear information from the FAA.

Marquis: American's primary source of information was CNN on the view screens in the SOCC.

Marquis: there was little information coming from the hijacked planes or from the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system

Marquis: With respect to communications with the federal authorities, on 9/11, AA personnel were not on the phone net with the FAA's Washington Operations Center, nor were they in continuous contact with the Herndon ATC Command Center. In both cases, the Air Transport Association was trying to "carry a lot of water" for all the airlines. In retrospect, the interviewees agreed that it would have been helpful for them to have had a more formal arrangement for reporting to and from the FAA and ATC. More specifically, if they had known sooner about United Flight #175, it might have affected their evaluation and decisions.

Marquis: ATC knew what was going on because of the intercepted communications from the cockpit. In the event that the AA SOC was aware that it was the first to know about an incident, the protocol would have been for the SOC Manager on Duty (Marquis) to have immediately autodialed to the Herndon manager on duty (Ben Sliney) with the information. The interviewees reported that AA had a hard time on 9/11 in getting in touch with Herndon. Precious minutes were lost in building the communications bridge.

[U] Kinton recalled that the bag found in Atta's rental car left in the parking garage, as well as the cell phone calls from the Boston based flight attendants, helped identify the nature of the plot and plotters.

Miles (after seeing the first WTC crash and hearing rumors about AAL) next received a call from the SAMC manager (he could not remember who it was that day) informing Miles that they had received a call on the STAR-FIX maintenance line that reported a hijacking. Miles first responded that it was an American flight, but the manager reiterated that the call came from UAL 175. He recollected that this call was placed from San Francisco shortly before the second tower was hit. (BILL, THIS APPEARS TO BE THE FIRST INDICATION OF A PROBLEM WITH 175 IN THE UA SOC)

AMERICAN

AHERN: AAL 11 was pretty clear to us, and after the crash we took immediate action to "ground stop" the northeast. He didn't recall the time of the ground stop but they have paperwork that provides the time. (Staff Note: Compare this ground stop time to that of United Airlines as well as the take-off time of UAL Flight 93. The ground stop was later than UAL 93 take-off but how much later?)

AHERN: [U] Ahern agreed that AAL originally thought that the second strike of the WTC was AAL 77. AAL 77 had been lost on radar, or rather the transponder was turned off

UNITED BRIEFING: [U] Barber remembers talking soon after tower 2 was hit to Craig Parfitt from American Airlines. The gist of it was, "whose plane is whose?" At that time, Parfitt thought both were American Airlines' planes but Barber was confident the second one was UAL 175. The more CNN slowed down the tape and enlarged the image of the second plane, the more certain they were it was a United jet in tower 2 because it was not the shiny metallic color of American Airlines' jets.

MARQUIS: He immediately started an active log on the incident, reporting it as a flight emergency. The form he began is called an "FI". To do so, he pulled up all the flight information on AA 11 available to him on the monitors at his workstation. At the outset, he was wondering where the flight was going to be taken to land.

WANSLEY: [U] After his call with Defenbaugh, Wansley went to his office briefly and then went over to the SOCC, sometime prior to 9:00 a.m. Shortly after he arrived at the SOCC he heard Gerard Arpey give the order for American to get its planes on the ground.

WANSLEY: Wansley received no information that ATC had received suspicious transmissions from the cockpit of AAL 11, and that those transmissions suggested that other "planes" were involved in the plot. Wansley said that if FAA had such information the FAA absolutely owed that information to the air carriers. He would be astonished that the FBI didn't have that information.

UNITED

MILES: Miles did not receive any reports from the ATC system about communications with Flight 175 (including loss of radar). (He reported that typically, he would receive relevant information from the ATC system, but he didn't receive any on 9/11.)

[U] Miles believes that the first awareness of a problem with UA 93 came in the Crisis Center, where they were viewing Aircraft Situation Displays and saw the plane turn around. Miles started focusing on UA 93 after receiving a call (between 8:30 and 9:00 AM Central Time, but most likely around 8:45) from the SAMC that was similar to the earlier call in reporting that they had gotten a call from UA 93 indicating that the flight had been hijacked.

MILES: While his experience and expectation was that ATC would communicate to him and to the SOC about "strange" or unusual communications from the cockpit, but he could not recall any such communications on 9/11 and he got no relevant information about the hijackings from that source. He added that ATC routinely communicates hourly throughout the system.

POLICASTRO: He was getting ready to leave at about 5:55 a.m. when he received a call. Per standard practice, he immediately asked for the flight number. The man on the phone told him it was UAL 175. He assumed it was a flight attendant because Star-Fix calls are always made by the attendants. The caller told him the plane had been hijacked, both pilots had been murdered and a flight attendant had been stabbed. Furthermore, he believed that the hijackers were flying the plane.

Soliday thought it was about five minutes after the second plane had hit when he received the call. Davis told Soliday they were opening the company's crisis center.

[U]Soliday said he did not recall hearing that UAL 175 had reported to ATC hearing suspicious transmissions coming from AAL 11.

SOLIDAY: Note: UAL is providing this time-date information to the commission. This should be helpful data about the situational awareness of the airline because the lock-out time will be precise, and it was in the interest of the airline to lock-out the flight information as quickly as possible after learning it was in trouble). Soliday reconfirmed his belief that the time of UAL's lockout of Flight 93 was about the time of the 77 crash. STUDDERT: He remembers at some point learning that UAL had lost contact with its Flight 93, and that a few minutes after that (around 8:45 a.m. CDT) he ordered that UAL's fleet be grounded. (NOTE: 93 TOOK OFF ABOUT THIS TIME).

UNITED BRIEFING MFR: Bill Roy, the Director of Systems Operations, arrived to work at 6:30 a.m. CT that morning. He spent some time discussing the activities of the night before with the managers on duty. When he heard about the first plane that hit the World Trade Center, he was near Rich Miles' desk in the control center. Roy reported to

have notified both the CEO and the COO at that time, and then went about activating the Operational Crisis Center. He reported that Andy Studdert, the COO, arrive at the Operational Crisis Center as they were activating it. United crisis centers were also activated in Denver, CO and San Francisco, CA at that time.

UNITED BRIEFING: ASD data was displayed tracking the United flights, initially UAL 175 and subsequently UAL 93; the other screens showed CNNN and other news media. On 9-11, the crisis center's checklist of things to do and people to call was manual. Since then, they have automated it.

UNITED BRIEFING: Ballenger, the dispatcher handling the sector that had both UAL 175 and UAL 93.

UNITED BRIEFING: Sandy Rogers is a Flight Dispatcher - ATC Coordinator #2 (West Coast; his shift was 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.). He was the United Airlines employee at the SOC that had the most contact with the FAA on 9-11. He made the call to FAA Headquarters in Washington, DC to confirm the plane that hit Tower 1 was not a United Airlines plane. Rogers confirmed that the FAA (he did not recollect the official's name that he spoke to at that time) said the plane was not United; it was an American Airlines plane

UNITED BRIEFING: [U] Barber remembers talking soon after tower 2 was hit to Craig Parfitt from American Airlines. The gist of it was, "whose plane is whose?" At that time, Parfitt thought both were American Airlines' planes but Barber was confident the second one was UAL 175. The more CNN slowed down the tape and enlarged the image of the second plane, the more certain they were it was a United jet in tower 2 because it was not the shiny metallic color of American Airlines' jets.

UNITED BRIEFING: Commission staff told the UAL representatives that in the morning ATC had heard a transmission from AA 11 that "we have planes." The UAL representatives confirmed that they were not told this by ATC. They also confirmed that UAL 175 and AA 11 were on the same frequency that morning. No one at the SOC heard of the message over the frequency, and no one communicated with UAL 175 regarding that unusual message. In terms of situational awareness, the dispatchers and managers at the SOC that morning were not aware of any communications between ATC and UAL 175; They maintained that ATC "first and foremost" communicated directly with airline pilots, not the dispatchers; and they were unaware that a NY controller asked UAL 175 to move to avoid AAL 11.

UNITED BRIEFING: managers at the SOC that morning were not aware of any communications between ATC and UAL 175; they were unaware that a NY controller asked UAL 175 to move to avoid AAL 11.

UNITED BRIEFING: Barber noted that his log stated that at 8:20 a.m. (CT) UAL 175 was confirmed.

UNITED BRIEFING: [U] The UAL staff found nothing unusual, and had no new information to volunteer about UAL 93's 40-minute delay taking off from Newark that morning.

At 8:21 a.m. (CT) - Ballenger got a "pirep" (pilot report) from UAL 93 that was routine.

At 8:24 a.m. (CT) - Ballenger and McCurdy sent the message to beware of cockpit intrusions to UAL 93, among others.

8:26 a.m. (CT) - UAL 93 confirms last message.

8:28 a.m. (CT), - a request for engineering data was sent to UAL 93. Ballenger did not get a report back from the plane.

8:30 a.m. (CT) - McCurdy reported that they started to focus on UAL 93 at.

8:31 a.m. (CT) - UAL 93 confirmed receipt of the message. **(I have this in my notes but it doesn't make sense...)**

8:32 a.m. (CT) - ATC Cleveland Center informed UAL SOC that UAL 93 was NORDO.

8:33 a.m. (CT) - Between 8:30-50 a.m. (CT), UAL stopped all the departures.

At 8:50 a.m. (CT) - they began to land all the flights.

UAL BRIEFING: McCurdy thought they determined UAL 93 was hijacked before the turn, due to the lack of communication from the pilot.

UAL BRIEFING: UAL staff thought that on 9-11, the ultimate decision makers were the pilots and the controllers.

9-11 STATUS OF FLIGHT DECK CREW

POLICASTRO: UAL 175. He assumed it was a flight attendant because Star-Fix calls are always made by the attendants. The caller told him the plane had been hijacked, both pilots had been murdered and a flight attendant had been stabbed. Furthermore, he believed that the hijackers were flying the plane.

D: RECOMMENDATIONS:

Arroyo thinks that Immigration and INS should be tied into the IT systems of aviation security.

Passengers need to be smarter with what they pack. Some carriers will turn it around and say "you can bring whatever you want to bring on the flight," as a customer service boost to their sales. If a passenger uses more diligence, then thing will get faster.

Assure that one entity, (either TSA or the Airport) does the credentialing so that they can identify trends and problems. Too many cooks in the pot right now.

Baer and other said that the purpose of credentialing and background checks was only to determine if the applicant had ever been incarcerated in the United States; she stressed it was not to uncover any potential terrorist affiliations. Credentialing should go beyond the criminal actions, and be cross checked with watch lists etc.

Baer thinks the background checks for employees (fingerprinting) should incorporate Interpol. Background checks only assess domestic issues for an individual, such as arrests and warrants, which is a deficiency in the system.

Federalize (TSA) airport law enforcement

BELGER: We need a common database FAA/FBI/CUSTOMS/INS from which to work.

BOIVIN: placing the x-ray operator in a remote location (to avoid being influenced by the appearance of the passenger) would be worthwhile.

BUCKINGHAM: There should be clear roles and missions. There needs to be a mix of partnership and leadership.

BUCKINGHAM: Behavior Pattern Recognition training for LEO's

BUTTERWORTH: Take cargo off passenger flights and put them on all Cargo flights.

BUTTERWORTH: the flow of performance information should include staff of congressional offices, as well as the insurers of the airlines. If they are made privy to such information, the regulators won't need to threaten public disclosure. Insurance premiums will go up if they are aware that the carrier has low performance results, and thus economic factors can be brought to bear on improving security.

CANAVAN: Make sure the regulators are regulated

CANAVAN: Arm Cargo Pilots

CANAVAN: Make sure that GA pilots are properly credentialed.

CANAVAN: Operational Security

CANAVAN: Randomness

CANAVAN: Security Impact Statements

CANAVAN: Have one person in charge of security

CANAVAN: Assure that screeners have a career track.

CANAVAN: Good study on which to base Number of FAMS

Can: Increase # of bomb sniffing dogs

CAN: Supports corporate board committees on security

CAN: Train flight attendants in defensive tactics.

COX: He indicated that individuals and vehicles access the air operations area through the perimeter fence without being screened, a practice, he says, continues today.

COX: He said that, "the known shipper program is the biggest joke. It is pathetic."

COX; Have a system for flagging police reports and suspicious activities that is shared.

Flynn: CAPPs like program to examine threat posed by airport personnel

Flynn: Better control Access to the airport

AT large: Watch for insiders. Make sure pilots are ok.

FLYNN: Make the pros do extraordinary things to attack CAS so they are more likely to be ferreted out.

FLYNN: "Throw money" at technology and research and development. He reported that R and D investment in aviation security has actually gone down since September 11th and is "way below where it needs to be." R & D spending has gone down since 9-11.

At Large: Have biometrics associated with law enforcement and "carriage of weapons."

FLYNN: A salient weakness of "known shipper" is the near impossibility of establishing the trustworthiness of the many thousand employees (of shippers, indirect air carriers and their contractors, and air carriers) who have both access to the cargo and the ability to know accurately when it will be in flight on passenger airliners (so they can set the detonation timer-altimeters). Until there is a reliable way of checking those employees, merely "knowing" the shippers (and also the IAC's and carriers) as reputable business entities will be an inadequate safeguard

FLYNN: Use CAPPs II for shipping employees until better screening is in place.

FLYNN: Cycle cargo in an altitude chamber.

GAO:

1) Provide for independent (outside of TSA) continuous covert testing of the system (not just test objects), with *consequences* (i.e. mandatory retraining after failures)

- 1) Expedite deployment of TIP technology (for screeners)
- 2) Incorporate covert testing results into goals and objectives (to avoid stovepiping of security)
- 3) Provide for recurrent and remedial training of screeners
- 4) Increase number and training of supervisors
- 5) Deploy covert testing in other transportation modes

GAO: Engineer security into our infrastructure and systems.

GAO: Better coordinate communications between federal agencies

GAO: ID Federal and Private resources and allocate using risk management.

GAO: Give localized, actionable intelligence

GAO: Clarify stakeholder roles and missions.

GARVEY: Clarify Role and Responsibilities in for Aviation Security.

HALLETT: She still can't believe that the government allows people to get boarding passes over the Internet. See if we should allow this.

HALLETT: Hallett said that for the past 5 years ATA has been concerned about the operation of the FAA technical center in New Jersey. Good technology is being overlooked. She believes part of the problem is that political pressure from members of Congress supporting home town vendors skews the process. In one instance, excellent technology sat at the center and was not assessed for over a year. Hallett suggests that there should be an investigative report on the technical center.

KINTON: "information sharing is absolutely critical to the people on the front line in the war on terrorism."

KINTON: In Kinton's view, the cameras can also act as a deterrent. He did recall a discussion of a CCTV program throughout the airport. This was a larger program, related to access issues, but it was not funded pre-9/11.

KINTON: Behavior Pattern research

KINTON: Harden airport facilities.

KINTON: Have ticket scanners at the gateway to screening to check names against watchlists and document validity.

KINTON: [U] There is a lot of General Aviation at Hanscom and also at Logan. Massport is requiring background checks and issuing ID's to pilots based out of Hanscom, in spite of initial push-back from industry. They are taking the Cat X (large passenger airport) approach to GA and are screening GA passengers out of Logan. Radio talk show host Don Imus has mentioned it on his show. They screened a Saudi Flight with a sports team: "unless we get a letter from the State Department we are going to do it." Kinton supported the ideas of having a security coordinator at each GA facility, and of requiring a special ID for GA pilots.

LAWLESS: He believes there seems to be more difficulty in sharing of information on the maritime side, and that this needs to be fixed. He suggests that the intelligence dissemination process be streamlined and made simpler.

LAWLESS: "best practices" protocol and standard needs to be developed for ports. He also suggests

LAWLESS: He also believes that the no fly lists provided by TSA to airports should be provided to cruise ship ports as well.

LAWLESS believes there should be SIDA areas in ports as well and that employees should be fingerprinted and crime-checked like airport employees.

LAWLESS He urges that we encourage the Coast Guard/TSA to provide screening technology to ports.

LAWLESS work to improve the speed and efficiency of EDS machines, and

LAWLESS: have a central location where employees are screened when they enter their workplaces in the airport.

LAWLESS: He urges that we work to ensure that cargo is screened.

LONGMIRE: Move toward the checkpoint of the future.

LOY: Maintaining a sense of urgency, while we are still learning how to grapple with the new, stateless enemy, is one of my main recommendations for the 9/11 Commission.

LOY: I don't know whether it is a "mother may I" to the Hill, but we need a deputy chief of staff on policy who focuses on major policy issues on protection, restoration, and response, and whom everyone knows has direct access to Secretary.

LOY: Regional Offices for DHS.

AT LARGE: A DHS office in each state

AT LARGE: a Job description for every position at DHS and TSA

Marquis et. Al.: Assure that FAA/TSA and the Carriers share information more rapidly and efficiently.

Marquis et. Al: Better information sharing between airlines—particularly their security divisions. This may need anti-trust.

LOGAN BRIEF: There needs to be improvement in identification documents because they are so easy to forge. Kinton believes that the proliferation and ease of acquiring fake identification renders ID checks meaningless.

LOGAN BRIEF: They agreed that a best-practices guideline book of how to incorporate aviation security into airport construction is a good idea. This could encourage things like bullet and shatter-proof glass; construction that minimizes explosion impacts, etc.

Osmus pointed out that the carriers do still have security responsibilities and that airline (and airport) employees, can and should be like a neighborhood watch.

(U) Osmus said that AOPA worked-up a GA security program and training materials. She recommended we contact Andy Cebula at AOPA for details (phone number 301 695-2203).

PARKS: He strongly supports the idea of assuring that federal officers who are used as force multipliers for the FAM program receive some basic training in how to operate in an aircraft cabin environment. (He said he's not very familiar with current training requirements).

PORTLAND: Shultes indicated that the EDS devices in use at the airport are all new, state-of-the-art equipment that give a lot of false positives.

PORTLAND: We need new technology that is better and faster and that will reduce the human factor.

PORTLAND: Linda Nieves reports that when she wants to provide credentials to a new airport employee she must check the name against a "watch list" and "selectee" list provided to her by the TSA. The list which is updated continuously is over 240 pages long and not alphabetized. She said she spends a great deal of time looking for names on an un-alphabetized list that could be spent on more important security measures. Shultes said he doesn't know why they have to do the check in the first place since they have to fingerprint the worker and submit the name to the TSA who should know whether the person is on the watch list or not.

Randol feels that "you get what you pay for" with respect to security and you have to make an explicit decision as to how much risk, or how much inconvenience, you are willing to take.

ROBINSON: For instance, the system has not highlighted for the intelligence community specific skill-sets, critical tasks or technical backgrounds that would assist a terrorist should they conduct a probe of the aviation security system for areas of vulnerability.

[REDACTED] (U) He feels that in every airport we build from here on out we need to engineer security into the system. We need to build security from the ground up.

SOLIDAY: We need a major human factors study. (we need to do this until we can perfect technology)

SOLIDAY: Comprehensive Strategic Plan for security

SOLIDAY: Quadrapole technology for checkpoints.

[
U] Soliday said that if the commission recommends the establishment of a set policy for how to shut down the National Airspace or ground some number of flights in the air, the scenario should be exercised and timed out so that all stakeholders would know what to expect, including data on system capacities.

Soliday stressed the importance of getting government agencies to work with and coordinate with each other to help emergency management and investigations to be operated more efficiently. One point of contact for information.

SOLIDAY: The NTSB law dealing with humanitarian response to victims and families after the downing of a plane does not specifically deal with criminal acts. While United and AAL agreed to apply the provisions to the 9-11 event, there was no legal requirement to do so. There's no telling whether other air carriers would follow suit in the event of future attacks. He believes this should be remedied with a change in the law to include humanitarian response to criminal acts.

STUDDERT: He thought that one way to address bombs is to set up a process where everything got swiped as it went by in an in-line process.

AT LARGE: Build the checkpoint of the future: Goals, standards, Budget, staffing, training, supervision, equipment and procedure.

SULLIVAN: Independent Red Teams

SULLIVAN: Walk and talk teams (like they now have at Boston) who are trained in behaving pattern assessment.

SULLIVAN: Congressional requirement that after every red team report TSA will describe their remedial steps.

SULLIVAN: Measures to ensure that management doesn't "fear" red team reports as an embarrassment, but rather as an important measurement tool.

SULLIVAN: Training and experience requirements for TSA managers (just like we have for screeners)

FLYNN: "Throw money" at technology and research and development. He reported that R and D investment in aviation security has actually gone down since September 11th and is "way below where it needs to be."

RED TEAM BRIEF: Make TSA a law enforcement agency. This would help solve the "unity of command" problem at the airports, and would also give the agency power to enforce its regulations.

RED TEAM BRIEF: IAPR representatives thought that provision of off-site screening would enhance screener performance.

UNITED AIRLINES: Security training for dispatchers

WANSLEY: There shouldn't be constraints on the government sharing information with "cleared" air carrier employees. Perhaps an industry core group could be established for receiving such information

DULLES: how will we allocate resources to address security concerns, and who will pay for such measures. (LET'S RECOMMEND AN ANSWER).

DULLES: Faggen, Pitts and Dunn all called for a more clearly defined role for TSA and all stakeholders in the system—we should know where the authorities and roles begin in ends to avoid confusion.

DULLES: Pitts expressed the opinion that TSA personnel lack strong backgrounds in aviation

DULLES: If anything, they may be getting too much unfiltered intelligence, coming in from many sources and therefore he believes there is still a need for a centralized intelligence-gathering point.

[] [U] Wright said that the FBI was not certain of its role in Civil Aviation Security. She said that this might still be the case.

[]: She thinks it should be a separate unit as a counterpart to TSA

[]: She believes that there might still be information sharing problems with the TSA. For instance, TSA still doesn't give FBI the access to its websites that it gives the air carriers.

[]: She said there is concern about the roles and mission of FAMS versus FBI on response and investigations etc

[REDACTED] said that one of the big problems is that agents don't know what information they can share with local police departments. Her advice has been for LEO's to join the JTTF to help them get the clearance/trust/access to information they need. She said that police need to know!

[REDACTED] [U] During her tenure with the FBI she tried to get the Bureau to send a liaison to the FAA. She believes this would still be a good idea.

AHERN: Data gathering and the sharing of intelligence, not only among U.S. government agencies, but between the U.S. and governments of foreign countries should be improved.

AHERN: Supports a Trusted Traveler program.

LUONGO: [U] General Aviation - we need to continue to look at it - it still presents a threat. "Terrorism didn't start on Sept 11. We can't assume the next one will be the same type of attack."

LUONGO: SSI] There is a lack of explosives-testing at the checkpoint. A metal detector won't pick it up. Trace detection of carry-on and person if you are a CAPPS selectee is "a must".

[U] Underwood agreed that GA represented a significant vulnerability. He also suggested that we do what we can to promote higher education for security managers and the development of programs in the discipline.

UNDERWOOD: He also suggests that DoT create a security council made up of modal administrators, which is even more important now that the security function has been transferred to TSA.

RIFFE: She said that the FAA didn't prepare a yearly report providing all the results of the testing involving the airline. (WE THINK THEY SHOULD).

RIFFE: [U] People who might be thrust into a position in an emergency operations center need some training. "We didn't know who was responsible for what."

RIFFE: [U] Test the system.