

April 10, 2000

Mr. Rolince,

RE: Threat to Hijack U.S. Based Airliner from the New York Metropolitan Area, on or about 4/2 - 4/16/00; IT-UBL/AI-Qaeda; OO: New York.

(U) On 4/7/00, FBI Newark received information from a walk-in, identified as Niaz Khan (Niaz), a British citizen of Pakistani ethnicity, who claims that he was sent to the United States in order to join up with others from the New York/Newark area and hijack a U.S. airliner (nfi) sometime in the two week time frame commencing on 4/2/00. Niaz relates the following details regarding this possible hijack threat:

(U) In March 2000, Niaz was at the "Some" casino in Manchester, England, and lost a large sum of money gambling. When he left the casino he was approached by an individual only known as Khan, who asked Niaz why he was despondent. Niaz told Khan that he lost money gambling, to which Khan stated that he and his associates could assist him and change his way of life. Niaz was then recruited to undergo training in Afghanistan. Khan provided the funds for the travel which was arranged through Falcon Travel, Winslow avenue, Manchester, England.

(U) On March 22, 2000, Niaz arrived in Lahore, Pakistan and stayed at the Alfa Inn (ph). After one day there he was met, as prearranged, by three males who took him to the Radwan Hakim (ph) camp in Pakistan. This camp is approximately forty minutes from Lahore. Niaz with seven other recruits received small arms and hijack specific training. Niaz made note that the aircraft was the 747 type. Niaz alleges that while at the camp he received Islamic indoctrination and that photographs of Bin Laden were displayed there as well.

(U) Prior to his departure from the camp, Niaz was purportedly told that he was assigned to take part in a mission, involving 5 - 6 other unknown males, that would hijack a U.S. based airline. Once hijacked the aircraft would be taken to Kabul. Upon arrival in Kabul all Pakistanis would be allowed off the aircraft and that all "white people" would be forced to stay on board. Niaz was told that he must use all force necessary to accomplish his mission. Weapons, described as pen guns and grenades, used in the operation would be provided by personnel employed by "duty free shops" on board the aircraft. Niaz indicated the hijacking was to occur during a two week period following his arrival in the United States.

(U) Upon completion of this training, Niaz as directed, returned to London, arriving there on 3/31/00. On 4/1/00, he departed London for Zurich, Switzerland; on 4/2/00 Niaz left Zurich returned to London and departed Heathrow airport for JFKIA on board British Airways flight 177 (arriving there on 4/2/00). Niaz's British passport corroborates this travel.

(U) Upon arrival at JFKIA Niaz was directed to meet with a taxi driver known only as Khan. Niaz was told Khan is Pakistani, with a French-cut beard, wearing a white muslim style hat. Niaz was instructed to wear a specific type of garb which would assist

Khan in identifying him.

(U) However, when he arrived at JFKIA, Niaz had second thoughts about proceeding with the operation and meeting with Khan, the taxi driver. As a result Niaz then traveled to Atlantic City, New Jersey, where he again lost a large sum of money gambling. Niaz then contacted FBI Newark, via local police in Atlantic City, and provided the information as set forth above.

(U) Niaz was polygraphed during the morning of 4/8/00. Initial polygraph analysis indicates Niaz showed no deception regarding all relevant questions.

(U) In an effort to further vet the information, on 4/9/00, FBI Newark and New York took Niaz back to the terminal area at JFKIA where he was to meet Khan the taxi driver a week earlier. New York SOG was present in the event Niaz and Khan made contact. This investigative initiative met with negative results.

(U) New York and Newark have obtained a listing and photographs of taxi-drivers at JFKIA who are Pakistani. The list and photographs are currently being reviewed and analyzed in a further effort to corroborate the reporting.

(U) It is the analysis of FBIHQ that it is unlikely that terrorists would trust an individual they have known for only a short period of time to take part in a hijacking operation. Also this operation would likely necessitate more intense and lengthy training. Additionally, Niaz should be able to provide identities (true or alias) of individuals he met at the Radwan Hakim training camp and during his travels.


(U) Niaz is described as follows: DPOB - 5/30/74, at Burnley, England, address - [REDACTED] British passport number [REDACTED] The above information has been forwarded to appropriate British liaison services, via Legat London. FAA and other pertinent U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been provided the above reporting.

Mr. Kurtz




Composite  
Drawing Lic  
No. N0330011  
Date 4-10-00  
Artist D. J. Tenenbaum




 Composite  
Drawing Unit  
No. N03300119  
Date 4-11-00  
Artist LT. L.A. TROWBRIDGE  
*L.A. Trowbridge*



 Composite  
Drawing Unit  
No. N03300117  
Date 4-11-00  
Artist L.L.A. Tenenbaum  
*L.L.A. Tenenbaum*



 Composite  
Drawing Unit  
No. N03300121  
Date 4-11-00  
Artist Lt. L.A. Teawberry  
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