Amid terror, a drastic decision:  
Clear the skies
Four hours of fear: 9/11’s untold story - Part I

By Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams and Blake Morrison

USA TODAY reporters Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams and Blake Morrison spent seven months interviewing more than 100 people involved in key decisions on September 11...

No one sure if hijackers were on board
Four hours of fear: 9/11’s untold story - Part II

By Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams and Blake Morrison

On Sept. 11, the nation’s aviation system quickly and safely landed almost 4,500 planes that were in the air when the terrorist attacks took place. How was this accomplished? How was the decision made to land all the planes? This case study will examine the decision-making thoughts, processes and strategies key players used on this day to protect over 350,000 people in the air. It will explore what individuals can learn about decision-making in an emergency.

Cover Story

On Sept. 11, the nation watched as passenger jets became missiles and terrorists seized the skies. The only way to stop them: Land all the planes. USA TODAY reconstructs how officials decided to take the most radical action in aviation history.

Source: Luntz Research Co. survey of 1,000 adults Oct. 3. Margin of error: ±3.1 percentage points.

Travelers to keep flying
Most Americans say they won’t cancel flights. Their plans:

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<th>Will travel as planned</th>
<th>Will cancel plans</th>
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<td>83.8%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
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Don’t know/Declined to answer: 1.8%

By William Bosor and Sam Ward, USA TODAY

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Capt. Jim Hosking is stunned as he reads the message from the cockpit printer aboard United Flight 890. On most days, messages sent to the Boeing 747 are ordinary: maintenance items or reports of bad weather. On this day, Sept. 11, before sunrise over the Pacific Ocean, the warning is unlike any he has seen.

Hijackings? Terrorist attack? Taking off from Narita, Japan, just hours before, Hosking, 56, looked forward to heading home to Los Angeles, where his wife would be waiting.

But reading the message, sent at 9:37 a.m. Eastern Time, the pilot of 34 years wonders: What the hell happened down there? And then, even more chilling:

"SHUT DOWN ALL ACCESS TO FLIGHT DECK." In the cabin behind him sit 243 passengers — all of them strangers to Hosking. He turns toward first officer Doug Price. "Get out the crash ax," Hosking tells him.

At the Federal Aviation Administration's command center in Herndon, Va., air traffic managers also struggle to make sense of what's happening.

Already, terrorists have deliberately flown two jets into the World Trade Center. The hijackings are unlike anything anyone has seen. In the past, hijackers commandeered passenger jets for political reasons. Pilots were told to cooperate with them, to take the hijackers wherever they wanted to go.

Today, the hijackers don't want to go anywhere. They just want the jets.

At the FAA's command center, managers can think of
And no one knows how many terrorists might still be in the air. During these hours, those who run the nation’s aviation system will come to believe as many as 11 flights have been hijacked.

This is the story of the four most critical hours in aviation history -- an ordeal that began at 8:15 a.m., when the first indication that something was wrong came during a telephone call to American Airlines.

8:15 a.m. ET
3,624 planes in the sky

Intruders in the cockpit

The call doesn’t make any sense. Not at first.

At American Airlines’ operations center in Fort Worth, manager Craig Marquis talks to a reservations agent in North Carolina. The agent isn’t sure what to do.

On another line, the agent is speaking with a flight attendant who’s in the air but can’t reach the pilots on her jet. The agent wants to transfer the call to Marquis but the phone system won’t let her. So she begins to relay messages coming from the back of American Flight 11, a Boeing 767 heading from Boston to Los Angeles.

Aboard, flight attendant Betty Ong tells what’s unfolding.

Marquis, a blunt-spoken veteran, isn’t sure what to make of the call. Is the woman even a flight attendant? he wonders. He checks his computer as he listens on the phone. There she is. Betty Ong. And she is on that flight.

Ong can’t contact the pilots, the agent says. That’s why she’s calling. Why doesn’t she just walk up to the cockpit and bang on the door? But as he listens -- as Ong, in hushed tones, tells of a passenger dead and a crewmember dying, of the jet’s erratic path and intruders in the cockpit -- Marquis realizes that Ong can do little.

The flight has been hijacked.

As Marquis, 45, considers what he can do, air traffic controllers at the FAA’s Boston Center reach the same
conclusion. Flight 11 has stopped talking. Its pilots don’t respond to calls; its transponder signal has disappeared. Worse, controllers report hearing a man with a strange accent in the cockpit.

"We have some planes," he says through an open mike. "Just stay quiet and you will be OK."

Could more hijackers be out there?

In the FAA’s command center in Herndon, Ben Sliney learns of the radio transmission. The words will haunt him all morning. "We have some planes."

Some? How many?

Sept. 11 is Sliney’s first day on the job as national operations manager at the Federal Aviation Administration’s command center in Herndon, Va. Hours after starting, Sliney ordered the airspace over the United States cleared (the first time in history such an order had been given).

"Order everyone to land": Sept. 11 was Ben Sliney’s first day on the job as national operations manager at the Federal Aviation Administration’s command center in Herndon, Va. Hours after starting, Sliney ordered the airspace over the United States cleared (the first time in history such an order had been given).

"We have some planes . . . "
Sliney can’t shake the words. Are there more hijackers out there?

8:30 a.m. 3,786 planes

"Wow, look at that!"

In the FAA’s largest air traffic facility in New York state -- a warehouse-like structure on Long Island, an hour east of Manhattan -- manager Mike McCormick rushes to the banks of radar screens where controllers are trying to track Flight 11.

The former Marine presses his cordless phone to one ear as he talks to officials at other facilities in the New York area. But the other ear is doing most of the listening -- to the radio reports of pilots who are watching the jet’s progress.

Over New York, Flight 11 has begun to descend. Not into JFK or LaGuardia or Newark International Airport but into the city itself.

It must have electrical problems, he thinks. That’s probably why the transponder is off. McCormick calls another air traffic center that hands off flights to New York’s three major airports. Flight 11, he warns, might try an emergency landing.

In Fort Worth, Gerard Arpey, American Airline’s vice president for operations, hears about the Ong call and the strange transmissions from Flight 11. In his 20 years with American, Arpey, 43, has grown used to stories about misbehaving passengers -- the drunks and disorderlies that airlines encounter. But this, he thinks, this seems more than that. This sounds real.

He tries to reach his boss, CEO Don Carty, but Carty isn’t in yet. Then he heads to the airline’s command center, where top operations officials gather only in the event of an emergency. They’re all here, Arpey thinks as he walks through the door.

All but Craig Marquis.

Just down the hall, in the airline’s operations center, Marquis hasn’t left the phone. Still listening to the relayed words of Ong, he works to calculate how much fuel the jet carries. That way, he may be able to predict where the hijackers will take the flight. But at 8:46 a.m., the North Carolina agent abruptly loses Ong’s call. Marquis’ calculations no longer matter.
At Newark’s tower, just across the Hudson River from Manhattan, controller Rick Tepper, 41, stands at a console behind a group of other controllers.

There, he answers phones and troubleshoots problems. He and the other controllers often wear jeans and polo shirts. The attire belies their intense work ethic.

When Tepper looks past the controllers, he sees it out the window: a mushroom cloud rising from the World Trade Center’s north tower.

"Wow! Look at that," he says to no one in particular. Flames shoot from the building. "How are they going to put that out?"

He didn’t see what caused the explosion, but on the chance that it was a plane, he begins calling airports nearby.

"Did you lose anybody?" he asks over and over. No one has.

Then, a phone rings: the "shout line," set up for speedy calls among controllers in the region. Tepper answers. "We’ve lost an aircraft over Manhattan," someone at the New York center says. "Can you see anything out your window?"

"No, I don’t see anything . . . " Tepper pauses. "But one of the towers, one of the trade towers, is on fire.

"I’ll call you back."

9 a.m. 4,205 planes

"This is not a drill!"

At the New York center, McCormick struggles to keep up with the barrage of information, most of it annoyingly vague.

"That must have been American 11, McCormick thinks. Could it be terrorism?"

Just three days before, celebrating his 45th birthday, he had taken his 8-year-old son Nicholas to the Trade Center. There they stood, toes touching one tower, peering toward the sky.

Now he tries to figure out why an airliner would’ve hit the building. Just before American disappeared, controllers heard an emergency beacon. From what? McCormick wonders. And controllers can’t find a helicopter that has disappeared from radar over the city. Did it hit the Trade Center, too?

In Herndon, national operations manager Sliney receives word from officials in New York: A small plane has crashed into the Trade Center. One of the room’s 10-by-14-foot TV monitors comes to life with CNN. Black smoke gushes from the north tower. The hole is huge. And the smoke!

"That was no small plane, Sliney thinks."

At United Airlines headquarters outside Chicago, Andy Studdert rushes to the airline’s crisis center, a windowless room with a large screen on one wall. To those who work there, the room resembles the bridge on Star Trek’s starship Enterprise.

"Confirm American into the Trade Center!"

Workers don’t need to look up to recognize the booming baritone of Studdert, 45, the airline’s chief operating officer.

Ten days earlier, he had popped a surprise drill on the staff. He told them a flight over the Pacific had suffered a potentially disastrous engine failure and radio contact had been lost. For 30 minutes, workers believed the story. Then Studdert told them the truth.
On this day, he makes certain everyone knows the stakes. "This is not a drill!" he shouts, but the staff already knows.

What they are about to tell Studdert is even worse than what brought their boss to the crisis center. Controllers have lost radio contact with a second flight -- a United jet that, like American Flight 11, took off from Boston bound for Los Angeles.

On the giant screen at the front of the room, airline workers can only watch as United Flight 175, northwest of New York, heads toward Manhattan.

Then . . . it vanishes.

"There was another one!"

In the Newark tower, the shout line rings again.

Where's United Flight 175? "Can you see him out the window?" the caller asks Tepper, the Newark controller.

Beyond the New Jersey shipyards, Tepper spots the jet flying north, up the Hudson River. His eyes track it toward the Manhattan skyline. It's moving fast. Too fast. And rocking. Its nose points down in a dive and now it's banking left and then right and moving as Tepper has never seen a jet move and then it starts to level and . . . .

"Oh my God! He just hit the building," Tepper tells the caller.

In Herndon, a shout: "There was another one!" and the giant TV monitor glows orange from the fireball. Scores of workers gasp, as if sucking the air from the room.

It can't be a second one. At the New York control center, McCormick’s deputy, Bruce Barrett, sits incredulous at the watch desk, the facility’s nerve center.

For a moment, Barrett can think only of his daughter, Carissa, who works in lower Manhattan. Could she be visiting someone at the Trade Center? Then he sweeps the thought from his mind. Stay calm, he tells himself.

Someone has to. Controllers who had been watching TV in the break room are rushing onto the floor. They saw the jet hit the other tower. Is there really any question what he should do?

"We're declaring ATC zero," he tells air traffic managers. McCormick approves the order. Clear the skies over the region.

If they have overreacted, the decision could ruin both their careers. But after what they just witnessed, they give little thought to asking for permission. A call to
Washington could take minutes, and they aren’t sure they have that long. They aren’t certain of anything, except that they need to do something.

A handful of managers spread the word to controllers. It doesn’t seem like enough, Barrett thinks, but it’s the most he can do.

The time: 9:03 a.m.

A radical decision

On its face, the order seems incredible. Not a single flight in or out of New York? Some of the nation’s biggest airports shut down?

Controllers had gone to “air traffic control zero” before, but only when their radar shut down or their radio transmitters went silent. The planes kept flying then, and controllers in other centers guided them.

This time, ATC zero means something far more drastic. It means emptying the skies -- something that has never been attempted. And not just the skies over Manhattan. Controllers must clear the air from southern New England to Maryland, from Long Island to central Pennsylvania -- every mile of the region they control.

The move reverberates through almost every part of the nation. Controllers from Cleveland to Corpus Christi must reroute jets headed to the region and put some in holding patterns.

In the windowless room of the New York control center, Barrett, at 56 one of the facility’s most senior managers, scans the faces of the other managers. Most pride themselves on their macho, can-do attitudes. Cool under pressure. Calm during the worst. But this . . . who has prepared for this? In the dim light, Barrett sees that they’re looking at him strangely, as though they can’t believe what he’s saying.

One controller begins to sob and shake. “I don’t understand how come I’m reacting like this,” the controller says. It reminds Barrett of the traumatized troops he saw as a photojournalist in Vietnam.

You’re scared, Barrett thinks, but he can’t afford to be. He needs to concentrate. To focus. But his phone! It won’t stop ringing. Everyone wants to know what’s going on, including his wife, Denise. She asks about their daughter.

“I don’t have time to talk to you,” Barrett tells her. “Just call and find out if she’s OK.”

The white board

At the FAA’s command center in Herndon, attention shifts from the weather maps and the radar displays. The new focus: a white dry-erase board propped at the front of the room.

On it, staffers have begun to scribble the call letters of every flight that controllers around the nation fear might be in the hands of hijackers.

Weather experts and the specialists who normally work on reducing flight delays have been drafted to investigate. They badger airlines to find out whether anyone knows what’s happening aboard a number of flights. On this day, the routine glitches of the air traffic system -- a missed radio call, even a pilot who seems uncooperative -- raise suspicions. Unless a controller or airline official can assure them the glitch is simply routine -- that the captain is responding and everyone is safe -- the flight’s letters won’t be crossed out.

The phone bridges between air traffic facilities have become emergency hotlines of sorts, and the reports of possible hijackings -- many of them sketchy -- flow at a frenetic pace.

As Sliney, the operation’s manager, moves around the room, a handful of air traffic specialists follow. Together, they have decades of experience, and no one hesitates to share an opinion. But without good information, Sliney knows that any decision might be risky. Amid the shouts and chatter and conflicting reports, he reminds himself: Don’t jump to conclusions. Sort it out.

Now, during a massive conference call among air traffic facilities, officials in Herndon learn about a third jet that
might be in the hands of hijackers: American Airlines Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles.

The jet departed from Washington’s Dulles International Airport. It stopped talking to controllers somewhere near the Ohio-Kentucky border. Moments later, it disappeared from radar. Its call letters join the list on the white board -- a list that will eventually swell to 11.

But why? What is this about? Across the nation, controllers and airline and aviation officials struggle to understand.

These weren't typical hijackings. Terrorists weren't seeking political asylum or a trip to Havana. They were using the two jets as guided missiles. They meant to hit the World Trade Center. No question about that.

Most of the pilots in the air don't know what has happened. Or why. How could they? Officials on the ground are still trying to make sense of it.

Pilots have always been trained to cooperate with terrorists, to do whatever they want in order to save lives. That means a crew probably won't fight back, at least not at first. And who knows how many other flights have terrorists aboard?

Again, Sliney hears them: the words that came from Flight 11.

"We have some planes."

9:15 a.m. 4,360 planes

Unprecedented decisions

From the moment air traffic managers McCormick and Barrett start to clear the airspace over New York, government and airline officials across the nation -- almost in unison -- begin to take similar, unprecedented steps.

In Fort Worth, American operations managers huddle, talking breathlessly about their options. They already have lost one flight. And now, Flight 77 has disappeared. Do they have a choice?

Manager Marquis’ voice booms over the loudspeaker. "Anything that hasn't taken off in the Northeast," he says, "don't take off."

At the FAA’s command center in Herndon, officials worry about what might be unfolding. Maybe there's another wave of hijacked jets coming off the West Coast. And what about the international flights?

The center halts takeoffs of all flights bound for New York and New England. Then officials stop takeoffs for any flight headed to Washington, D.C. Moments later, they freeze takeoffs headed to Los Angeles, the destination of the two hijacked flights that crashed into the Trade Center. Then to San Francisco.

The orders will keep hundreds of flights on the ground. As in surgery, each step clamps shut another artery of the air traffic system.

But the moves aren't strong enough for some of the air traffic specialists at the center, who bombard Sliney with advice.

"Just stop everything! Just stop it!"

The words ring true to Sliney. It doesn't matter who said them -- with the noise in the room, it's hard even to know. But stopping everything, he thinks. That makes sense.

At 9:25 a.m., with Flight 77 still unaccounted for, Sliney issues another order that no one has ever given: full groundstop. No commercial or private flight in the country is allowed to take off.

The decision is sweeping, but Sliney has no doubt he has made the right call. And if he's wrong? At least he has erred on the side of safety. If higher-ups want to second-guess him, so be it. He has left the agency before to practice law, and he knows if he has to depart again -- if someone thinks he's screwed up -- he can leave with no regrets.

What he doesn’t know -- what no one knows -- is how crucial this order to ground planes will prove when controllers are asked later to clear the skies.

9:25 a.m. 4,452 planes

Watch and wait

In the New York control center, Bruce Barrett wonders what lies ahead. Scores of overseas flights are heading to New York. Though many are hours from landing, rerouting them from the now-closed airspace will be far more difficult than clearing the skies over the area had been.

Over land, controllers can see jets on radar and reach them by radio. But those tools are useless beyond a 200-
mile band near the shoreline. The New York center's oceanic controllers must use a complicated system to guide jets. They estimate a jet's position and issue commands to a private company, which relays them to the jet. If the jet doesn't follow a command, controllers might never know.

Barrett already has told the oceanic supervisor to turn every jet away from U.S. airspace. The primary option: Canada.

"Are you sure this is where we want to go?" the supervisor asked.

Yes, he was certain. But now, he learns that Canadian authorities are not. An official tells the supervisor that Canada cannot accept all the arrivals streaming across the North Atlantic.

"Just be emphatic," Barrett tells the supervisor, "and tell them they're not coming here."

In Herndon, Sliney considers his options. Do something. Make a decision. That's the credo of the air traffic controller. Make a decision.

But what? What should he do? Already, they have stopped takeoffs nationwide. What else can they do? Land every plane?

Throughout the morning, few had agreed what the right move was. Officials in Herndon initially questioned whether managers in New York had overstepped their authority when they cleared the airspace there. But all of the moves had proved right. And now, a consensus is building: They should land every plane.

Then, just before 9:30 a.m., a report comes from a controller at Washington Dulles International Airport. She has a jet on radar, heading toward Washington and without a transponder signal to identify it. It's flying fast, she says: almost 500 mph. And it's heading straight for the heart of the city. Could it be American Flight 77?

The FAA warns the Secret Service. Fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia race toward Washington. They won't get there in time.

'Get to the nearest airport'

On his way to the office in Fort Worth, Don Carty, American's CEO, talks on his cellphone. Flight 77 has vanished, he is told.

He was at home when Flight 11 hit the Trade Center. The TV in the kitchen was on. "Could that be your airplane?" his wife asked. Her face went pale.

Carty, 55, told her no. No, of course not; it couldn't have been. But even he didn't believe what he was saying. By the time Carty reaches the office, a jet is bearing down on Washington. Is it Flight 77? A groundstop will keep flights from taking off. But what about the ones in the air? he wonders.

At the airline's operations center in Fort Worth, vice president Arpey takes charge. "I think we better get everything on the deck," Arpey says. What the hell am I doing? he thinks, but Carty concurs when he arrives minutes later.

"Do it," he says, and Arpey puts the order out to land every American plane.

At United headquarters in Elk Grove, Ill., operations head Studdert issues a similar order: "Tell them to get to the nearest airport they can."

Before this day, no airline has ordered all of its planes from the sky.

'Where's it going?'

At FAA headquarters, less than a half-mile from the White House and Capitol, Dave Canoles paces before a speakerphone.

The head of air traffic investigations, Canoles has set up phone connections with air traffic facilities. As different regions come on the line, the reports of suspicious planes accumulate. We might be at war by afternoon, Canoles thinks. The FAA had better be ready. Already, some air traffic centers had considered evacuating. Canoles told them to stay put.

Now, about 9:35 a.m., he and others on the conference call listen as an official watching a radarscope tracks the progress of the jet heading for Washington.

Canoles sends an investigator who works for him to an adjoining office with a view to the west. "See if you can spot it," he tells him.

"Six miles from the White House," a voice on the phone says.

Canoles glances outside, through a window facing north. He wonders if he and his co-workers are in danger. At 500 mph, the jet is traveling a mile every seven seconds.

"Five miles from the White House."

"No way the FAA is a target, Canoles thinks. It can't be."

"Four miles from the White House."
They'd never choose to hit us. No way.

"The aircraft is circling. It's turning away from the White House."

Where? Where's it going?

Then: "It's gone."

In the adjoining office, the investigator spots smoke to the west of the city.

The jet has hit the Pentagon. The time: 9:38 a.m.

'Order everyone to land'

For the last 30 minutes, since the second Trade Center tower was hit, Sliney has considered bringing every flight down. Now, the manager in charge of the nation's air traffic system is certain.

He has no time to consult with FAA officials in Washington.

The skies are filled with guided missiles, he thinks. Filled with them. The words he cannot shake have proved true. The hijackers did have more planes.

"Order everyone to land! Regardless of destination!" Sliney shouts.

Twenty feet away, his boss, Linda Schuessler, simply nods. She had organized the command center earlier that day, trying to create order from the chaos so Sliney could focus on what had to be done.

"OK, let's get them on the ground!" Sliney booms.

Within seconds, specialists pass the order on to facilities across the country. For the first time in history, the government has ordered every commercial and private plane from the sky.

9:45 a.m. 3,949 planes

A misunderstanding

In Washington, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and her deputy, Monte Belger, have been moving back and forth between a secret operations center and their offices.

Throughout the morning, staffers have kept Garvey and Belger apprised of Sliney's decisions.

Now, they tell them of the order to clear the skies. With little discussion, the FAA leaders approve.

Minutes later, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta calls from a bunker beneath the White House, where he has joined Vice President Cheney. Belger explains that the FAA plans to land each plane at the closest airport, regardless of its destination.

Mineta concurs. FAA staffers, following the conversation over the speakerphone with Belger, pump their fists. Then the conversation sours.

Mineta asks exactly what the order means.

Belger says pilots will retain some discretion. All the FAA deputy means is that under long-standing aviation regulations, pilots always have some discretion in the event of an emergency aboard their aircraft. But the secretary assumes the FAA is not being tough enough. "F---- pilot discretion," Mineta says. "Monte, bring down all the planes."

Ready for a fight

Aboard United Flight 890 over the Pacific, Capt. Hosking and another pilot, Doug Price, wait anxiously for news.

A third pilot, "Flash" Blackman, sleeps in the bunkroom in the cockpit of the 747, unaware of what's unfolding.

"Why don't we just let him sleep?" Hosking suggests. Price, set for the next break, agrees.

"I couldn't go to sleep if I wanted to," Hosking says. The message about the hijackings arrived only minutes ago, but the two already have decided: Hijackers are aboard their flight.

They don't know that for sure. But they decide to believe it, if only to keep the jet safe. For years, they had been instructed to cooperate with hijackers. No longer. This time, they won't give up without a fight, not when they know someone might try to hijack the jet.

Quickly, they wedge their bags between a jump seat and the flimsy cockpit door. The door opens inward and, with the suitcases there, no one can budge it. Not without a lot of effort.

They don't know that for sure. But they decide to believe it, if only to keep the jet safe. For years, they had been instructed to cooperate with hijackers. No longer. This time, they won't give up without a fight, not when they know someone might try to hijack the jet.

And if someone does manage to get through the cockpit door?

Price will be waiting as Hosking flies the jet. He has the cockpit's hatchet-sized crash ax in hand, along with orders to use it.

"If someone tries to come in that door, I don't want you to hurt him," Hosking says. "Kill him."
On Sept. 11, the nation’s aviation system quickly and safely landed almost 4,500 planes that were in the air when the terrorist attacks took place. How was this accomplished? What was it like inside air traffic control centers and at airline headquarters? How was the decision made to land all the planes? And how did controllers execute it?

USA TODAY reporters Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams and Blake Morrison spent seven months interviewing more than 100 people involved in key decisions that day. Among them: air traffic controllers, pilots, flight attendants, airline executives, federal officials and other aviation system workers. The reporters traveled to New York, Washington, Nashua, N.H., Chicago, Fort Worth, Atlanta and Halifax, Nova Scotia. Morrison wrote the stories.

The scenes, thoughts and quotes in the stories are based on interviews with participants or with sources who had access to tape recordings. Characters’ thoughts are highlighted in italic type throughout the stories. Accounts of the day’s events were verified with other participants. Reporters and editors also scrutinized hundreds of pages of records, including transcripts of radio calls with the four hijacked jets and a log kept by the Federal Aviation Administration.

USA TODAY compiled and analyzed data from several sources. A key source was FAA radar data from the Traffic Situation Display. The system tracks all aircraft in the United States and Canada that have filed flight plans: commercial jets, private planes, cargo jets and military aircraft. It also estimates the location of planes over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans flying to and from North America. USA TODAY examined data from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Sept. 11. Aircraft totals were adjusted to eliminate military flights and several hundred domestic flights over Europe that had been included.

USA TODAY also used a database from Flight Dimensions International (www.flightexplorer.com) to analyze flights that were rerouted by controllers. A few rerouted flights were not recorded. The data allowed USA TODAY to determine when specific flights were rerouted and where they landed.

Separate software from the same firm allowed an analysis of the number of planes in the air and the airline to which those planes belonged. This analysis was done by Paul Overberg, database editor, and Lee Horwich, national editor.
By Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams and Blake Morrison
USA TODAY

Aboard Delta Flight 1989, Capt. Paul Werner learns of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks from his cockpit radio. The time: about 9:15 a.m.

Werner, 54, figures the planes that hit the World Trade Center must be small ones -- not passenger jets like the Boeing 767 he commands.

He has no idea what the FBI and air traffic controllers suspect: that terrorists plan to hijack his flight next.

Shortly after the second attack on the Trade Center at 9:03 a.m., FBI agents called an air traffic facility in Ohio that was tracking Flight 1989.

Werner flies west over Pennsylvania, the similarities can’t be dismissed.

Aircraft sizes not to scale

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approaches the Ohio border. Then they hear a voice: "Get out of there!" Then what sounds like a scuffle.

Minutes later, a new voice, this one with a heavy accent: "Ladies and gentlemen, here it's the captain. Please sit down. Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb aboard."

No one who hears those words believes they are coming from Werner. Not with such a heavy accent. No way. Rather, the transmission seems to be from a hijacker who unwittingly spoke over the radio when he meant to address passengers.

Officials at Cleveland Center rush word to Washington: Hijackers have another flight.

At the Federal Aviation Administration's command center in Herndon, Va., Delta Flight 1989 joins a growing list of suspicious jets. Some of their flight numbers will be scrawled on a white dry-erase board throughout the morning. Eventually, the list will grow to 11.

One, a TWA flight, refuses to land in Pittsburgh and wants to fly on toward Washington. Another, a Midwest Express flight, disappears from radar over West Virginia. And three jets over the Atlantic Ocean are sending out distress signals, the Coast Guard reports.

Top managers at the FAA's command center fear the worst: Jets all over the country -- including some over the oceans -- are being hijacked. One after another.

And why shouldn't they believe that, after all that has happened already this morning?

After the first two jets were hijacked and flown into the World Trade Center, FAA managers had directed all planes out of New York airspace. Next they had stopped takeoffs nationwide. Minutes after a third jet hit the Pentagon, they had ordered controllers nationwide to undertake the most massive effort in aviation history: clearing the skies.

Now they face an unprecedented challenge. They must land as fast as possible almost 4,500 planes in or headed toward U.S. airspace. Their goal is to bring 350,000 passengers and crew safely to the ground. But the order carries with it another prospect.

By ordering all jets to land, controllers may discover more planes that don't respond.

Jets that are in the hands of terrorists.

Jets the U.S. military might have to shoot down.

No one has ever contemplated such a scenario. Not since the days of the Cold War have controllers even simulated landing the fleet. The plan then was called SCATANA, an acronym for "security control of air traffic and navigation aids." Its intent: to empty the skies and give control of the nation's airspace to the military in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union.

Now, controllers must do much the same thing but with one major difference: During the Cold War, the threat would have been a Soviet fighter or missile. Today, a passenger jet might hold the enemy, and any plane could be a missile.
During the frantic hours after the order to ground the fleet is issued, controllers will reroute at least 1,300 flights. They will land 48 planes, on average, each minute. Another hijacked jet will crash in Pennsylvania after passengers fight terrorists who took over the jet. A SWAT team will await the landing of another.

These minutes -- from the time the order is issued until noon Eastern Time -- will prove the most critical of the day for controllers, air traffic officials, pilots and crews. They need to know quickly if each flight is safe.

Each missed radio call and every odd transmission will prompt them to worry: How many other flights have been hijacked?

9:45 a.m. ET: 3,949 planes in the air

Mistake realized

Silence.

Controllers at Cleveland Center can't raise United Flight 93, a Boeing 757 flying over Ohio.

Perhaps the strange radio transmissions -- the reference to a bomb and the heavy accent of a "captain" -- hadn't come from the Delta flight. Maybe Capt. Werner's Flight 1989 is fine after all.

At least, that's the way it seems to the controllers. The United flight had been just 25 miles ahead of the Delta flight when the radio transmissions came through -- close enough to account for the confusion.

Then, at 9:35 a.m., the United jet had climbed unexpectedly and turned back, over Ohio, toward the Delta flight. Then . . .

Silence. The United flight stopped talking.

It must be United that's hijacked.

When controllers ordered Werner to change course to avoid Flight 93, he had complied quickly. Yes, Delta Flight 1989 must be fine.

But now . . . what's this?

The Delta flight wants to land in Cleveland? And the captain's request comes before he can know that the FAA wants every flight down. On this day, the fact that the pilot requests to be rerouted before he is ordered to land seems suspicious. Why the urgency?

Controllers don't know that Delta officials, also concerned about the flight, have ordered Werner to land in Cleveland. They continue to send messages to Werner. In code, they ask him if all is OK. Yes, he responds time and again. He doesn't know why they're so worried.

And now, preparing for landing, Werner has more important things to worry about. He was too close to Cleveland when he got the order to land. So he loops back, over Michigan, and heads toward the city.

As the jet begins its descent, another message comes through. Busy, Werner fails to respond.

On the ground, controllers in Cleveland Center grow alarmed. Why didn't he respond? Have both jets -- the United and the Delta flights -- been hijacked?

As a SWAT team gathers on the tarmac in Cleveland, controllers and airline dispatchers around the nation continue to contact hundreds of flights.

Each receives the warning: Terrorists might be aboard.

Protect the cockpit

The steak knives. Get the steak knives. And the crash ax. And wine! Full bottles of wine.

Aboard hundreds of flights, pilots and crews begin a quiet scramble for makeshift weapons. Just minutes before, they heard radio reports or received word through their cockpit computers about the hijackings and Trade Center crashes.

What they don't know, what no one on the ground can tell them, is whether their flights may be next.

The pilots need to protect the cockpit. But with what?

They don't want to alarm passengers. More important, they don't want terrorists to know that they know, to know that they'll be waiting, even if it is with only cutlery, a cockpit hatchet and a year-old chardonnay.

Over the Atlantic Ocean, the crew aboard United Flight 963 learns of the attacks from the BBC. Four hours remain on the flight from Munich to Washington, D.C. Two off-duty pilots are summoned to the cockpit and stationed outside. One tucks an unopened bottle of wine beneath a blanket. A flight attendant rolls the beverage cart in front of the cockpit door.

Aboard American Flight 71, now over Greenland, the captain tells flight attendants to gather steak knives from first class. The knives seem hopelessly inadequate, especially if hijackers have guns, but what choice do they have?

On American Flight 84 from Frankfurt to Chicago, Marcia
Wilks, a flight attendant for more than 30 years, is dispatched to the back of the jet. Her job: to look for terrorists. On her way, she gathers the other crewmembers to tell them what she knows.

"We're not going home to Chicago today," she says.

A spunky Boston native, Wilks joined American in the late 1960s, bored with typing briefs for a lawyer and intrigued by the planes that flew past her office window. She wanted to see the world, and what better way than to fly? She even had a feel for the job; her father once worked for an airline.

Now, she resolves that on this day she will behave no differently from any other. Maintain service. That's what they always say during training. Maintain service.

When the pilot receives word to fly to Toronto instead of Chicago, he tells passengers the jet will have to stop in Canada because a crewmember is sick.

"How long will we be there?" a passenger asks Wilks.
"Are we going to miss our connections?" another asks.

"It won't be long. Don't worry," she says over and over. Each time, she feels shame.

Oh my God, what you don't know, she thinks. You don't know what's happened to the world. Wait until we open the door.

She can't shake the thoughts as she lies down for a break in the back of the jet. She closes her eyes, but she doesn't sleep. She prays for the world she expects to find when -- if -- her flight lands.

What will it be like?

9:55 a.m. 3,520 planes

What's the target?

From aboard United Flight 93, a handful of passengers contact family and friends by cellphone. What they learn -- that three jets have already been hijacked and crashed into buildings -- will prompt one of the most heroic efforts of the day. Within moments, they will rush the cockpit to try to regain control of the jet.

On the ground, controllers know nothing of their plans. They became convinced the flight was hijacked when it turned back toward the east over Ohio. But they have no idea where the hijackers plan to take the flight.

At first, the jet flew toward Pittsburgh -- so low to the ground that controllers at Pittsburgh International Airport fled. They feared the jet might be headed for them.

Then Flight 93 turned south. Toward Washington, Toward the White House? The Capitol? Or maybe Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland?

In the FAA's command center in Herndon, workers are concerned. "Are we secure here?" one asks Ben Sliney, the man in charge of overseeing the nation's airspace.

Sliney answers quickly and firmly. "Yes. We've taken measures to increase our security."

In truth, he has no idea. He sidles back to where officials are gathered around his desk. "What have we done to increase security?" he asks quietly.

But like the others who remain at their posts, Sliney and controllers around the nation realize their safety is secondary. Some try to steal away to make calls home, but they know they must continue to work. Thousands of jets remain in the sky; more could be in danger.

In Cleveland Center, controllers still wonder why the Delta captain failed to respond to their coded message. In Washington, the fears are even more pronounced. As they watch on radar as Flight 93 heads toward them, they can't help worrying: What is its target?

10:05 a.m. 2,985 planes

Shoot it down?

At United Airline's crisis center, a solitary blip glows red on a big screen. It transfixes Hank Krakowski, the airline's flight operations director. Although the airline still has hundreds of flights in the air, officials at the airline's headquarters outside Chicago choose to illuminate only the path of Flight 93 on the status board.

Are they gonna have to shoot it down? he wonders.

A 737 captain who flies vintage fighter planes at air shows, Krakowski, 47, isn't the only one wondering. Military jets already are closing on the Boeing 767 as it barrels toward Washington.

Then, at 10:06 a.m., the blip stops moving over Pennsylvania.

"Latitude and longitude," Krakowski snaps. The coordinates put the jet at Johnstown, Pa., about 120 miles from the nation's capital.

Krakowski picks up the phone and is patched through to the Johnstown airport. No answer.

No answer? How can there not be an answer?
A staffer finds the cellphone number for the airport manager. Krakowski tries again. "We might have a plane down in your area there," he says calmly. "See anything unusual?"

The answer is the one Krakowski fears. A black column of smoke rises from a field due south of the airport, near the town of Shanksville, the manager tells him. Krakowski feels numb as he looks at the screen. We just watched one of our airplanes crash.

But at least the jet hadn’t reached Washington. No one would have to shoot it down.

10:30 a.m. 1,505 planes

Flight quarantined

On a remote taxiway at Hopkins International Airport in Cleveland, Delta Flight 1989 is quarantined.

Since early reports that a bomb, then hijackers, might be aboard, Delta CEO Leo Mullin, 58, had nervously tracked the flight from the company’s headquarters in Atlanta. Every five minutes, a new report came in. None seemed clear.

Still, the flight landed uneventfully in Cleveland at 10:10 a.m.

But what now? Mullin wonders.

For two hours, passengers and crew will stay aboard the jet. Cautiously, federal investigators will talk with Capt. Werner through an open cockpit window. Finally, they will board the flight and interview its passengers and crew.

Not until midafternoon will Mullin learn the flight never was in danger. No bomb, no hijackers.

On United Flight 890, Capt. Jim Hosking remains more than an hour from North America, more than an hour from knowing whether terrorists are somewhere in the cabin. The message about the hijackings had come an hour earlier, while the flight was over the Pacific. He had been headed from Japan to Los Angeles, also the destination for three of the hijacked flights.

Then came orders to fly to Canada, where some 250 flights have been rerouted. Now, he’s bound for Vancouver, British Columbia. He elects to tell the passengers nothing.

They won’t notice where they’re going anyway, he reasons. Not until the flight is close to landing. … Unless they’re looking at the maps.

On the in-flight TVs, passengers can tune to a channel that shows the course of the flight. Hosking pulls the circuit breaker to disconnect the channel. Other pilots aboard other flights do the same. Passengers will be blind to where their flights are headed. As far as they know, nothing is amiss.

10:45 a.m. 1,081 planes

Deploying the snowplows

At one of the world’s busiest airports, Chicago’s O’Hare
International, passengers who came expecting to catch flights now crowd the turnstiles at the airport’s train station, trying to leave.

The lines stretch so long that Patrick Harney, a city transportation official, calls the transit authority and pleads with officials there to let passengers board for free. “A lot of people just want to get out,” he explains.

Many aren’t even certain why they’re being herded from the airport so fast. After the first Trade Center attack, the airport authority shut off the TVs in every concourse. The practice was adopted years ago, at the request of airline officials who knew news of any crash would unnerve travelers.

But airport officials are watching. As more details stream in -- the second tower of the Trade Center fell just minutes ago -- authorities begin a response that seems more befitting a blizzard than a terrorist attack.

Workers stand ready to set up 2,000 cots set aside for travelers stranded during snowstorms. Outside, along the airport’s edges, O’Hare’s 187 snowplows are deployed as roadblocks. They encircle the base of the control tower, their blades pointed toward anything that might approach.

11 a.m. 923 planes

Rumors and relief

When is this going to end?

And what more can she do?

Throughout the morning, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey has witnessed the most painful hours in the agency’s history.

She and her deputy, Monte Belger, approved orders to close airspace over major cities. Then they approved stopping takeoffs nationwide. When Flight 77 hit the Pentagon at 9:38 a.m., they seconded the decision of managers in Herndon to order every flight to land.

But the reports of more suspicious flights didn’t stop. A bomb is reported aboard a United Airlines jet that just landed in Rockford, Ill. Another jet disappears from radar and might have crashed in Kentucky.

The reports are so serious that Garvey notifies the White House that there has been another crash. Only later does she learn the reports are erroneous.

Now, almost 1,000 planes remain in the air. And at FAA headquarters in Washington, Garvey and Belger try to focus on what to do next. Still, they can’t avoid another thought: Whoever hijacked the four jets that crashed somehow got past the airport security forces they oversee.

What could we have done? Garvey thinks. What did we miss?

In Belger’s office, the phone rings. It’s the Herndon command center. For once it’s good news. Every commercial flight in U.S. airspace -- about a quarter of the planes still in the air -- is within 40 miles of its destination. The others are still over the oceans, and many are heading toward Canada. But at least all the flights over the United States are accounted for and complying with controllers.

"Thank God," Garvey says.

For the first time this morning, she takes a moment alone to call her family in Massachusetts.

11:30 a.m. 758 planes

A battle won

It seems small consolation, but Ben Sliney can’t help thinking it: At least no one has run into anything in a couple hours.

When he accepted the job overseeing the nation’s airspace a few months earlier, Sliney wanted to be sure he had the power to do the job as he saw fit.

"What is the limit of my authority?" he asked the man who had promoted him. "Unlimited," he was told.

Weeks later, as Sliney orders every flight to land on his first day on the job, he recalls the conversation.

He expects questions and complaints from his colleagues. But there are none.

At this time on most days, the screen at the command center is choked with so many green flight markers that the East Coast is almost obscured. Now, Sliney watches as a mere hundred commercial and private flights fly over the lower 48 states.

The skies seem manageable.

Then, an aide tells him about a serious car accident in Georgia. The pilot of a rescue helicopter is begging for permission to pick up someone who is critically injured.

"If it was my family lying in a wreck on the highway, I would hope you would let him go," the aide tells him.

All morning, Sliney has refused to make exceptions. Three times he ordered a jet carrying Attorney General John Ashcroft, who was heading to Washington, to land. I can’t be sure who’s on that jet, Sliney reasoned. The nation’s top law enforcement official won’t make it back to the capitol until afternoon.
Sliney knew that decision could have political consequences. But this one could mean life or death. *Do I have the authority to do this?*

Sliney knows he can’t wait. He tells the aide to give permission to launch the helicopter. There’s been enough death today. Maybe he can save a life.

**Noon: 669 planes**

**A safe landing**

Capt. Hosking begins to direct his jet into Vancouver. Though he’s only minutes from landing, he still isn’t sure all is safe. If hijackers have been waiting until the jet is close to its destination, something still may happen.

But what can he do? The cockpit door has been barricaded and his first officer still has the crash ax out.

As the snow-covered peaks of the Canadian Rockies come into view, one of the flight attendants calls the cockpit. "Where are we going?" Even she doesn’t know.

"I can’t tell you," Hosking says. "And don’t call back anymore."

They land just after noon Eastern Time. Hosking taxis the jet to a remote runway near other airliners rerouted to Vancouver.

Not until he shuts off the engines does he reach for his handset. He pushes the button that turns on the jet’s public-address system, but he doesn’t say a word.

*What can I say? How do I tell them?*

He recalls how he felt when he heard the news. How he wondered what had happened, how none of it had made any sense. He still isn’t sure what to tell those in the back of the jet. He knows so little himself. What he’s sure of is that they’ve made it. Perhaps that’s what’s most important. Perhaps that’s the way to start.

They are *safe*, and so are thousands of other flights that have made it to the ground. Yes, that’s what they should know. That’s what he will tell them first.

His voice quavers: "The experienced fliers in the cabin know we’re not in Los Angeles . . . ."

On this day, it is the best he can offer.
For discussion

1. Grounding all of the flights on September 11, 2001 was a decision that had never been made before. If you were the person who had to make the decisions to "clear the skies," what would you have needed to take into consideration? Make a list of the pros or positive aspects and the cons or negative aspects of this decision. Do the same process of listing "pros" and "cons" for an important decision that you think you may make in your life.

2. Should one use their intuitive sense or "gut feeling" when making a decision in an emergency? Justify your answer and provide examples of where this has worked successfully and unsuccessfully.

3. How do strong leaders behave and exercise their leadership in a crisis? Who were the leaders in these articles and how did they exercise their leadership abilities? Research a leader in history who demonstrated such behavior and list the attributes he or she used.

4. Often major heroes make "small decisions" that make a big difference in history or life. Give an example of a small decision that made a big difference. Predict what the outcome would have been had that decision not been made.

5. Outline strategies that you could use in a crisis to evaluate the potential impact of a critical decision.

Future implications

1. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has suggestions on being prepared in a personal emergency created by a natural or man-made disaster. Select an emergency and develop a personal preparedness plan for others to use. For example, a hurricane, a tornado, a terror attack?

2. If you had to rise to the challenge and be a "leader" in an emergency, what knowledge and skills that you possess would you draw upon to help yourself and others?

3. Experts advise that in a crisis chaos will exist initially, but if a plan has been developed previously the chaos will be reduced when that plan is implemented. Based on your career goals, what type of crisis might you face on the job? Outline a plan to implement in such an emergency.

Additional Resources


Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) - Library www.fema.gov/library

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for Kids www.fema.gov/kids

Facing Fear: Helping Young People Deal with Terrorism and Tragic Events Masters of Disaster Curriculum Supplement American Red Cross www.redcross.org

Citizen Corps www.citizencorps.gov