

RD0804016261

NORAD Timeline Statement

Comments on NEADS Briefing: "America Under Attack: 11 Sep 01"

Slide 14: 2. 1305Z FAA reports hijack of UA175

Comment: Notification from FAA to NEADS occurred at 1303Z.¹

Slide 18: 2. 1316Z FAA reports possible hijack of UA93.

Comment: FAA hijack notification for UA93 did not occur until 1406:28Z when conversation begins between Cleveland Center and NEADS that UA93 had a possible bomb on board.²

Slide 20: 1. 1324Z FAA reports possible hijack of AA77

Comment: FAA hijack notification on AA77 did not occur until 1334Z when Washington Center Ops Manager told NEADS that AA77 was "lost."³

* Slide 20: 2. ¹³²⁴ 1224Z Langley scrambled on AA77

Comment: NEADS Commander scrambled the fighters at Langley because he felt there was a threat to Washington DC, but not specifically because of AA77 which was not mentioned until 1334Z.⁴ *B. G. man*
from AAL11

Slide 20: 3. 1325Z AA77 headed toward Washington DC

Comment: Even though AA77 was headed toward Washington DC at this time, NEADS does not know this is occurring.

* Slide 20: 4. 1327Z Boston FAA reports ^{3RD A/c missing} 5th aircraft missing (D89?) - AAL 11

Comment: There is some confusion as to whether there are three or five unaccounted for aircraft at this time. On the NEADS ID1 voice recorder the following statement was made: "there is 3 unaccounted for aircraft, more aircraft unaccounted for Boston." It is possible that this statement could have been combined with the knowledge that AA11 and UA175 had been hijacked, accounting for the entry on the slide as "5th aircraft missing."⁵
ID channel 4

Slide 26: 1- 1347Z Delta 89 landed in Cleveland

Comment: At 1345Z, FAA notified NEADS that D89 might not be a hijack and had acknowledged air traffic control instructions to land (not landed) in Cleveland.⁶ First notification of D89 landing at Cleveland was passed from Cleveland Center to NEADS at 1359Z.⁷

Slide 28: 1- 1407Z FAA reports bomb on board UA93

Comment: Conversation discussing a possible bomb on board UA93 begins at 1406:28Z.⁸

¹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0903:20L, background voice on ID1, p.10.

² NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 1006:28L to 1010:53L, from Cleveland Center and ID1, p.28-30.

³ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0934:02L, Washington Center Ops Manager to ID1, p.19.

* ⁴ "NORAD's Response to request for Information From the Meeting With 9-11 Commission Staff, 24 October, 2003," Statement from Colonel Marr, NEADS Commander, p.2-3.

⁵ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0926:57L, by ID1, p.16.

⁶ NEADS voice data extracted from voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 8, from 9-11-01, 0945:22L, from FAA to ID2.

⁷ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0958:29L, from Cleveland Center and ID1, p.26.

⁸ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 1006:28L to 1010:53L, from Cleveland Center and ID1, p.28-30.

Slide 30: **1415Z UA93 reported crash**

Comment: Conversation between Washington Center and NEADS begins at 1414:09Z.⁹

Comments on CONR brief: "Operation NOBLE EAGLE, Air War Over America"

Slide 17: 2. **0905L FAA reports hijack of UA175**

Comment: Notification from FAA to NEADS occurred at 0903L.¹⁰

Slide 19: 2. **0916L FAA reports possible hijack of UA93**

Comment: FAA hijack notification for UA93 did not occur until 1006:28L when conversation begins between Cleveland Center and NEADS that UA93 had a possible bomb on board.

Slide 20: 1. **0924L FAA reports possible hijack of AA77**

Comment: FAA hijack notification on AA77 did not occur until 0934L when Washington Center Ops Manager told NEADS that AA77 was "lost."¹¹

Slide 20: 2. **0924L Langley scrambled on AA77**

Comment: NEADS Commander scrambled the fighters at Langley because he felt there was a threat to Washington DC, but not specifically because of AA 77 which was not mentioned until 0934L.¹²

Slide 20: 3. **0925L AA77 headed toward Washington DC**

Comment: Even though AA77 was headed toward Washington DC at this time, NEADS does not know this is occurring.

Slide 20: 4. **0927L Boston FAA reports 5th aircraft missing (D89?)**

Comment: There is some confusion at this point as to whether there are three or five unaccounted for aircraft at this time. On the NEADS ID1 voice recorder the following statement was made: "there is 3 unaccounted for aircraft, more aircraft unaccounted for Boston." It is possible that this statement could have been combined with the knowledge that AA11 and UA175 had been hijacked, accounting for the entry on the slide as "5th aircraft missing."¹³

Slide 22: 4- **0943L AA77 impacts Pentagon**

Comment: Impact later confirmed to occur at 0937L.

Slide 23: **0947L Delta 89 landed in Cleveland**

Comment: At 1345Z, FAA notified NEADS that D89 might not be a hijack and had acknowledged air traffic control instructions to land (not landed) in Cleveland.¹⁴ First notification of D89 landing at Cleveland was passed from Cleveland Center to NEADS at 0959L.¹⁵

⁹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 1014:09L to 1015:23L, from Washington Center and ID1, p.30-31.

¹⁰ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0903:20L, background voice on ID1, p.10.

¹¹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0934:02L, Washington Center Ops Manager to ID1, p.19.

¹² "NORAD's Response to request for Information From the Meeting With 9-11 Commission Staff, 24 October, 2003," Statement from Colonel Marr, NEADS Commander, p.2-3.

¹³ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 1326:57L, by ID1, p.16.

¹⁴ NEADS voice data extracted from voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 8, from 9-11-01, 0945:22L, from FAA to ID2.

Slide 24: 1- **1007L FAA reports bomb on board UA93**

Comment: Conversation discussing a possible bomb on board UA93 begins at 1006:28L.¹⁶

Slide 25: **1015Z UA93 reported crashed**

Comment: Conversation between Washington Center and NEADS begins at 1014:09L.¹⁷

¹⁵ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0958:29L, from Cleveland Center and ID1, p.26.

¹⁶ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 1006:28L to 1010:53L, from Cleveland Center and ID1, p.28-30.

¹⁷ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 1014:09L to 1015:23L, from Washington Center and ID1, p.30-31.

NORAD 9-11 Timeline

Sources for Times for AA11:

- 0759 - AA11 takeoff time extrapolated from RADES radar data¹
- 0820 - AA11 turns off transponder from RADES radar data
- 0827 - AA11 Turns south from RADES radar data
- 0840 - FAA reports possible hijack from NORAD/PA News Release on 18 Sep 01², from "FAA Responds"³

(Note: Former FAA administrator, Jane Garvey, testified that the notification took place at 8:34. According to NEADS Commander, Colonel Robert Marr, "This is the time [0840] captured in the primary operations log maintained by the Mission Crew Commander Tech (MCC/T). SSgt Powell answered the call from Mr. Joe Cooper of Boston Center at 0837:24⁴ and put a supervisor, Maj Deskins, on the line to get the information needed to take action. By the time this information was gathered the time was between 0839 and 0840, leading to the logged time of 0840L."⁵) from NEADS logs

- 0846 - Otis scramble order from NEADS logs⁶
- 0846 - AA11 impacts WTC 1 from RADES radar data
- 0852 - Otis airborne from NEADS logs⁷

¹ RADES radar data reduction provided by 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES), Hill AFB, UT, 25 Sep 01.

² "NORAD Response Times, September, 11, 2001," at www.norad.mil/index.cfm?fuscaction=home.news_rel_09_18_01

³ "FAA Responds, September, 11, 2001," at www2.faa.gov/sept11/portraits/chronology.cfm

⁴ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder DRM 2, Dat 2, Channel 14 from 9-11-01 at 0837:24L, p.1.

⁵ "NORAD's Response to Request for Information From the Meeting With 9-11 Commission Staff, 24 October, 2003," Statement from Colonel Marr, NEADS Commander, p.2.

⁶ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 2 from 9-11-01 at 0846:22L, background voice on MCC-OP, p.52.

⁷ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 15 from 9-11-01 at 0857:55L from AST, p.32.

Sources for Times for UA175:

0814 - UA175 takeoff from Boston extrapolated from RADES radar data and from "FAA Responds"

0843 - FAA reports possible hijack from NORAD/PA News Release on 18 Sep 01 and from "FAA Responds"

(Note: According to NEADS Commander, Colonel Marr, "The time that the FAA notified NEADS of the hijacking of UAL175 is listed as 0843L. None of the NEADS logs, transcripts, or audio recordings support this time. My recollection of the events was that the first indication we had of a second hijacking was the media transmission of the second tower being hit. The first transcript indication that the FAA had contacted NEADS was background voices at 0903L providing the call sign of UAL175. ...0843L was labeled as the reporting time, but this time was attributed to an early effort by Operations people to build a timeline using a faulty computer time indication (numerous entries that used this method were later proven to be inaccurate by the transcript that used the Naval Observatory Time Hack on the tape). It is my speculation that this early, incorrect time was used to build the early NORAD timeline."⁸)

0846 - UA175 changes transponder code from 1470 to 3020, then to 3321 from RADES radar data

0846 - Otis scramble order from NEADS logs

0852 - UA 175 alters course toward WTC from RADES radar data

0852 - Otis airborne from NEADS logs

0902 - UA175 impacts WTC2 from RADES radar data and from "FAA Responds"

0903 - FAA reports hijack of UA175 from NEADS logs⁹

0905 - 0907: Discussion about UA175 between NEADS ID and FAA (Boston Military) from NEADS logs¹⁰

0909 - Langley to Battle Stations from NEADS logs¹¹

0909 - 0915: Discussion about UA175 between NEADS ID and FAA (Boston and New York Military) continues from NEADS logs¹²

0915 - FAA confirms that UA 175 has crashed into WTC from NEADS logs¹³

⁸ "NORAD's Response to request for Information From the Meeting With 9-11 Commission Staff, 24 October, 2003," Statement from Colonel Marr, NEADS Commander, p.2.

⁹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0903:20L, background voice on ID1, p.10.

¹⁰ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0905:23L to 0907:15L, between Boston Military and ID1, p.10-11.

¹¹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 2 from 9-11-01, 0908:58L, by MCC, p.57.

¹² NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0910:04L to 0915:02L, between Boston and New York Military and ID1, p.11-12.

¹³ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0915:28L, New York Military to ID1, p.13.

Sources for Times for AA77:

- 0820 - AA77 takeoff from IAD extrapolated from RADES radar data
 0851 - Transponder and radar returns lost from RADES radar data
 0905 - 0907: Discussion about UA175 between NEADS ID and FAA (Boston Military) from NEADS logs¹⁴
 0909 - Langley to Bartle Stations from NEADS logs¹⁵
 0909 - 0915: Discussion about UA175 between NEADS ID and FAA (Boston and New York Military) continues from NEADS logs¹⁶
 0915 - FAA confirms that UA175 has crashed into WTC from NEADS log¹⁷
 0917 - 0918: Discussion between NEADS MCC and FAA (Boston Military) about fighter availability from NEADS logs¹⁸
 0922 - 0930: Discussion begins / continues about AA11 still being airborne between NEADS ID and FAA (New York and Washington Center) from NEADS logs¹⁹
 0924 - FAA reports possible hi-jack from NORAD/PA News Release on 18 Sep 01, from "FAA Responds"

(Note: According to the NEADS Commander, "The time that the FAA notified NEADS of the hijacking is listed at 0924L. However, this was not a clear indication that AA77 was hijacked. The first specific information regarding AA77 did not come until 0934L, just three minutes prior to impact at 0937L. At 0924L it was reported to the Operations floor from Boston Center the AA11 had not impacted the WTC, but was still airborne en route to Washington, DC (which later proved to be inaccurate). Simultaneously, there were indications of UAL93 as a possible hijack in Ohio (Col Marr is now unable to confirm this specifically about UA93 happening at this time) and a reported "third" hijacking. Numerous other uncorroborated reports were coming in that increased the likelihood that an attack would be possible against Washington, so the 0924L report time is more accurately a general indication of a possible targeting of Washington rather than a specific notification of AA77 hijacking which actually was reported to NEADS at 0934L.²⁰)

- 0924 - Fargo alert fighters at Langley AFB scramble order from NEADS logs²¹
 0930 - Fargo alert fighters at Langley AFB Airborne from RADES radar data
 0934 - FAA reports AA77 "lost" from NEADS logs²²
 0935 - 0940: Discussion between NEAD ID and FAA (Indy Center) about location of AA77 from NEADS logs²³
 0936 - NEADS MCC directs that fighters airborne from Langley go straight to Washington based on aircraft reported 6 miles west of White House from NEADS logs²⁴
 0937 - AA77 crashes into Pentagon from RADES radar data

¹⁴ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0905:23L to 0907:15L, between Boston Military and ID1, p.10-11.

¹⁵ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 2 from 9-11-01, 0908:58L, by MCC, p.57.

¹⁶ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0910:04L to 0915:02L, between Boston and New York Military and ID1, p.11-12.

¹⁷ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0915:28L, New York Military to ID1, p.13.

¹⁸ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0917:01L to 0918:37L, between Boston Military and MCC, p.13-14.

¹⁹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0922:38L to 0930:08L, between New York and Washington Center and ID1, p.14-17.

²⁰ "NORAD's Response to request for Information From the Meeting With 9-11 Commission Staff, 24 October, 2003," Statement from Colonel Marr, NEADS Commander, p.2-3.

²¹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 15 from 9-11-01, 0924:33L by AST, p.35.

²² NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01 at 0934:02L, Washington Center Ops Manager to ID1, p.19.

²³ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0935:40L to 0940:23L, between Indy Center and ID1, p.19-21.

²⁴ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 2 from 9-11-01, 0936:37L, from MCC, p.67.

Sources for Times for UA93:

0842 - UA93 takeoff from Newark extrapolated from RADES radar data
 0909 - Langley to Battle Stations from NEADS logs²⁴

0916 - 0922: NEADS Commander stated, "The time that the FAA notified NEADS of the hijacking of UAL93 is described as being unknown, part of open line conversations with the FAA that were established while discussing AA77. Some briefings describe the time that the UAL93 hijacking was announced as being 0916L. Any of these times are educated guesses based upon the wide range of information, most of it inaccurate, which was coming into NEADS at the time. The Mission Crew Commander log describes hijacking information at 0916L, but further research indicates that this information is most likely related to the previous hijackings that impacted the World Trade Center. It is most likely that the first report of UAL93 came into the Battle cab via a conference call (DEN line which was not recorded) that established with the FAA that morning. As a result, it is most likely that the UAL93 hijacking was originally discussed over the FAA conference line as a possibility some time between 0916L and 0922L (allowing for an estimated two minutes processing time from the direction to scramble Langley fighters to the time the scramble order was actually transmitted at 0924L.)"²⁶

0922 - 0930: Discussion begins about AA11 still being airborne between NEADS ID and FAA (New York and Washington Center) continues from NEADS logs²⁷
 0924 - Fargo alert fighters at Langley AFB scramble order from NEADS log²⁸
 0930 - Fargo alert fighters from Langley AFB airborne from RADES radar data
 0935 - 0940: Discussion between NEAD ID and FAA (Indy Center) about location of AA77 from NEADS logs²⁹
 0936 - NEADS MCC directs that fighters airborne from Langley go straight to Washington based on aircraft reported 6 miles west of White House from NEADS logs³⁰
 0936 - UA93 alters course to the southeast from RADES radar data
 0940 - UA93 turns transponder off from RADES radar data
 0941 - 0958: Discussion between NEADS ID and FAA (Indy and Cleveland Center) about Delta 89 being hijacked near Cleveland from NEADS logs³¹
 0945 - FAA notifies NEADS that D89 has acknowledged air traffic control instruction to land in Cleveland and may not be hijacked from NEADS logs³²
 0946 - Radar contact lost from RADES radar data
 0959 - FAA (Cleveland Center) confirms that Delta 89 is not hijacked from NEADS logs³¹
 1002 - Radar contact regained from RADES radar data
 1003 - UA93 crashes in PA from RADES radar data
 1006 - 1010: First discussion about UA93 having a bomb on board from NEADS logs³⁴
 1014 - FAA notifies NEADS that UA93 has crashed from NEADS logs³⁵

²⁵ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 2 from 9-11-01, 0908:58L, by MCC, p.57.

²⁶ "NORAD's Response to request for Information From the Meeting With 9-11 Commission Staff, 24 October, 2003," Statement from Colonel Marr, NEADS Commander, p.3.

²⁷ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0922:38L to 0930:08L, between New York and Washington Center and ID1, p.14-17.

²⁸ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 2, Dat 2, Channel 15 from 9-11-01, 0924:33L by AST, p.35.

²⁹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0935:40L to 0940:23L, between Indy Center and ID1, p.19-21.

³⁰ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 69 from 9-11-01, 0936:37L, from MCC, p.67.

³¹ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0941:08L to 0958:01L, between Indy and Cleveland Center and ID1, p.21-25.

³² NEADS voice data extracted from voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 8, from 9-11-01, 0945:22L, from FAA to ID2.

³³ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 0958:29L, from Cleveland Center and ID1, p.26.

³⁴ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 1006:28L to 1010:53L, from Cleveland Center and ID1, p.28-30.

³⁵ NEADS voice data extracted from transcript of voice recorder, DRM 1, Dat 2, Channel 4 from 9-11-01, 1014:09L to 1015:23L, from Washington Center and ID1, p.30-31.



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