Memorandum for the Record

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The Penttbom team at FBIHQ presented a two-day briefing on the Penttbom timeline for Commission staff. The Penttbom team gave a chronological presentation but answered Commission questions as they arose.

There is some evidence that the hijackers used fake bombs during the attacks. They are known to have bought batteries and electrical tape, and some of the callers on the flights said the hijackers wore bombs on their belts. There was no explosive residue found, however, at the Flight 93 crash site.

On Flight 77, several of the hijackers set off the metal detectors and were checked twice. This is the only flight (other than footage from Portland) where there is a video of the hijackers going through the security line. Khalid al Mihdhar went through the metal detector twice. Majed Moqed and Nawaf al Hazmi were hand-wanded after they set off the alarms and were allowed to continue.

The best estimate of when Flight 11 was hijacked is about 8:21 a.m. when the transponder was turned off. A flight attendant called the reservations center and reported that a passenger had been stabbed. The flight attendant reported that it was hard to breathe, leading to the belief that the hijackers may have used mace. (It was also found in Atta’s checked luggage that did not make it on to Flight 11.)

There is one call where a victim’s family member called police and mentioned a gun. Otherwise there were no reports of guns on the flights.

There were some calls reporting that the hijackers had boxcutters. There is nothing definitive showing that they purchased boxcutters. The term may have come up because the two Arabs who were arrested on Amtrak shortly after 9/11 had boxcutters. It is possible that they did have boxcutters, but that there is no record of the purchase.

On Flight 93, there was a May Day message at 9:28. At 9:31, one of the hijackers made an announcement that they had a bomb, but he was using his radio rather than the
PA system. The CVR also has the pilot yelling at the hijackers to get out prior to the takeover of the cockpit.

Jarrah had purchased a GPS unit before 9/11, but he did not need it because all the equipment is on the plane. Jarrah “dialed in” to DCA except that he was too far from the airport beacon when he did it. On whether the hijackers had enough skill to do what they did, Penttbom put someone with no background on a simulator, and after about 30 minutes of practice they were able to replicate it under the conditions of 9/11, clear skies during daylight.

Hani Hanjour had rented planes in the Maryland area to practice his maneuvers.

Yazeed al Salmi entered the US on 8/7/00. In July he had purchased traveler’s checks. When he arrived, he moved in with \[ \text{On 9/5/00, al Salmi’s traveler’s checks were deposited into Nawaf al Hazmi’s account, and then cash was taken out of the account. Al Salmi shared an insurance policy with al Hazmi and Rahmez Noaman because their insurance broker had told them it was cheaper to share. Al Salmi has not been questioned about the checks. He was deported to Saudi Arabia, and the FBI requested that he be interviewed, but the request is outstanding.} \]

\( \text{FBI has not found direct evidence of Mounir Motassadeq being involved in 9/11.} \)

Motassadeq did have the Power of Attorney, and made some transactions that helped the hijackers.

\( \text{FBI has not found evidence that Said Bahaji knew about the plot, and} \)

There is no direct evidence of a link between the Spain meeting in July between Atta and Binalshibh and the Spanish cell.

\( \text{Binalshibh used a stolen passport under the name of Aheid Zabet after the Spain meeting, and used it to transfer money to Zacarias Moussa.} \)

Atta usually did not waste time, so it is curious that he stayed in Spain so long if the meeting with Binalshibh was the only purpose. But there is no witness reporting of a meeting with anyone else. In September 2001, Binalshibh traveled through Spain on the way to Afghanistan.
After 9/11, a search of Said Bahaji’s residence produced a phone list that included an old phone number for Barakat Yarkas, the head of the Spanish cell.

Operation Backtrack looked at all the flights the hijackers took from 1999 to 9/11/01. The FBI looked for travel in pairs, and anything else significant, with no results. The hijackers did not travel under false names or use official ID under false names. Atta used the name El Amir as well, but this was not a false name.

There is no evidence that the hijackers were in cell phone contact with each other during the flights on 9/11. The FBI looked at archived voicemails of the hijackers and did not find anything significant.

Jarrah’s girlfriend Aysel Senguen was interviewed by the Germans, and the US has pending letters rogatory.

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The first indication of concrete steps for the attacks were in April of 1999 when Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar got their US visas. In October 1999, Atta entered a lottery for a US visa. Atta cannot be placed in Afghanistan before November 1999 to February 2000, but it is possible that he was there earlier since there are some gaps in his timeline. It is unknown who vouched for Atta to get into the camps in Afghanistan.

The German authorities have ruled out a connection between Darkazanli and Belfas to 9/11. Darkazanli may have recruited people for jihad, but not necessarily for this plot.


Jarrah, Atta and Binalshibh overlapped in their time in Afghanistan. At that point, it was supposed to be the four from Hamburg plus Nawaf al Hazmi as pilots for the plot. Binalshibh and Jarrah left Afghanistan in January 2000, and Atta left in February.

In January 2000, al Shehhi was already buying a 747 simulator program and sending it to Abdul Aziz al Baluchi, KSM’s nephew in the UAE. At about the same time, in Malaysia, al Hazmi, al Mihdhar and Khallad were meeting.

Binalshibh researched flight schools in Europe, and found that US flight schools would be better. The hijackers quickly switched gears to finding US schools.

In April 2000, Abdul Aziz al Baluchi transferred money to al Hazmi through Adel Rafeea.
In June of 2000, Hani Hanjour appeared in Karachi. He probably went to the camps in Afghanistan soon after, but there are no definite dates.

Atta and al Shehhi arrived in May-June 2000 in the New York area. They stayed at a hotel and then short term rentals. They did not make any contacts with local people, and only made calls to find rooms for rent. They traveled to Norman, Oklahoma to visit the Airman Flight School. There is no indication of why they decided against enrolling there. They then traveled to Florida, but it is not known how.

They rented a room from a flight instructor for a week then found an apartment. Jarrah was training in Venice, FL as well, at Florida Flight Training Center. Atta and al Shehhi went to Huffman Aviation. Jarrah intended to have Binalshibh join him at his flight school, but Binalshibh was not able to do so due to a failure to get a visa.

Al Shehhi’s last salary payment from the UAE was on 12/23/00.

Mohdar Abdullah went to the airport with al Hazmi and al Mihdhar to help them cancel the second leg of their round trip tickets.

Shahid Nickels was an individual who was close to the Hamburg cell from 1997 to 1999. He broke off from then in 1999. He gave the German authorities extensive background on the Hamburg cell.

The FBI went to all the Kinko’s that the hijackers used, and sometimes were able to identify the individual computers the hijackers used. But the hard drives were wiped on a regular basis, so very little useful information was found.

On the question of UBL family flights, none left before the opening of US air space, contrary to many reports.

Atta and al Omari did not have much contact before the attacks. There is some speculation that al Omari was very religious and could have written the letter that was found in their belongings.

Atta was waiting for al Qahtani on 8/4/01 at the Orlando airport. Atta’s rental car was placed at the airport garage. His car was there for about five hours, until about the
time that al Qahtani was on his return flight home. Al Qahtani had a one way ticket and conflicting answers about why he was coming to the US. There were five phone calls from the terminal to al Hawaswi that day. There was someone name ______ on the flight with al Qahtani, who turned out to be not suspicious.

Al Shalawi may have been trying to make his way back. His visa application was denied on 8/5/01.

The FBI has found no connection between ______ with the 9/11 plot.

It is unknown where Hani Hanjour stayed during his first few days in San Diego, from 12/8 to 12/12/00. It is possible that he stayed at ______

Hanjour was in Afghanistan in mid 2000. It is unclear how he ended up going to Afghanistan. Hanjour’s brother said he made extremist statements while he lived in Phoenix.

Jarrah made several trips home to visit his girlfriend.

8) The biggest logistical challenge for Atta was finding four flights to be in the air at the same time on the type of aircraft that they had learned to fly. Atta made a number of searches on Travelocity looking for flights ______

Hanjour asked for the Hudson tour at a flight school he visited and the flight instructor turned him down because he was not skilled enough.

It is unknown why many of the hijackers obtained duplicate pilot’s licenses and driver’s licenses. ______

On December 2, 2000, Binalshibh traveled from Hamburg to London and stayed in a 16 room hostel near a mosque. Moussaoui stayed in the same hostel during the same week, but Binalshibh claims not to have met Moussaoui.

At about the same time, Marwan al Shehhi traveled to Morocco. It is unknown why he went there. All that is known is that he stayed at the Hyatt.
Atta and al Shehhi spent time in the Atlanta area in early 2001. Other than renting planes on a few of the days, it is not known what they were doing there. The

Atta and al Shehhi also traveled to Virginia Beach and opened a mailbox there for unknown reasons. Mail recovered after 9/11 from the mailbox did not reveal anything of interest.

Atta was in Virginia Beach on April 3, 2001, and can be planned next in the U.S. on April 12 when he and al Shehhi signed a new lease on an apartment in Florida.

In March of 2001, al Hazmi and Hanjour left Arizona and drove to Virginia.

Al Shehhi went to Cairo in April of 2001. Atta’s father claimed al Shehhi came to pick up Atta’s international driver’s license, but Atta already had the license with him according to a traffic stop during al Shehhi’s trip. Al Shehhi’s trip was also too lengthy if the only purpose was to pick up an item from Atta’s father.

As for the alleged trip by Atta to Prague, there is no travel record that Atta traveled outside the country. It is possible that he used a false name to travel but that would depart from his usual practice. There is cell phone activity on Atta’s phone on 4/6, 4/9 and 4/10 through 4/13/01. The Iraqi that Atta allegedly met has denied meeting Atta, and was not in Prague on the day that the meeting allegedly happened. He was in Brno that day. Variations of Atta’s name have been checked on all flights in and out of Prague.

Later in April, the muscle hijackers began to arrive in the United States. Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami arrived in Florida, and Atta probably picked them up at the airport.

Al Hazmi and Hanjour were assisted in Virginia by Eyad Alrababah. Alrababah claims that he met them by chance at the Dar al Hijra mosque after speaking with the imam, Anwar Aulaqi. The FBI has tried to arrange for another interview of Aulaqi.
It is unknown why Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami attempted to travel to the Bahamas in May.

At the end of May, the hijackers started taking their cross country flights, stopping in Las Vegas. Al Shehhi was the first to take a test flight. There is no evidence that al Shehhi met with anyone else while he was in Las Vegas.

Once the muscle hijackers arrived in the United States, the first thing they did was open bank accounts to deposit the money that they brought with them for the plot.

Ziad Jarrah went to a flight school in Philadelphia, Hortman Aviation, and was there with an unknown individual.

There is some evidence that Hanjour was in Arizona in June of 2001. There are some records indicating that he was training on a flight simulator at one of the schools there.

In June of 2001, Binalshibh traveled to Malaysia to attempt to meet with Atta. He tried to contact Atta to arrange for the meeting but Atta was not able to come.

At the end of June, al Hazmi was involved in a car accident on the George Washington Bridge. He tried to convince the other driver not to go through insurance, but the other driver refused. In the end the other driver’s insurance company paid for the damage.

While the hijackers in Paterson were getting the unofficial “USA IDs”, Atta was in the area and got an ID from the same business.

In June, al Hawsawi opened a bank account with one of the muscle hijackers, Fayeza Banihammad. That allowed money to flow to and from the hijackers. By the end of June, all the muscle hijackers were in the country. On July 4, al Mihdhar returned to the U.S.

Waleed al Shehri was the only non-pilot, non-leader hijacker to buy a car and also to take a cross country flight.

In early July, Atta made numerous calls to Germany, as Binalshibh had returned from his stay in Malaysia. They arranged to meet in Spain. Atta traveled through Zurich, where he bought two knives and withdrew 1700 Swiss francs. It is not known why Atta made the withdrawal. Binalshibh was in Spain from 7/9 to 7/16. Other than discussing the progress of the plot, it is unclear whether there was any other operational activity.

According to Binalshibh, Atta brought up the possibility of a nuclear power plant as a possible target, but Atta said the “other students” did not like the idea. After the meeting, Atta gave Binalshibh the money for his ticket back to Germany, and Atta returned to Florida.
In July, Binalshibh emailed his contact information to Zacarias Moussaoui. Funds from al Hawsawi were transferred to Binalshibh who sent it to Moussaoui.

On July 23, 2001, KSM obtained a US visa.

On July 31, 2001, Waleed al Shehri went on his cross country flight to San Francisco, with a brief stop in Las Vegas.

On August 13, al Hazmi and Hanjour went on their cross country flights. Atta did the same, and the three spent the night in Las Vegas.

During the final weeks before the attacks, the pilots took brush up flight lessons and the muscle hijackers worked out at gyms.

On August 20, Said Bahaji made a reservation to leave Germany, and Essabar did so on 8/22.

On August 22, Jarrah tried to buy four GPS units but was only able to buy one. He picked it up on 8/27/01. He may have not known that he did not need it on the plane.

During the last week of August, the hijackers made their final reservations and ticket purchases. Some of the hijackers purchased knives. The hijackers also began moving into position to their departure cities, sold their cars and consolidated their cash to send back to al Hawsawi. In total, about $26,000 was sent back to al Hawsawi before the attacks. Al Hazmi or Hanjour tried to send al Mihdhar’s bank card to al Hawsawi but it was not shipped before 9/11 and was seized.

9/11 Classified Information

After the hijackings, it was discovered that the hijackers had left some belongings at two mosques, one in Laurel, MD and another in Pompano Beach, FL. There is no evidence indicating that the hijackers had been at these mosques prior to dropping off their belongings.