The story...

“The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airlines within the United States -- and using them as guided missiles -- was not recognised by NORAD before 9/11”, claimed NORAD Commander in Chief General Ralph E Eberhart. However there are many examples showing this is untrue, within the 9/11 Commission Report itself, and elsewhere.

Our take...

David Ray Griffin offers 15 examples in “The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions”, which he claims may, or clearly do contradict Eberhart’s statement. The first nine are to be found in the Commission Report itself. Let’s consider each one in turn.

1. “[A]n Algerian group hijacked an airliner in 1994,... possibly to crash it into the Eiffel Tower” (345). The airplane was hijacked in Algiers. But since the distance from Algiers to Paris is less than the distance across the United States, there might have been less time to intercept it than is available to intercept a plane hijacked within this country. It would, therefore, not take much imagination to transfer the scenario to the United States.
Page 264
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions

To get this in perspective, here are the references in the Commission Report:

...an Algerian group hijacked an airliner in 1994, most likely intending to blow it up over Paris, but possibly to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. [345]

Chapter 11, Footnote 14: The Algerian hijackers had placed explosives in key areas of the cabin. However there was some speculation in the media based on reports from a passenger above the plane that the hijackers had discussed crashing it into the Eiffel Tower.

There’s no great certainty that the hijackers were going to crash it into anything, then. And other reports don’t cover this possibility at all:

Instead of waiting for a spy to discover a terrorist plot and pass this information on to the appropriate authorities, the aviation security system should be designed to prevent acts and deter threats. Failure to implement such a system can have disastrous results. The December 1994 hijacking of an Air France flight from Algeria is a case in point. Anyone who has monitored the front page of a major newspaper during 1994 would recall that Algeria has been wracked for several years by a wave of terrible terrorist violence. Much of this violence has been carried out by radical Islamic groups bent on ousting a secular government. Notwithstanding the violence, the French adopted the traditional approach to aviation security by relying on Algerian authorities to maintain the appropriate level of security. This approach left 170 passengers and crew vulnerable to the events that ensued on December 24.

Four hijackers affiliated with the Armed Islamic Group, disguised as airport security officials, took over the Air France crew. After killing three passengers, including a French citizen, the hijackers were allowed to take off and subsequently land in Marseilles, France on December 26. As the situation continued to deteriorate French commandos stormed the plane, rescued the passengers and crew, and killed the hijackers. The world was aghast when it learned the hijackers had placed explosives on board the plane, intended to blow it up in the air above Paris. Only in the aftermath of the hijacking and narrowly averted aerial kamikaze assault on Paris did French security officials tighten security on flights between Algeria and France and assert their right to monitor Algerian and the airline compliance.
http://www.berg-associates.com/aviation.htm

Note also that much of the blame here is placed on Algerian authorities for not maintaining “the appropriate level of security”: that is, the incident is being portrayed as something specific to them, not so likely to happen in other countries. And as such it’s really not a clear threat of 9/11-like attacks.

2. “In early 1995, Abdul Hakim Murad == Ramzi Yousef’s accomplice in the Manila airlines bombing plot-- told Philippine authorities that he and Yousef had discussed flying a plane into CIA headquarters” [345]. It was, we saw, this plan that provided the basis for Wolfowitz’s “failure of imagination” comment.
Page 264
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions

Griffin is referring to this passage from the report:

The next day, Wolfowitz renewed the argument, writing to Rumsfeld about the interest of Yousef's co-conspirator in the 1995 Manila air plot in crashing an explosives-laden plane into CIA headquarters, and about information from a foreign government regarding Iraqis' involvement in the attempted hijacking of a Gulf Air flight. Given this background, he wondered why so little thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a "failure of imagination" and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities. [336]

Whether this was more than a “failure of imagination” is hard to say, but it would help if there was other clear examples showing the same thing, which of course is what Griffin is trying to show. Let’s continue to review them.

3. “In August of [1998], the intelligence community had received information that a group of Libyans hoped to crash a plane into the World Trade Center” [344-345]. The Commission does not explicitly say that the planes would be hijacked from within the United States, but it also does not explicitly say otherwise.
Page 265
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions

Checking the 9/11 Commission Report reveals the first problem:

Threat reports also mentioned the possibility of using an aircraft filled with explosives. The most prominent of these mentioned a possible plot to fly an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. city. This report, circulated in September 1998, originated from a source who had walked into an American consulate in East Asia. In August of the same year, the intelligence community had received information that a group of Libyans hoped to crash a plane into the World Trade Center. In neither case could the information be corroborated. [344-345]

Dr Griffin failed to point out that this information was a claim that could not be corroborated. Further:

For the August report, see Intelligence report, "Terrorism: Alleged Threat by Arab Terrorists to Attack the World Trade Center in New York," Aug. 12, 1998. An FAA civil aviation security official believed the plan was improbable because Libyan planes were required to operate within airspace limitations and the Libyans did not possess aircraft with the necessary range to make good on the threat. Jack S. interview (June 13, 2004). On September 30, 1999, the FAA closed the file on the August report after investigation could not corroborate the report, and the source's credibility was deemed suspect.
Footnote 14
Notes to Chapter 11
Page 561
9/11 Commission Report

The FAA gave up on the idea as the source wasn’t deemed credible. And although Dr Griffin may be technically correct in saying the Commission doesn’t explicitly say the planes weren’t to be hijacked in the US, it’s still a misleading statement. Talk of Libyan planes range making the plan improbable means the FAA were clearly envisaging a hijack overseas.

4. “[Richard] Clarke had been concerned about the danger posed by aircraft since at least the 1996 Atlanta Olympics... In 1998, Clarke chaired an exercise [that] involved a scenario in which a group of terrorists commandeered a Learjet on the ground in Atlanta, loaded it with explosives, and flew it towards a target in Washington, D.C.” [345] The Commission elsewhere concluded the description of this exercise by saying that the terrorist group “took off for a suicide mission to Washington” (457-58n98)
Page 265
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions

Read the full text of this paragraph and you’ll immediately see that, even at the time, this wasn’t taken seriously as a threat by the Defence Department:

Clarke had been concerned about the danger posed by aircraft since at least the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. There he had tried to create an air defense plan using assets from the Treasury Department, after the Defense Department declined to contribute resources. The Secret Service continued to work on the problem of airborne threats to the Washington region. In 1998, Clarke chaired an exercise designed to highlight the inadequacy of the solution. This paper exercise involved a scenario in which a group of terrorists commandeered a Learjet on the ground in Atlanta, loaded it with explosives, and flew it toward a target in Washington, D.C. Clarke asked officials from the Pentagon, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Secret Service what they could do about the situation. Officials from the Pentagon said they could scramble aircraft from Langley Air Force Base, but they would need to go to the President for rules of engagement, and there was no mechanism to do so. There was no clear resolution of the problem at the exercise.
Page 345
9/11 Commission Report

Clarke’s book spells out the views of others in more detail:

The Secret Service and Customs had teamed up in Atlanta to provide some rudimentary air defense against an aircraft flying into the Olympic Stadium. They did so again during the subsequent National Security Special Events and they agreed to create a permanent air defense unit to protect Washington. Unfortunately, those two federal law enforcement agencies were housed in the Treasury Department and its leadership did not want to pay for such a mission or run the liability risks of shooting down the wrong aircraft. Treasury nixed the air defense unit, and my attempts within the White House to overrule them came to naught. The idea of aircraft attacking in Washington seemed remote to many people and the risks of shooting down aircraft in a city were thought to be far too high. Moreover, the opponents of our plan argued, the Air Force could always scramble fighter aircraft to protect Washington if there were a problem. On occasions when aircraft were hijacked (and in one case when we erroneously believed a Northwest flight had been seized), the Air Force did intercept the airliners with fighter jets. We succeeded only in getting Secret Service the permission to continue to examine air defense options, including the possibility of placing missile units near the White House. Most people who heard about our efforts to create some air defense system in case terrorists tried to fly aircraft into the Capitol, the White House, or the Pentagon simply thought we were nuts.
Page 131
Against all Enemies
Richard A Clarke

It’s hard to see how this does anything other than confirm the “failure of imagination” statement. Still, we’re only on example #4 of #15: let’s see what else Griffin has to offer.

5. After the 1999-2000 millennium alerts,... Clarke held a meeting of his Counterterrorism Security Group devoted largely to the possibility of a possible airplane hijacking by al Qaeda... [T]he possibility was imaginable, and imagined [345]

Once again some relevant information has been snipped from the page. Here’s the full text (our emphasis):

After the 1999­2000 millennium alerts, when the nation had relaxed, Clarke held a meeting of his Counterterrorism Security Group devoted largely to the possibility of a possible airplane hijacking by al Qaeda.17 In his testimony,Clarke commented that he thought that warning about the possibility of a suicide hijacking would have been just one more speculative theory among many, hard to spot since the volume of warnings of "al Qaeda threats and other terrorist threats,was in the tens of thousands--probably hundreds of thousands."18Yet the possibility was imaginable,and imagined.
Page 345
9/11 Commission Report

Even Clarke sees this as just “one more speculative theory among many”. How is that supposed to contradict the statement that “the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airlines within the United States -- and using them as guided missiles -- was not recognised by NORAD before 9/11”?

6. “In early August 1999, the FAA’s Civil Aviation Security intelligence office summarized the Bin Ladin hijacking threat... [T]he paper identified a few principal scenarios, one of which was a ‘suicide hijacking operation’”. [345]

And in a familiar move, Dr Griffin is simply editing out the uncertainties expressed in the full report:

In early August 1999,the FAA's CivilAviation Security intelligence office summarized the Bin Ladin hijacking threat. After a solid recitation of all the information available on this topic, the paper identified a few principal scenarios, one of which was a "suicide hijacking operation." The FAA analysts judged such an operation unlikely, because "it does not offer an opportunity for dialogue to achieve the key goal of obtaining Rahman and other key captive extremists. . . .A suicide hijacking is assessed to be an option of last resort."19

Analysts could have shed some light on what kind of "opportunity for dialogue" al Qaeda desired.20The CIA did not write any analytical assessments of possible hijacking scenarios.
Page 345
9/11 Commission Report

This is simply more confirmation that the official view (with the FAA, not just the Department of Defence) didn’t believe suicide hijackings were likely.

7. “A CIA report on June 12, 2001, said that KSM “was recruiting people to travel to the United States to meet with colleagues already there so that they might conduct terrorist attacks on Bin Ladin’s behalf. On June 22, the CIA notified all its station chiefs about intelligence suggesting a possible al Qaeda suicide attacks on a U.S. target over the next few days.” [256].

Let’s remember that these examples are supposed to illustrate that NORAD should have envisaged the use of planes being hijacked within the US and used in suicide attacks. That’s not information available here, and the full text makes this even clearer:

Threat reports surged in June and July,reaching an even higher peak of urgency. The summer threats seemed to be focused on Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and possibly Rome, but the danger could be anywhere— including a possible attack on the G-8 summit in Genoa.A June 12 CIA report passing along biographical background information on several terrorists mentioned, in commenting on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that he was recruiting people to travel to the United States to meet with colleagues already there so that they might conduct terrorist attacks on Bin Ladin’s behalf. On June 22, the CIA notified all its station chiefs about intelligence suggesting a possible al Qaeda suicide attack on a U.S.target over the next few days.DCITenet asked that all U.S. ambassadors be briefed.

The concerns were worldwide, the expectation was of a possible suicide attack within a few days of June 22, and there was no specific information regarding hijackings.

8. “In late July [2001], because of threats, Italy closed the airspace over Genoa and mounted antiaircraft batteries at the Genoa airport during the G-8 summit, which President Bush attended” (258). We learn elsewhere that the Italians kept fighters in the air over the city, and that the threat was taken so seriously that Bush stayed overnight offshore, on an aircraft carrier. Although this example, like the first one, is about a threat in Europe, not the United States, it obviously counts against the thesis that there was a “failure of imagination” with regard to the possibility that terrorists might try to use airplanes to attack President Bush. (Another puzzling thing about this example is that the Commission, in mentioning that “antiaircraft batteries” had to be mounted at the Genoa airport, failed to point out that the White House and the Pentagon already have their own antiaircraft batteries, which would shoot down any aircraft except one with a transponder signal indicating that it belongs to the US military.)

Whether this threat was taken seriously at the time, by anyone other than the Italians, isn’t entirely clear. 

U.S. and Italian officials were warned in July that Islamic terrorists might attempt to kill President Bush and other leaders by crashing an airliner into the Genoa summit of industrialized nations, officials said Wednesday.

Italian officials took the reports seriously enough to prompt extraordinary precautions during the July summit of the Group of 8 nations, including closing the airspace over Genoa and stationing antiaircraft guns at the city's airport.

But a U.S. official said that American counter-terrorism experts considered the warning "unsubstantiated."

In either case, the reports suggest that Western governments were aware that terrorists might one day use a hijacked airplane as a suicide weapon--as they did Sept. 11 in attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The Genoa warning was disclosed last week by Italian Deputy Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini. In remarks on a television talk show reported by the Italian news agency ANSA, Fini said: "Many people were ironic about the Italian secret services. But in fact they got the information that there was the possibility of an attack against the U.S. president using an airliner. That's why we closed the airspace and installed the missiles. Those who made cracks should now think a little."

An attack on the summit would have endangered not only President Bush, but also British Prime Minister Tony Blair, French President Jacques Chirac, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin and others.

In an interview published Sept. 21 in the French newspaper Le Figaro, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said his government provided information to the United States about possible attacks on the Genoa summit by Saudi-born terrorist Osama bin Laden. "There was a question of an airplane stuffed with explosives. As a result, precautions were taken."

White House aides refused to comment on the reports. "We just don't talk about security arrangements," spokeswoman Anna Perez said.

But a U.S. official outside the White House said the Genoa reports were received and discounted.

"There were some press reports citing what we subsequently determined was unsubstantiated information," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

In any case, the possibility of suicide hijackings has been known to U.S. counter-terrorism officials for several years.
http://web.archive.org/web/20010927121241/www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-092701genoa.story

The most this article suggests is that the possibility of suicide hijackings was known to the US, and that’s obviously true. However they discounted it, and the comment from Gianfranco Fini about many people being “ironic” shows that the US weren’t alone: it wasn’t taken seriously by a significant number of people.

Even post-9/11 the situation remained uncertain.

Two months before the attacks on New York and Washington, Osama bin Laden may have been contemplating an aerial attack against world leaders assembled in Genoa for a G8 summit.

Rumours that the terrorist suspect planned to pack an aircraft with explosives and launch it at the Ducal palace containing George Bush have been given weight by the president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak.

He said Islamist suicide pilots were originally intended to launch an attack on the Italian riviera.

"On June 13 of this year, we learned of a communique from Bin Laden saying he wanted to assassinate Mr Bush and other G8 heads of state during their summit in Italy. It was a well-known piece of in formation," said President Mubarak.

On a state visit to Paris, the president told French media that Egypt's intelligence services had intercepted plans for "an aeroplane stuffed with explosives" to plunge into Genoa. A warning was passed to the US, he said.

When they installed a missile defence system at Genoa's airport in July and enforced a no-fly zone, the Italian authorities were derided, but now they feel vindicated.

After President Mubarak went public, Italy's deputy prime minister, Gianfranco Fini, confirmed that his own intelligence services had briefed him about the threat. They were expecting a small civilian aircraft with the range to fly from dozens of European airports, not a passenger jet.

"Many people joked about the Italian intelligence force. But actually, they had information that in Genoa there was the hypothesis of an attack on the American president with the use of an aeroplane. That is why we closed the airspace above Genoa and installed anti-aircraft missiles. Those who joked should now reflect," Mr Fini said.

In addition to President Bush and Vladimir Putin, the July 20-22 summit of the seven most industrialised countries plus Russia gathered the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan.

Days before the summit the head of Mr Putin's personal protection force, General Yevgeni Murov, told the Russian news agency Itar-Tass that the US and Russian presidents were at risk. "Bin Laden utters threats to the US president," he was quoted as saying.

Italian media at the time also reported that Germany's intelligence service had relayed to Rome notice of a Bin Laden plot. That prompted the former CIA chief, Vincent Cannistrano, to hypothesise about an attack at the time deemed fanciful: "It would be simple to put explosives in a toy plane and fly it into a room full of dignitaries."

The Egyptian president told Le Figaro that his knowledge was based on a video made by Bin Laden on June 13. "It spoke of assassinating President Bush and other heads of state in Genoa. It was a question of an aeroplane stuffed with explosives. These precautions then had been taken."

However, in a twist which casts doubt on President Mubarak, the New York Times reported that people who have viewed the tape said there was no reference to stuffing an aircraft with explosives or killing Mr Bush.

The British government was unable to confirm that there had been a threat to attack the Genoa summit.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,558918,00.html

This was not a US threat, then. It was not expected to be a hijacked passenger jet. There are questions about whether Mubarak’s account of a video is accurate, and many people seem to have questioned whether the deployment of antiaircraft measures was necessary at the time.

So why did Bush stay on an aircraft carrier? Just because they may have discounted a threat from the skies doesn’t mean there weren’t other risks, as this article pointed out:

Italian security forces are on heightened alert after a bomb attack in Genoa, where the world's top leaders are to gather for the latest G8 meeting of industrialised nations.

The Italian government had already put in place a widespread security system, including at least 15,000 policeman, army, navy servicemen at a cost of up to $110 million.

But a parcel bomb sent to the Carabinieri station in the Fruttuoso area of Genoa and a defused time bomb just days before the summit opened acted as a further warning to security forces.

Police will be fully equipped with riot gear and armed with live and rubber bullets, tear gas, water cannon and batons during the summit this weekend. Army and navy personnel will also be on call, as will snipers, bomb disposal units and armoured vehicles.

The Italian authorities' security measures also include the positioning of surface-to-air missiles at Genoa's Christopher Columbus airport. Dubbed the SPADA, the land-based system consists of missiles capable of a range of 15 kilometres (9.3 miles).

The ministry said the decision to install the missiles is not excessive.

"There's no excessive precaution," military spokesman Colonel Alberto Battaglini told Reuters. "The measure, which was planned by the previous government, may seem open to criticism, but in reality it is merely to act as a deterrent against any aerial incursion during the summit."

The choice of Genoa for the summit is regarded as a security nightmare. It is a port, with access from the sea, and has a backdrop of hills. Its central streets are narrow and winding, making hit-and-run violence of the type seen at June's EU summit at Gothenburg difficult to contain.

Italy's Defence Minister, Antonio Martino, told CNN: "Genoa is not the best place to organise such a meeting because it is very hard to defend key sites and the concern of the government is that some violent elements may join the protesters and cause problems."

The official G8 Summit Web site said it was not so much violence by the demonstrators that they feared most, but "the possibility of a terrorist attack."

The head of Russia's Federal Bodyguard Service has warned of a plot by terrorist Osama bin Laden to assassinate George W. Bush at the summit and the U.S. President may be staying at U.S. Camp Darby military base in Livorno or offshore on the American aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise to avoid any terrorist risk.

The other leaders of the world's most industrialised nations -- the U.S., Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, plus Russia -- are also staying offshore on a luxury cruise liner, the "European Vision, " chartered by the Italian government at a reported cost of $2.89 million.
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/17/genoa.security

Note the defensive tone about the missiles, the concerns about other forms of attack, and the fact that all leaders stayed offshore, not just Bush. Put this all together with the fact that even the Italians seem to feel they were only taken seriously post-9/11, and it’s hard to see it as a convincing argument that NORAD should have considered suicide hijackers within the US.

With regard to the second part of Griffin’s claim...

(Another puzzling thing about this example is that the Commission, in mentioning that “antiaircraft batteries” had to be mounted at the Genoa airport, failed to point out that the White House and the Pentagon already have their own antiaircraft batteries, which would shoot down any aircraft except one with a transponder signal indicating that it belongs to the US military.)

If it’s so “puzzling” then perhaps Dr Griffin could point us to a reference proving the existence of these batteries and explaining how they work, because he fails to do it here. (See this page for more on the supposed Pentagon batteries.)

9. On August 6, 2001, the Presidential Daily Brief included an intelligence memo stating, amongst other things, that “[one threat report said] that bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft... FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks... CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives” (262).

This is a very selective view of the PDB. Here’s the context of “bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft”, for instance:

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a xxxxxxxxxx service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.
http://www.cnn.com/2004/images/04/10/whitehouse.pdf

This was an old warning, about a conventional hijacking (because you don’t gain the release of anyone by taking hostages and then killing them all), which was regarded as sensational and uncorroborated. Not much reason to pay attention there.

The warning later that there was “suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks” is next to useless, as that doesn’t actually rule out anything at all. And talk of “attacks with explosives” adds nothing, as they can come in many forms (and suicide plane hijackings probably wouldn’t be the first that would come to mind). More on the PDB here.

Six other examples

Dr Griffin next adds another six examples of his own, which he suggests shows that the threat from hijacked airliners within the US should have been recognised. We’ll consider each of these, too (originally numbered 1-6, we’re allocated them letters a-f instead, to make it easier to discuss them all later).

a. In 1993, a panel of experts commissioned by the Pentagon suggested that airplanes could be used as missiles to bomb national landmarks. In 1994, one of these experts wrote in the Futurist magazine:

Targets such as the World Trade Center not only provide the requisite casualties but, because of their symbolic nature, provide more bang for the buck. In order to maximize their odds for success, terrorist groups will likely consider mounting multiple, simultaneous operations.

The clever juxtaposition of the second quote with the first sentence appears designed to make you think that the Futurist article was about flying planes into the World Trade Center... But then you’d be wrong. The article talks about possible future nuclear terrorism, the use of neurotoxins and pathogens created through genetic engineering, suggests that a WTC bomb packed with “cobalt-60 or iodine-131” might have “rendered New York's financial district uninhabitable for generations”, that anthrax might be used, and more. Then it tells us that:

Governments generally respond to increased terrorism by beefing up the security of government installations, key components of the nation's infrastructure, and other lucrative targets. This pressures the terrorists to seek softer targets that effectively coerce the government to meet their demands. Operations that generate large civilian casualties fit these parameters and are anywhere large numbers of people gather. Choice targets include sports arenas, shopping malls, houses of worship, and movie theaters. Targets such as the World Trade Center not only provide the requisite casualties but, because of their symbolic nature, provide more bang for the buck. In order to maximize their odds for success, terrorist groups will likely consider mounting multiple, simultaneous operations with the aim of overtaxing a government's ability to respond, as well as demonstrating their professionalism and reach.
http://www.wfs.org/cetron94.htm

But there’s no discussion whatsoever of how these attacks might take place, and nothing in the article about hijacking in any form (suicide or conventional). Even picking the WTC as a target is hardly surprising, as the study was written just after the 1993 bombing.

The original study did suggest the idea of using a plane as a weapon, however evaluating how much this meant isn’t easy. The study wasn’t simply saying “we think these things are likely”, for instance. Instead it proposed four different potential futures -- “Economics dominates”, “Violence dominates”, “Status quo” and “Environment dominates” -- each of which assumed that a particular set of trends would be pre-eminent in world affairs. The study then reported on the results of a survey, suggesting what the participants believed the most likely forms of attack for each future, as follows.

The Economics Dominates Future

In the survey’s most probable future, in which economics dominates other global forces, industrial and financial facilities predictably are most at risk. For the remainder of the 1990’s, three forms of attack were rated as having both high probability and high impact: physical attack on a firm that offers electronic data-processing services, physical attack on a major stock exchange or on the Securities Exchange Commission; and a credible hoax involving the threat of an improvised nuclear weapon or dispersal device. In the first decade of the new century, a disruption of banking communications joins the list. One low-impact item also becomes highly probable after the year 2000: hijacking.

In addition, our participants believed that many potential threats, though unlikely, would have a sufficiently high impact to justify monitoring them. These included disruption of satellite communications, seizure of a communications system, attacks at a main power station or a substation on the grid, disruption of transportation, an attack on imported energy sources at a port or other choke point, use of chemical or biological weapons to contaminate food or water supplies, and the use of a functional nuclear bomb or contamination device...

The Violence Dominates Future

High-probability/high-impact attacks were plentiful in “Violence Dominates,” which ranked second on the list of possible North American futures and third for the rest of the world. Between 1994 and 2000, no fewer than nine types of incident examined by the survey were found to justify extreme vigilance: destruction of facilities, including military bases and stations and religious shrines; kidnapping of elected officials and nationally known clergy; general anarchy (the kind of chaos that struck the United States during the Vietnam War, but with more sophisticated weaponry; attacks on judges or criminal-justice computer systems; and hoaxes involving simulated nuclear weapons. Less likely events, but ones which would have a high impact, include attacks on sporting events, chemical or biological attacks such as contamination of food or water supplies, kidnapping of a nationally known scientist, physical attacks on stock exchanges or computer service suppliers, attacks on court houses, the use of a working nuclear weapon, or disruption of communications satellites or banking communications systems.

Yet even in this turbulent world, the situation changes dramatically after 2000. Only a nuclear hoax and the destruction of facilities -- now mass gatherings such as ceremonies and sporting events, rather than the more traditional, better protected targets -- still seem both highly probable and likely to have a great impact...

Status Quo Future

In the status-quo future -- third on the list for North America but second for the rest of the world -- only a nuclear hoax combines high impact with high probability in the next few years. By 2000 or so, it is joined by disruption of data communications and biological or chemical attacks, such as the contamination of food or water supplies. For the near term, bio/chemical contamination and disruption of data communications seems relatively unlikely, though still high in impact. During both periods, several other varieties of terrorist incident, though relatively improbable, bear watching: physical attacks on a major stock exchange or the Securities Exchange Commission, communications disruptions of all types, the use of a working nuclear weapon, and hijacking...

The Environment Dominates Future

In the environmentally-dominated scenario, the least probable future for both North America and the rest of the world in the early 21st century, almost is devoid of high-probability/high impact terrorist incidents. Only generic kidnappings seemed highly probable, and by the turn of the century, society will have learned to deal with them, sharply reducing their impact. Attacks on long-distance power lines can also be expected throughout the study period, but they will have little impact...
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/951.pdf

Where did the “plane as a bomb” scenario come into this? We don’t know, as apparently it was left out of the report:

One expert panel commissioned by the Pentagon discussed in 1993 how an airplane could be used to bomb national landmarks. But the panel decided not to publish the theory, partly in fear of inspiring terrorists.

"It was considered radical thinking, a little too scary for the times," said retired Air Force Col. Doug Menarchik, who organized the $150,000 study for the Defense Department's Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. "After I left, it met a quiet death."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A55607-2001Oct1?language=printer

But in any event, as you can see, it was only one scenario out of a considerable number. And without the benefit of hindsight, could you really read lists like the above and decide which ideas were accurate? We would say it’s unlikely, and no real surprise that this failed to happen.

b. in 1995, Senator Sam Nunn, in Time magazine’s cover story, described a scenario in which terrorists crash a remote-controlled airplane into the US Capitol Building.

This example is something of a stretch, as the full text makes clear:

Even very sober public officials are deeply concerned. Three weeks ago, Georgia's Senator Sam Nunn sketched a lurid fantasy: how terrorists might wreck the central government of the U.S. On the night of a State of the Union address, when all the top officials are in the Capitol, Nunn said, a handful of fanatics could crash a radio-controlled drone aircraft into the building, "engulfing it with chemical weapons and causing tremendous death and destruction.'' This scenario, said Nunn, "is not far-fetched,'' and the technology is all readily available.

Many of the experts say they are surprised that chemical weapons have not been used in a major attack before. The ingredients for making them are available commercially and can be put together by almost any competent chemist. Muslim zealots, for example, are increasingly a younger generation of angry men who have the education and sophistication to construct weapons their fathers and uncles never dreamed of.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,982759-2,00.html

It’s not about using commercial jets, or hijacking, or even using the plane as a bomb: this is all about a delivery system for chemical weapons. As such it doesn’t really add to the existing knowledge of plans to “fly a plane into CIA headquarters” (see above), and if the US didn’t see those as being likely, it’s hard to see why this should give them any more credibility.

c. In 1999, the National Intelligence Council, which advises the President and US intelligence agencies on emerging threats, said in a special report on terrorism: “Al-Qaeda’s expected retaliation for the US cruise missile attack [of 1998]... cpuld take several forms of terrorist attack in the nation’s capitol. Suicide bombers belonging to al-Qaeda’s Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives... into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House.”

This sounds impressive when excerpted, however the full text reveals a subtly different story:

Al-Qaida’s expected retaliation for the U.S. cruise missile attack against al-Qaida’s training facilities in Afghanistan on August 20, 1998, could take several forms of terrorist attack in the nation’s capital. Al-Qaida could detonate a Chechen-type building-buster bomb at a federal building. Suicide bomber(s) belonging to al-Qaida’s Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House. Ramzi Yousef had planned to do this against the CIA headquarters. In addition, both al-Qaida and Yousef were linked to a plot to assassinate President Clinton during his visit to the Philippines in early 1995. Following the August 1998 cruise missile attack, at least one Islamic religious leader called for Clinton’s assassination, and another stated that “the time is not far off” for when the White House will be destroyed by a nuclear bomb. A horrendous scenario consonant with al-Qaida’s mindset would be its use of a nuclear suitcase bomb against any number of targets in the nation’s capital. Bin Laden allegedly has already purchased a number of nuclear suitcase bombs from the Chechen Mafia. Al-Qaida’s retaliation, however, is more likely to take the lower-risk form of bombing one or more U.S. airliners with timebombs. Yousef was planning simultaneous bombings of U.S. airliners prior to his capture. Whatever form an attack may take, bin Laden will most likely retaliate in a spectacular way for the cruise missile attack against his Afghan camp in August 1998.
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf

Although this is given as a separate example by Griffin, it’s really just another reminder of the “Yousef attack on CIA HQ” plan. We already know they knew about that, and that they didn’t appear to take it seriously, and that is the “failure of imagination” that we’re discussing. Why should a reminder of that ensure they take it more seriously, especially in a document that lists many other options, and says the more likely attack is something conventional like placing bombs on aircraft?

d. In October 2000, Pentagon officials carried out an emergency drill to prepare for the possibility that a hijacked airliner might be crashed into the Pentagon.

The drill related only to the crash of a plane into the Pentagon, not specifically one that was hijacked. As the Pentagon is right next to an airport, planning for such an event makes a lot of sense:

An Army medic who participates in the mock attack calls it “a real good scenario and one that could happen easily,” while a fire chief notes: “You have to plan for this. Look at all the air traffic around here.”
Source

More here.

There’s no reason to assume this contingency planning issue should persuade NORAD that a suicide terrorist attack using a plane was any more likely than they believed already.

e. In July 2001, according to an article headed “NORAD Had Drills of Jets as Weapons,” the military planned a drill in which hijacked airliners, originating in the United States, were used as weapons to crash into targets, including the World Trade Center.

Here’s the complete version of that article.

WASHINGTON — In the two years before the Sept. 11 attacks, the North American Aerospace Defense Command conducted exercises simulating what the White House says was unimaginable at the time: hijacked airliners used as weapons to crash into targets and cause mass casualties.

One of the imagined targets was the World Trade Center. In another exercise, jets performed a mock shootdown over the Atlantic Ocean of a jet supposedly laden with chemical poisons headed toward a target in the United States. In a third scenario, the target was the Pentagon — but that drill was not run after Defense officials said it was unrealistic, NORAD and Defense officials say.

NORAD, in a written statement, confirmed that such hijacking exercises occurred. It said the scenarios outlined were regional drills, not regularly scheduled continent-wide exercises.

"Numerous types of civilian and military aircraft were used as mock hijacked aircraft," the statement said. "These exercises tested track detection and identification; scramble and interception; hijack procedures; internal and external agency coordination and operational security and communications security procedures."

A White House spokesman said Sunday that the Bush administration was not aware of the NORAD exercises. But the exercises using real aircraft show that at least one part of the government thought the possibility of such attacks, though unlikely, merited scrutiny.

On April 8, the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks heard testimony from national security adviser Condoleezza Rice that the White House didn't anticipate hijacked planes being used as weapons.

On April 12, a watchdog group, the Project on Government Oversight, released a copy of an e-mail written by a former NORAD official referring to the proposed exercise targeting the Pentagon. The e-mail said the simulation was not held because the Pentagon considered it "too unrealistic."

President Bush said at a news conference Tuesday, "Nobody in our government, at least, and I don't think the prior government, could envision flying airplanes into buildings on such a massive scale."

The exercises differed from the Sept. 11 attacks in one important respect: The planes in the simulation were coming from a foreign country.

Until Sept. 11, NORAD was expected to defend the United States and Canada from aircraft based elsewhere. After the attacks, that responsibility broadened to include flights that originated in the two countries.

But there were exceptions in the early drills, including one operation, planned in July 2001 and conducted later, that involved planes from airports in Utah and Washington state that were "hijacked." Those planes were escorted by U.S. and Canadian aircraft to airfields in British Columbia and Alaska.

NORAD officials have acknowledged that "scriptwriters" for the drills included the idea of hijacked aircraft being used as weapons.

"Threats of killing hostages or crashing were left to the scriptwriters to invoke creativity and broaden the required response," Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley, a NORAD official, told the 9/11 commission. No exercise matched the specific events of Sept. 11, NORAD said.

"We have planned and executed numerous scenarios over the years to include aircraft originating from foreign airports penetrating our sovereign airspace," Gen. Ralph Eberhart, NORAD commander, told USA TODAY. "Regrettably, the tragic events of 9/11 were never anticipated or exercised."

NORAD, a U.S.-Canadian command, was created in 1958 to guard against Soviet bombers.

Until Sept. 11, 2001, NORAD conducted four major exercises a year. Most included a hijack scenario, but not all of those involved planes as weapons. Since the attacks, NORAD has conducted more than 100 exercises, all with mock hijackings.

NORAD fighters based in Florida have intercepted two hijacked smaller aircraft since the Sept. 11 attacks. Both originated in Cuba and were escorted to Key West in spring 2003, NORAD said.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-04-18-norad_x.htm

As a reminder, these examples are supposed to be undermining the claim that “the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airlines within the United States--and using them as guided missiles--was not recognised by NORAD before 9/11”. Perhaps this is why Dr Griffin summarised the story by saying “the military planned a drill in which hijacked airliners, originating in the United States, were used as weapons”, but as you can see from the story, that’s untrue:

The exercises differed from the Sept. 11 attacks in one important respect: The planes in the simulation were coming from a foreign country.

And so the example fails the second test, right there.

In addition, the idea of a plane crashing into the Pentagon was dropped as being unrealistic, offering some confirmation that officials weren’t taking the idea seriously. And in fact the officer who revealed this, Terry Ropes, saw it as a defence of NORAD, not a condemnation:

In defense of my last unit, NORAD.

For POSITIVE FORCE/RSOI in Apr 01, the NORAD exercise developers wanted an event having a terrorist group hijack a commercial airline (foreign carrier) and fly it into the Pentagon. PACOM didn’t want it because it would take attention away from their exercise objectives, and Joint Staff action officers rejected it as too unrealistic.
http://pogo.org/m/hsp/planesasmissiles.pdf

Another story reveals that this scenario didn’t arise solely from the exercise developers, or necessarily from inside knowledge that such a terrorist attack was likely. They were specifically asked to come up with something that would render the Pentagon inoperable, forcing some of its functions to be relocated:

The proposal surfaced during planning for a combined exercise in April 2001: Positive Force, an exercise run by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for evaluating decision making; and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration, an exercise involving the Republic of Korea and Pacific Command that focused on deploying forces.

Norad was invited to participate. The planner was asked for a scenario in which the Pentagon was rendered inoperable and part of its functions in the exercise had to be moved to another location.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2819359.php

Factor in the comment “that the scenarios outlined were regional drills, not regularly scheduled continent-wide exercises”, and this is far from a convincing refutation of Eberhart’s claim. If anything, it confirms it: they didn’t even recognise planes hijacked from outside the US and crashing into the Pentagon as realistic.

f. At 9.00 on the morning of 9/11, the National Reconnaissance Office, which operates spy satellites and draws its personnel from the military and CIA, had planned to simulate the accidental crashing of an airplane into its headquarters, four miles from Dulles Airport in Washington. The simulation was evidently to be run by John Fulton “and his team at the CIA.”

Again, these examples are supposed to be undermining the claim that “the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airlines within the United States--and using them as guided missiles--was not recognised by NORAD before 9/11”. This occurred on 9/11, did not involve terrorists, or hijackings, and seems to have been little more than an extended fire drill with a few complications (like blocking some exits to see how an evacuation would proceed). Some people make the claim that this exercise interfered with the response to the hijackings, and while we see no case for believing that (go here), it’s at least a reasonable question to investigate. The idea that the NRO drill shows (or might show) that NORAD did recognise the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the US, though, is simply false.

Conclusion

One strategy common to many 9/11 theories involves the construction of Big Lists. The hope, presumably, is that anyone arguing another point of view will be overwhelmed with the depth of your research. And if not, at least you’ll be able to argue that “it’s impossible for all these signals to be ignored”, and call your opponents “coincidence theorists”.

Of course, the success of this depends on the quality of the items in your list. If they contain cherry-picked information, leave out vital information or don’t address your central point at all, then your case may not be as strong as you think. Or to put it another way, you can’t create a good argument by collecting weak points together, no matter how many you might find. So how weak are these points? Let’s see, keeping in mind that they should be showing that the statement “the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airlines within the United States--and using them as guided missiles--was not recognised by NORAD before 9/11” is unlikely to be true.

#2 was the reference to Bojinka, flying a plane into the CIA. This was already reported by the 9/11 Commission Report and remarked upon as a “failure of imagination” in not considering it further. Dr Griffin is trying to provide additional points to support that, so this one can’t be considered here.

Of the 14 remaining, 7, 9, b, d and f either do not relate clearly to suicide hijacking, or don’t relate to hijacking at all.

Of the 9 remaining, 1 is only a “possible” suicide hijacking plot (and not involving a US hijack anyway), and 3 was dismissed as unlikely and the source of the story was found not to be credible.

Of the 7 remaining points, 4, 5 and 6 show suicide hijackings were considered by Richard Clarke and the FAA, but don’t appear to have been regarded as likely by many.

Of the 4 remaining points, 8 relates to a possible attack abroad, that the Italians took seriously at the time, but it’s not clear that anyone else did.

Of the 3 remaining points, a and c only offered a “plane as bomb” idea as one scenario amongst many, and c specifically said that was not the most likely attack.

And the final point, e, did not relate to planes being hijacked in the US, and again, through the Pentagon scenario being dismissed as “unrealistic”, only supports the idea that the military did not recognise the potential threat from terrorists hijacking commercial airliners until after 9/11.

It’s easy to ignore all this, go back to The Big List, and say it’s just inconceivable that they couldn’t have put the pieces together. But then this is with the benefit of hindsight, of course, looking only at warnings sort-of related to suicide hijackings, spread over a period of 8 years, and ignoring everything else. In reality, as Richard Clarke says, life isn’t that easy:

 In his testimony,Clarke commented that he thought that warning about the possibility of a suicide hijacking would have been just one more speculative theory among many, hard to spot since the volume of warnings of "al Qaeda threats and other terrorist threats,was in the tens of thousands--probably hundreds of thousands
Page 345
9/11 Commission Report

Have Griffin’s examples really made a compelling case that suicide hijackings must have received more attention from NORAD? You’ll make up your own mind -- but we say no.