6. In early August 1999, the FAA’s Civil Aviation Security intelligence office summarised the Bin Ladin hijacking threat... [T]he paper identified a few principal scenarios, one of which was a ‘suicide hijacking operation’” (345).
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions
David Ray Griffin
This is non-specific as to the location of the threat, and the form the attack might take. And if you read the full version, then you’ll find this passage is followed by an important qualification:
In early August 1999, the FAA's Civil Aviation Security intelligence office summarized the Bin Ladin hijacking threat. After a solid recitation of all the information available on this topic, the paper identified a few principal scenarios, one of which was a "suicide hijacking operation."The FAA analysts judged such an operation unlikely, because "it does not offer an opportunity for dialogue to achieve the key goal of obtaining Rahman and other key captive extremists. . . . A suicide hijacking is assessed to be an option of last resort."
9/11 Commission Report
Once again, this supports the NORAD position, that intelligence wasn’t pointing to suicide hijackings as a likelihood: it’s in no sense evidence against them.