Commission staff spoke with Arias in a non-official capacity in order to receive information on how the press releases from NORAD that described the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were developed and released.

Arias noted that on 9/11 he and Sergeant Tibits were the only Public Affairs officers at CONR. His recollections on 9/11 were more personal because of his direct connection to the attacks.

He coordinated with the Public Affairs office at NORAD, and received information from NORAD’s operators.

Arias mentioned that on 9/11 he received a call from then Lt. Col., now Col. Dawne Deskins that informed him of the hijack and the impact of the aircraft in the World Trade Center. He called his brother, who worked in the south tower, and then went to attempt to contact NORAD Public Affairs in order to create connectivity. He received a fax from NORAD, and made a public statement.

On September 13th, he went to New York to attempt find his brother.

Arias informed Commission staff that he had no impact on the timeline of events that was developed at NORAD. He believes in theory that NORAD should have all the specific timing information coordinated between operators at CONR and at NEADS.

Arias indicated that at NORAD headquarters Commission staff should speak with retired Colonel Mike Perini and Major Doug Martin. He believes they were involved in creating and releasing the NORAD timeline. Arias also noted that NORAD handled the
BBC and other media interaction at NEADS. He also noted that those personnel who appeared in those programs had access to public affairs packets to guide them on what questions could or could not be answered.

Regarding the Leslie Filson book *Air War over America*, Arias noted that she had produced an earlier volume on the 1st Air Force, and thus General Arnold indicated she would be appropriate to create a volume on 9/11. She received guidance on who to speak to from Arias, but she had instruction to follow the story where it led, and she had clearance to speak with whomever she deemed appropriate and could coordinate with. Arias noted that their goal was to complete the publication within eighteen months. Arias noted that the book undertook a security and policy review, and that he, Colonel Scott and Colonel Nevin all reviewed the publication for its veracity. He believes anyone who was quoted in the book had the opportunity to review their remarks. He also noted that his fact review of the publication was a basic check that her citations were double sourced, but he does not believe she had access to any of the Mission Crew Commander logs from NEADS.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region (CONR) field site visit  
Type of event: Interview with Colonel Randy "Cat" Morris  
Date: Tuesday, February 03, 2004  
Special Access Issues: Clearance check  
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown  
Team Number: 8  
Location: CONR Headquarters Building  
Participants - Non-Commission: Major Mike Gullilory, Staff JAG  
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown, John Farmer, Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer  
Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

Morris has spent most of his career involved with fighter operations regarding the F-16. He was deputy director of Fighter Operations on 9/11, and is now the Chief of CONR Combat Operations.

Battle Cab at CONR:

The Battle Cab at CONR is also referred to as the RAOC – CONR Regional Air Operations Center, which is now referred to as a CAOC – Combined Air Operations Center. Morris commented to Commission staff that CONR Instruction 10-2 is regulation for the RAOC.

Morris informed Commission staff that on 9/11 Colonel Clark was the Air Operations Center (AOC) Director, and Morris was the Assistant AOC Director. Morris, as Assistant AOC Director, was to assist in the execution of the mission as ordered by General Arnold and Colonel Clark, and he was also responsible for the flow of activity within the Battle Staff. He noted that there was a “beefed up” posturing of NORAD’s air defense fighters due to a planned Russian Bear exercise.

Morris noted that Colonel Marr, Commander at Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), called CONR to inform of a potential hijack in the New York/Boston area. Morris responded to Marr that such an event falls under law enforcement jurisdiction. Marr replied that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had requested assistance and NEADS was “forward leaning” fighters from Otis AFB (Note: Morris is referring to Marr’s decision to place Otis ANGB NORAD air alert fighters at “Battle Stations”).
Morris directed the exercise be suspended, and directed his staff to concentrate on the hijacking.

Morris began to input data on the chat log at his position, and noticed CNN broadcast that the World Trade Center (WTC) was on fire. According to Morris, the Battle Staff began to realize that CNN's broadcast of an event at the WTC was one and the same as the hijack report from NEADS. As this was transpiring General Arnold entered that Battle Cab, and Arnold began speak with Marr.

Chat logs:

Morris noted that there were four chat logs on the upper row of the Battle Cab. The middle row had three, and the lower had five. He further noted that there were "fifteen or so" log points on the side of the floor. Overall, Commission staff received the impression that CONR's Battle Cab is a "chat log driven" operation. Morris noted that the chat logs themselves have "channels". Morris explained to Commission staff that the Battle Commanders would all be logged into the same channel. He does not believe General Arnold was present on the CONR chat log.

Morris noted that Lt. Col. Usher, then DCO at CONR and responsible for keeping track of the operational status of the fighters around the country, spent a fair amount of time on the chat log systems. He was attempting to actively monitor the fighter and tanker status. Morris assisted in this role.

Morris noted regarding chat channels that they were created and discarded as needed on 9/11.

Atlantic City:

Morris and Usher attempted to receive support through Atlantic City, since there is a NORAD support role and a general purpose mission there. Prior to 9/11 Atlantic City fighters sat alert at other sites depending on the need to posture assets in different regions. Morris commented that he made the call to the squadron commander at Atlantic City and spoke to the 119th Fighter Squadron Commander. He asked for two of their fighters to sit alert with hot guns, and asked for the other six to be loaded with missiles. Eventually all the aircraft of all the units were generated. He commented that they also generated tankers.

False American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11) report after 8:46 AM:

Morris commented that there was some spurious information entering into the Battle Staff on 9/11, and that much information from the intelligence section was being filtered to General Arnold's attention to help facilitate his orders and coordination with NEADS. Morris does not recall a track on AA 11 being forwarded to CONR. Morris commented that any reports of suspect aircraft and on the identity of aircraft were from.
the FAA, and that the decisions made by Colonel Marr and General Arnold were fed by these reports and from information sent from the intelligence section.

American Airlines Flight 77 (AA 77):

Morris does not recall any awareness of AA 77 or its position before it impacted that Pentagon.


Morris explained that General Arnold was coordinating a response to Delta 1989. They informed a crisis action team of the situation, and Morris received word that there was intelligence suggesting that “a threat an hour for another ten hours” would occur. He thought to keep the Battle Staff proactive in assessing threats, and recommended to General Arnold certain sites he believed needed an immediate military cap.

Rules of Engagement (ROE):

Morris recalls the change of Washington D.C. ROE, but commented that he was removed from the minute to minute happenings since he was focused on generating assets.

FAA communication:

Morris noted that the GS Airspace Manager, Mr. Bill Childers, spoke with the FAA from the extended Battle staff.

Now:

Morris noted that he believes there to be a tremendous change in the Battle Cab from 9/11, and in its capability to effectively fulfill its mission.

Morris noted the NORAD Contingency Sweep is a first step, but that the next step that is necessary is the fighter data link system to be fully functional. Morris commented that he would like to see better radio connectivity to fighter pilots. He is able to circumvent some areas where connectivity is poor by using aircraft as communication relays to fighters, but commented that there is technology that would make this step unnecessary.

He also noted that the DVD recording system that is currently being installed at CONR will prove to be an improvement in CONR’s ability to assess its operations.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Continental U.S. Aerospace Defense Command Region (CONR) field site visit
Type of event: Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Usher
Date: Wednesday, February 04, 2004
Special Access Issues: Clearance check
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: CONR Headquarters Building
Participants - Non-Commission: Major Mike Gullilory, Staff JAG
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown, John Farmer, Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer
Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

Usher was Director of Combat Operations (DCO) on September 11, 2001 (9/11) at CONR.

Usher explained that he arrived at CONR in 2000, and that most of his Air Defense experience began at that point. He explained that the DCO executes Air Tasking orders. If there is an aircraft scramble they monitor its progress in order to provide situational awareness on the fighters and the targets to the Battle Commander (BC). Usher recalled that on 9/11 he monitored the Vigilant Guardian exercise’s air tasking order prior to the hijacking events. Usher noted that twenty-four operations were ongoing a few days prior to 9/11 because of the exercise.

9/11:

Usher received information over the ZIRCOM chat log of a possible hijacking event. He noted that they scrambled Otis ANGB assets, and then saw on CNN the two flights hit the World Trade Center.

Usher noted that he communicated Fighter Officers at the other sectors. He spoke with the NBMC (NORAD Battle Management Control) and the NORAD FDO (Fighter Duty Officer) over receiving fighter and tanker assets.

Chat Logs:

Usher noted that until the exercise was terminated, information was entered on the exercise chat log regarding the attacks as well as the real world chat logs.
UNCLASSIFIED
Commission Sensitive

Usher noted that the BC/DO chat log would be between the Battle Commander and the Director of Operations, and Commission staff is not certain they have received that log. Usher noted that after 9/11 he saved all the chat logs that he monitored. He explained to Commission staff that he created one log he referred to as the Consolidated Combat Chat Log out of the many chat logs that were used on 9/11. He explained to Commission staff that he also inserted 84th RADS analysis information in this after-the-fact document. He further explained to Commission staff that he sequenced roughly ten chat logs into this consolidated document, and finished it on October 1, 2001. Usher commented to Commission staff that the original text document folder would have the original logs; but that he does not believe he had the BC/DO Chat Log, and does not believe he used this log in compiling the Consolidated Combat Chat Log. He monitored that log, but did not “own” that log. The “owner” of that log is General Arnold. He explained to Commission staff that to keep the log, you have to manually direct the computer to save the file into the hard drive. Otherwise the file is lost when power is lost to the consul. Usher noted that the bandwidth was not large enough to handle all the logs, and thus there are breaks.

Commission staff reviewed with Usher the chat log he prepared, and Usher identified and clarified the entries.

Usher commented that it was an extensive effort for him to put together the Consolidated Chat Log, and that a parallel extensive effort occurred at NEADS in order to compile the timeline that became the NORAD released timeline per the request of General Eberhart.

Usher commented that the ZIRCOM chat may have been more reliable than the phones on 9/11. He commented that attempting to get a Fighter Officer on the phone was at times difficult since they were contending with their own priorities.

Post 9/11 and ROE:

Usher commented that post-9/11 NORAD and the FAA brought to bear a greater communication capability. This was to facilitate Rules of Engagement (ROE) discussions in case of another event.

Usher commented regarding the Vice President’s order to shoot down non-responding targets that he is not sure if General Arnold heard that order directly or if it was passed to him.

Usher commented that the DEFCON (Defensive Condition) change came from the AOC or from General Arnold. There is an emergency action message to confirm this transition.

Usher does not believe he monitored the Intel Chat Log on 9/11, and does not believe he used it to compile the Consolidated Chat Log. Usher noted that if an entry
from a document does not appear on the Consolidated Chat Log, it was not in his log folder on his desktop.

**Langley scramble:**

Usher noted that he does not know exactly why NEADS scrambled Langley, and that all he knew was that there was other information on suspect targets. He noted that if he did not include the information on reports of AA 11 being airborne after 8:46AM, that information must not have been on the chat logs that he used to compile his consolidated log.

**Today:**

Usher commented that the situational awareness at CONR is very different than it was on 9/11, and that the force posture is much more robust.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: CONR Field Site Visit
Type of event: Interview with General Larry Arnold
Date: February 3, 2004
Special Access Issues: Clearance check
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: Commander’s Conference Room
Participants - Non-Commission:
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown. John Farmer, Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer

Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

Please refer to the Arnold’s biography for a complete record.

He began with First Air Force (1st AF) in December of 1997. He was Vice Commander, then Commander, and retired in August of 2002. On September 11, 2001 (9/11), Arnold was Commander at CONR.

1st AF:

Arnold noted that in the 1960s the threat to the continental United States (CONUS) from Soviet bombers diminished, and the Russians concentrated on Inter-Continental Ballistic missions (ICBs) and Submarine ICB launches. He explained that the resources of North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) were lessened because of this, since the strategic shift was away from air-launched missiles.

Arnold noted that NORAD was focused specifically on the Soviet threat, and maintained surveillance over the Canadian border. He explained that the radar over the Canadian border was taken down, and that in the 1970s anything flying from over Canadian airspace into CONUS air space was considered friendly. With the beginning of the Joint Surveillance Sites and the partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration the NORAD mission shifted to a monitoring of the air space. In the late 1980s there was a window of concern prior to the demise of the Soviet Union because of the advent of Cruise Missiles. Arnold noted that the ability to detect a cruise missile was limited. So the surveillance capability was intended to initiate a strike a on an inbound aircraft with hostile intent before that target could launch a cruise missile.
Arnold noted that in the early 1990s NORAD's mission of air defense shifted to a mission of air sovereignty. Air defense was protective, whereas air sovereignty was intended to maintain control and prevent illegal entries into CONUS.

Arnold noted that the Hart-Rudman study indicated terrorists, rogues and rogue nations were the greatest threat to the national security of the United States. He explained that he took note of this, and that he concentrated on this threat's potential to come from outside the borders of the country.

1st AF, the Air National Guard (ANG), and NORAD:

According to Arnold, the ANG had always been involved with NORAD's mission by providing experienced fighter pilots for air defense, but not at the Command and Control (C2) level. Arnold recalled that General Russ, former Air Combat Commander, had spoken to General Kelly, Director of the ANG, and General McPeak, and suggested the NORAD air defense mission be placed under the ANG in order to protect the mission. He was concerned that the mission would be shut down by Pentagon, and its resources reallocated to other projects. Their plan was adopted, and 1st AF began transitioning the mission to the ANG in 1993. Arnold noted that General Lowe wanted to maintain the Active Duty Title 10 Chain of Command, so that predominantly the funding would be supplied by the ANG. The sectors became traditional guard units that were staffed by Title 32 Guardsman; guardsman could volunteer to become conditional employees, which carried there status over to Title 10.

Arnold noted that despite the switch to ANG there were initially still fighter wings as components to 1st AF. In 1994 General Kelly became the first Guardsman Commander of 1st AF.

Arnold noted that at one point there was a heavy push at the Pentagon to move CONUS air defense into what was called “a four corner defense” – four air alert sites, each at one geographic corner of CONUS. Arnold believed this was inadequate. He noted that even with the seven air alert sites he was concerned that the south border was vulnerable. Arnold explained that when you balance the top line of money at the high levels of the military they have to make the best decisions with limited resources; but that the capacity of the 1st AF as a resource proved greater than for just for air defense. He explained that without the air defense forces it would have been very difficult to rotate assets into different mission theatres during the 1990s, and gave the example that the fighter support of the drug mission in Panama was simultaneous with the Gulf mission.

As an example of his concern, Arnold noted that a terrorist threat could come from over the southern border towards El Paso and with one hour’s notice fighters stationed near Houston, Texas would not make an intercept. Arnold also noted regarding the radar capability that the radar across the eastern border was not designed to pick up primary targets at low altitudes. He noted that you could pick up low altitude if they were close to the radar, but that it is line of sight, and thus less in capability with distance. He
noted that this is a better capability in the south, but the capability was paid for by the drug mission.

RAM Team:

Arnold noted that to make the decision to move to a “Four Corner Defense” there was not suitable analysis. He wanted the analysis to be led from outside of the Air Defense core. He created a team that analyzed two specific variables: 1) if there was a NORAD mission; and 2) if there was no mission, Arnold asked them to discover the best way to dispose the resources of NORAD. If there was a mission, he asked them how to make it more effective.

Arnold explained that the RAM team did not address an internal threat assessment. He noted that since 1st AF was designed to address threats externally, and that threats that occurred internally were law enforcement issues.

He noted that the Air Force could develop plans to respond to the types of threats addressed by the RAM team because the air threats are akin to cruise missile threats, and can be used to meet these threats. He noted that the Intercontinental Theatre Defense (ICTD) has the “short fall” that assets must be present for it to be effective. There need to be more radar, and lacking that there must be either “intelligence cueing” or the protection of an event already underway. This would imply Air Warning Aircraft (AWACs) overhead, or a Navy capability already present at a site. He noted that these steps were in 1998, 99, 00 and 01.

Arnold noted that post 9/11 national security should be accounted for by multiple entities. For instance, he noted that with 15000 controllers, the FAA has a National Security responsibility, and that the Air Force is the only entity that has the capability to rapidly respond to a 9/11 type terrorist threat.

Paine Stewart event:

Arnold recalled that the aircraft took off over southern Florida and the FAA lost contact with it over Gainesville. NORAD launched fighters from Tyndall AFB, but fighters that were already airborne made contact with the target. CONR and the sectors had to work very carefully with the FAA to maintain the handoff off fighters to monitor the aircraft. Arnold explained that even for a “derelict balloon” the Secretary of Defense had to authorize its shoot down; so with the Paine Stewart event the same authority would have to be passed.

Training and exercising:

Arnold noted that the intelligence community designated projections of the capability of a cruise missile directed against the United States was always six years out. He noted that no one believed the Cold War was over in a military sense in 1993, and thus continued to exercise for a few years based on that perceived threat. He commented
that they exercised for asymmetrical threats that would come from supporters of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Arnold expressed his belief that it was not until after 9/11 in the mind of the US military planners that the Russian threat “went away”.

Arnold noted that all the exercises that he recalls that addressed terrorist air threats included having intelligence warnings in time for there to be a response from the air assets; and commented that he believes that exercise “shops” in individual sectors did think of aircrafts being used as weapons. He commented that the scenarios that bothered him were when the intelligence on an intercept indicated the threat of the aircraft to a populated area would then receive a shoot down order on that target, and the debris of the target would crash into a populated area. Thus what would have been exercised is the proper chain of authority being fed from the operational level the proper level of information as to target location and possible intent, and then from the command authority down to the operations level with the indication and authority on the action to be taken.

Arnold explained that in a general sense an exercise is developed with hope that the probability of the event actually happening is low. He explained that the exercise is meant to test the coordination involved in a response to a scenario. He continued and explained that the exercise scenarios focused on what NORAD was tasked to do.

Arnold noted that the only person who talked about an internal threat was the Deputy Assist Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology Joe Easch in the prior administration. Arnold noted that when he personally was asked about the NORAD capability to respond to an air threat internally he responded that internal of CONUS was a law enforcement issue. He noted that his efforts were expended attempting to get better low altitude radar capabilities facing over the water. He noted that his view was that NORAD could respond if called upon to do so by a law enforcement entity that detected the threat.

9/11:

Arnold explained that the Battle Staff at CONR consisted of five members at all times, and they had 38 staffers. He believes Steve Hurd might have spoken to MCC Nasypany at NEADS (Northeast Air Defense Sector).

Regarding the fighter posturing on 9/11, Arnold noted that there were seven alert sites, and the Portland, Otis and Langley fighters that were scrambled had long range tanks as well as Infrared (IR) and Visual Range (VR) guided missiles on the fighters. Arnold noted that he was “pretty comfortable in the northeast” with the capability of the alert sites. And if he had more assets to place prior to 9/11, he would not have placed them in the northeast, but most probably in strategic locations along the southern border.

Arnold noted that Kelly Ducket, an Executive Officer (XO), passed him a note that informed him of a real world hijack. He noted that the sectors forward tel (telecommunicate) and voice tel information from their radars to keep CONR
situationally aware. Arnold noted that the sectors monitored the skies, and they are best suited to keep CONR informed. He noted that their system was meant for situational awareness, and he believed at that time it to be “pretty good”. He commented that in light of the developments since 9/11 with regard to the Rules of Engagement (ROE), he realizes when looking back at 9/11 that the situational awareness at CONR was totally inadequate.

He noted that they had red switches and STU3s (secure telephones) on 9/11 for communication. It was on one of these phones that Arnold called Colonel Marr at NEADS and Marr informed Arnold of the ongoing situation. Arnold told Marr to scramble Otis ANGB air defense fighters. Arnold noted that he was aware of the formal process through the FAA and NMCC (National Military Command Center) for a scramble of fighters. He noted that they had the intent to place the fighters in W105 (Whiskey 105, a military controlled airspace) since neither he nor Marr knew where the hijacked aircraft was. He noted that the same minute of the scramble was when he saw the “smoking hole” of the aircraft in the World Trade Center (WTC) on CNN. He noted that he did not think the hole had something to do with the hijacking. He noted he did not realize the magnitude of what had happened to the building. He noted that it was his call to place the fighters in the airspace. He does not recall if it was his idea to put them in the space, but he believes the notion was to “hold them over the water”.

Next he spoke with General Fedeling (a Canadian at NORAD) to facilitate receiving the appropriate clearances. Arnold noted that by the dictates of the bi-national agreement the Canadians had authority to respond to the situation, and that only in events involving Cuba do Canadians not have full authority to participate in the decision making at NORAD.

Arnold explained to Commission staff that when he saw another aircraft crash into the south Tower of the WTC, he is not sure he immediately realized that there was an ongoing major terrorist attack. He noted that receiving word that UAL 175 was a “possible hijack” complicated the issue immensely.

Arnold noted that he and Marr did not stay on the line continually, but spoke when information needed to be passed.

**Battle Stations ONLY at Langley (9:03 AM):**

Arnold noted that they did not know the extent of the terrorist attack at that point of the second impact at the WTC. Arnold agreed with Commission staff’s explanation that Col. Marr held Langley AFB fighters at Battle Stations because of fuel considerations for the Otis ANGB Air Superiority Aircraft (ASA).

10:33 – “regional commander declared that we can shoot down tracks...”

Arnold noted that he recalls an initial thought that UAL 93 would be intercepted when it was one hundred miles out from Washington, D.C. He noted he does not
remember clearance from outside the military chain in regard to United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL 93). He does recall receiving notification that the Vice President passed authority to engage targets at some point during the day. Arnold noted that they knew there was a Delta flight that contributed to the confusion, but he recalls UAL 93 being the motivation for shoot down authority.

Commission staff explained to Arnold the timeline for VAL 93, and he responded by acknowledging that the story on UAL 93 as he presented it was not based on fact. And he acknowledged that he may have spoken based on what he thought, but not based on what was actually ongoing. Arnold noted that what was important to the fighter pilots that were flying with no weapons regarding ROE was the information that they may have had to use their fighters to stop a threatening commercial airliner at all costs.

**Defensive Conditions (DEFCON):**

Arnold noted that he spoke with Arnold Eberhart regarding the transferring of DEFCON and Eberhart had spoken to the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Air Force. Arnold’s intent in the conversation was to inform Eberhart of what was ongoing – that they were attempting to get fighter assets airborne to account for possible threats. Arnold noted that he heard of the DEFCON change from NORAD through General Finley, or from one of the chat logs. He commented that at CONR they were in a stage of transition from the formal protocol of taking action at official communications or in response to real-time events.

Arnold was not involved in the SCATANA declaration and its operation. He recalled that he received the call and what he remembers is that he supported that decision, but had not thought of it himself.

Arnold discussed with Commission staff the levels of authority existent today regarding shoot down authority and commented that on 9/11 the authority was much “looser”. An aircraft that violated certain airspace could be shot down per the discretion of the pilot. This was the condition of the “weapons free zone” over the National Capital Region on 9/11. Arnold does not believe CONR was involved in making the decision that designated shoot down procedures and authorities that was issued later on 9/11. Eberhart believed it was politically not feasible for the authority to be placed with a Canadian officer at NORAD. They also spoke about bringing Canadian F-18s into the Noble Eagle operation, but that was decided against as well.

**Communication “ramp up”:**

Arnold noted that the CINC was never connected directly to the fighters regarding ROE and the passing of authority. Arnold explained that on 9/11 there was no-to-limited radar and communication in the interior of the country. He also noted that the C2 system was not capable of absorbing information on the interior. He explained that CONR shifted assets and units after 9/11 so that the communication issue could be solved to some extent. He explained that there was some capability to expand and move radar for a
greater awareness as well. He commented that there were a number of sites at which it was decided a view as low as 5000 feet in unpopulated areas, and as low as the FAA in populated areas, was necessary.

Another major concern was that those who had command authority could speak directly to airborne fighter pilots from anywhere in the country. This need developed into the "Big Voice" – a system whereby a telephone patch can directly link a commander to a fighter pilot. Arnold explained as well that there were air combat maneuvering pods that received SATCOM radios as transmitters from pilots that could transmit voice and picture data. That technology was never purchased until the CINC bought them. But CONR still is not connected to any. But NORAD did become connected to various FAA sites, including 51 en route radars, and the possibility for more long range radars. Arnold believes they spent roughly 78 million dollars that OMB helped facilitate the funding of.

Assessment of changes since 9/11:

Arnold noted that airport security is one of the most important measures to improve the safe conduct of air commerce and traffic in the post-9/11 world. He also believes that the NORAD ability was greatly expanded due to its additional basing, and that there is sufficient coverage that the military can respond within a 9/11 timeframe.

May Commission testimony:

Arnold acknowledged that his testimony before the Commission in May differed from the discussion of the facts in the interview with Commission staff.

Arnold believed he received the timeline construction that was displayed to the Commission from NEADS and the 84th RADS squadron. He believes Colonel Scott compiled the briefing, and received his information from NEADS.

Arnold explained to Commission staff that there was no discussion prior to the hearing that Langley AFB NORAD fighters were scrambled on a target headed southbound. He noted that the scramble was on target does not surprise him, but that he does not recall any information that qualified it as such until the Commission staff interview.

Filson:

Arnold explained that Sovereign Skies was written to describe the history of how the mission changed to a National Guard mission. In regard to Filson's recent book, Air War Over America, he explained that the information that Filson compiled was not based on the same information that was accessible to Commission staff.

Reconstruction of Air Defense story:

Arnold noted that CONR and Scott accepted the validity of NEADS data.
Otis scramble and the FAA:

Arnold noted that he did not have an understanding as to why they fighter pilots equated that they had traveled at supersonic speeds towards New York City. He noted as well that he understands that Duffy most likely went supersonic at his own discretion, but was not directed to do so by another authority. Arnold commented that the details do not pose an impact as far as he knows. Arnold believes he did not have an understanding that the country was under attack at the point before the impact of UAL 175 during the course of the beginning directions of the Otis scramble, and he believes the only order the pilots had from CONR was to hold over the water until further directed. Arnold explained that they were operating under the concept that they were going to cooperate with the FAA.

Arnold explained that the timing on the scrambles did not matter after the fact. He acknowledged that it could have mattered, but did not.

Arnold explained that the story that was presented at the hearing was based on a timeline he believed to be true, and he does not know of any effort that was made to create a better picture for either NORAD or the FAA. He believes it was a very “shaky” start for the FAA on 9/11 regarding their ability to communicate with the military, but overall he believes they did a good job through the efforts of Collin Scoggins. Arnold did note that he personally spoke with Jeff Griffith at the FAA.

After 9/11, other than attempting to get the pilots to reconstruct what they did, most of his efforts were expended improving the system between 1st AF and the FAA. He was not aware of Collin Scoggins efforts prior to the Commission interview, but it surprised him that most of the information flowing to NEADS from the FAA came from Scoggins.
MAJOR GENERAL LARRY K. ARNOLD


Major General Larry K. Arnold is commander, 1st Air Force, Air Combat Command, and commander, Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla. The 1st Air Force is responsible for organizing, equipping and operating air defense forces for the commander in chief of binational NORAD. He is responsible for more than 10,000 people at 19 fighter alert sites and 50 radar sites to provide tactical warning, threat assessment and counterdrug forces for the North American continent.

The general received his commission in 1965 through Officer Training School. Following undergraduate pilot training, he was stationed at Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam, where he flew 153 combat missions in the F-4C Phantom. In 1973 he separated from active duty and joined the 177th Fighter Interceptor Group of the New Jersey Air National Guard. In 1986 he was called to active duty as the ANG adviser to Air University. In 1988 he was assigned as commander of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group of the Texas ANG. In 1992 the general was selected commander of the Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews Air Force Base, where he served until his reassignment in 1997 as vice commander of 1st Air Force. He is a command pilot with more than 4,040 flying hours in ten types of aircraft, most recently the F-15.

EDUCATION
1964 Bachelor of arts degree in political science, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, N.C.
1972 Squadron Officer School
1977 Master's degree in business administration, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala.
1977 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
1984 Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS
3. December 1966 - September 1967, F-4C fighter pilot, 390th Fighter Squadron, Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam
6. June 1968 - September 1972, F-106 instructor pilot, 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Langley Air Force...
Base, Va.
8. August 1973 - August 1976, instructor pilot and training officer, 177th Fighter Interceptor Group, New Jersey Air National Guard, Atlantic City Airport, N.J.
12. June 1984 - January 1986, deputy commander for operations, 177th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, New Jersey Air National Guard, Atlantic City Airport, N.J.

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: 4,040
Aircraft flown: T-33, T-37, T-38, F-102, F-106, F-4C/D, F-16 and F-15

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Medal with 14 oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Air Force Achievement Medal
Presidential Unit Citation
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with "V" device and oak leaf cluster
Air Force Organizational Excellence Award
Combat Readiness Medal with three oak leaf clusters
National Defense Service Medal with service star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Vietnam Service Medal with two service stars
Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm
Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Unit Citation
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant Feb 10, 1965
First Lieutenant Aug 10, 1966
Captain May 21, 1968
Major Feb 19, 1976
Lieutenant Colonel Sep 10, 1980
Colonel Dec 28, 1985
Brigadier General Mar 11, 1993
Major General Mar 2, 1998

http://www.af.mil/bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=4552&name=1
(Current as of September 1998)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Command Region (CONR) Field Site Visit

Type of event: Interview with Major General Craig R. McKinley

Date: February 3, 2004

Special Access Issues: Clearance check

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown

Team Number: 8

Location: Commander’s Conference Room


Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown. John Farmer, Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer

Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

Please see attached biography.

On September 11, 2001 (9/11) McKinley was in Section 4E10-26 of the Pentagon, and evacuated shortly after the impact of American Airlines 77 (AA 77).

North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) mission evolution:

McKinley explained to Commission staff that during the height of the Cold War the air defense of North America was of highest priority. But with the onset of Desert Storm One many of the alert units were called to overseas assignments. This compromised the robust alert force that existed during the Cold War, and the mission declined periodically until the point on 9/11, when there were only seven air alert sites in the Continental United States (CONUS).

According to McKinley, the NORAD air defense capability can be evaluated by looking at the time-distance factors for fighter intercepts from air alert bases. Based on time-distance factors from an outside attack, as the NORAD mission declined during the 1990s NORAD was “just working the margins” of providing a continental air defense. McKinley noted that during his time at Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) the fighters were only able to successfully intercept defection flights from Cuba if the conditions were perfect. He noted that in his opinion the ability to fulfill successfully the drug interdiction mission, and the air sovereignty mission was compromised.
Drug interdiction:

McKinley noted that during the eighties there were many intercepts in response to southern border drug trafficking, and to monitor the movement of Cuban fighters. McKinley explained that by the time a scramble from Homestead Air Force Base was initiated on a track picked up from Cuba or the Caribbean the intercept would usually have entered CONUS airspace: the aircraft usually would have passed the twelve mile limit by the time the fighters would be airborne. When asked by Commission staff to comment on the relationship with the Federal Aviation Administration from SEADS perspective, McKinley noted that SEADS frequent interaction with the FAA centers in the region to intercept drug traffickers created a closer, positive relationship between the entities. McKinley opined that each air defense sector likely developed relationships with particular FAA centers based on their geographic locations and frequency of interaction.

From McKinley’s personal experience, the sector with the most unknown traffic was SEADS. He noted in regard to the unknown traffic in the NEADS region that the Canadian system would usually identify tracks coming from Europe and pass that knowledge; thus NEADS does not deal with the volume of unknown aircraft that confronts SEADS.

Hijack experience and asymmetrical threats:

McKinley referred to the eighties as the “decade of hijacks.” He noted that fighters would perform their intercept, identify, and escort the aircraft to a safe landing with routine proficiency.

McKinley noted that if exercises did take place that can be compared to the 9/11 hijack attacks then there were no intelligence warnings that drove these exercises. He noted that “the exercise kids probably put on their creative hats” and developed interesting scenarios to test the operations capabilities of their sectors but there was no indication that the scenarios paralleled a credible threat.

McKinley noted that to his knowledge before he left for the Pentagon there were no 9/11 type scenarios built into their exercises. The hijack scenarios that were exercised involved a successful escort to landing and negotiation with the hijackers. He noted that there were more rules and relationships built into the communication with the Cuban Air Force over Cuban airspace, and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Cuba were “very clear to us.”

August 2002, when General McKinley takes command of CONR:

McKinley did not ask for a specific briefing on the 9/11 attacks after he became Commander of CONR. He noted however that General Arnold did put together a comprehensive hand-off briefing. McKinley took command and looked at the task set
before him by General Eberhart; he noticed that there was a need to continue building a relationship operationally with the FAA.

He did work closely with General Arnold and retired Colonel Scott as he took command. But he noted that as far as he knows there was no comprehensive military investigation into the military response to 9/11. He does believe that there was an Enduring Look assessment of Noble Eagle, but he does not know if this work was ever concluded.

McKinley noted that the DCINC, a Canadian Three Star, General Rick Finley was General Arnold’s point of contact at NORAD for information related to 9/11. Mark Beasly, a deputy U.S. Colonel on the operations staff, was the NORAD J3V who also served as a primary point of contact.

Preparring for the Commission hearing:

McKinley noted that he had approximately a week or ten days to prepare for the Commission hearing, and he was disappointed that he only had the public affairs staff and Colonel Scott to assist his preparation.

Commission staff presented to General McKinley the Team 8 facts for the 9/11 Air Defense timeline.

McKinley noted that he never had knowledge of the transcript of the NEADS Mission Crew Commander (MCC) Op Channel 2 that was presented to him by Commission staff. This version of the transcript was compiled by NEADS within ten days of the attacks. He also noted that to his knowledge those transcripts were never forwarded to CONR.

McKinley noted to Commission staff that no calls came from the FAA to the NMCC as dictated by protocol in place on 9/11.

McKinley noted that the best data was likely the NEADS data that had already been collected by Commission staff. He cautioned that the data would get “even worse” and more clouded as Commission staff interviewed people higher up in the NORAD chain of command (since those agencies are more removed from the operations conducted at NEADS).

McKinley reiterated that the best two people to follow up with on the Commission’s work are General Arnold and Col. Scott. [NOTE: Commission staff interviewed both Arnold and Scott on February 1st, 04 and 2nd, 04 respectively]. McKinley also commented that the Dictaphone logs should have been transcribed and forwarded from NEADS immediately to CONR and NORAD after the attacks. McKinley noted that there are anecdotal stories from the 113th Fighter Wing at Andrews AFB that Commission staff may want to investigate.
Post 9/11 and current state of mission:

In August of 2002 General Arnold directed the implementation of significant additions to the CONR capabilities, which included multiple 24 hour operations with Combat Air Patrols, now called Air Patrols, over major cities and critical sites. U.S. Northern Command was created to deter, prevent, and mitigate losses specifically for the U.S., which caused some difficulty with the Canadian relationship. But this was seen as the only way to provide sufficient military support for law enforcement operations within CONUS. He noted that this creates dual roles between NORAD combined nationality positions and USNORTHCOM, but he believes this will soon be rectified by the new Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin. [Staff note: PM Martin has indicated he is willing to “take a new look at Canadian defense policy including such ideas as missile defense and rationalizing North American defense by expanding NORAD to include land and sea forces”, Dwight Mason, Senior Associate, CSIS Canada Project, www.csis.org/press/pr03_73.pdf]

McKinley noted that if the FAA had followed the proper set of procedures he does not believe there would have been a different outcome. He believes that the procedures in place on 9/11 would not have translated to the different outcome that may result from the assets and posture that exists today.

McKinley noted that his command has benefited from the lessons learned and the operations developed from 9/11. At the senior administration levels McKinley noted that communications with the FAA have improved significantly. He noted that U.S. Customs has been helpful by providing the use of Blackhawk helicopter operations over Washington D.C. He also noted that the Coast Guard is playing a role in the national defense system, and the defense of the National Capitol Region.

Need for further improvement:

McKinley noted he would like to have more permanent “Strip Alert” sites; but they do have procedures in place to establish additional sites quickly based on intelligence agencies indications of the need for heightened alert in the United States. He noted as well that he is very pleased with the flow of information from the Homeland Defense department. He noted that he believes there should be more “pop-up” ground based air defense capability through the U.S. Army to protect major U.S. cities.

He noted that while the cultures between the FAA and the military are different he sees no friction at the operational level.
MAJOR GENERAL CRAIG R. MCKINLEY

Maj. Gen. Craig R. McKinley is Commander, 1st Air Force, Air Combat Command, and Commander, Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla. The 1st Air Force is responsible for organizing, equipping and operating air defense forces for the commander of bi-national NORAD. He is responsible for more than 10,000 people at 19 fighter alert sites and 50 radar sites to provide tactical warning, threat assessment and counterdrug forces for the North American continent.

General McKinley received his commission in 1974 as a distinguished graduate of the ROTC program at Southern Methodist University. He has served in numerous assignments in flying and operations, as well as command positions at group, wing, sector and field operating agency levels. General McKinley is a command pilot with more than 4,000 hours, primarily in the T-38, F-106, F-16 and F-15. Additionally, General McKinley has been pilot in command in the C-131 and C-130 Operational Support Airlift aircraft.

Prior to assuming his current position, General McKinley served as Deputy Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.

EDUCATION
1974 Bachelor's degree in business administration, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
1979 Master's degree in management and economics, Webster College, St. Louis, Mo.
1984 Squadron Officer School
1990 Air Command and Staff College
1995 Master's degree in national security strategy, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
1995 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
1997 National Security Management Course, Syracuse, N.Y.
1998 Capstone, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
2002 Combined Forces Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS
3. March 1977 - May 1979, equal opportunity and treatment officer, Air Force Military Training Center, Lackland AFB, Texas
6. April 1986 - June 1987, Chief of Safety, 125th Fighter Interceptor Wing, Jacksonville, Fla.

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 4,000
Aircraft flown: C-130, C-131, F-15, F-16, F-106, T-33, T-37 and T-38

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Achievement Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award
Combat Readiness Medal with four oak leaf clusters
National Defense Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
Air Force Longevity Service Award Ribbon with four oak leaf clusters
Armed Forces Reserve Medal
Air Force Training Ribbon

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
1993 I.G. Brown Trophy
1974 Distinguished graduate, Air Force ROTC, Southern Methodist University

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant May 18, 1974
First Lieutenant Dec. 8, 1977
Captain Nov. 21, 1980
Major May 16, 1986
Lieutenant Colonel May 16, 1990
Colonel Jan. 28, 1994
Brigadier General Jan. 28, 1998
Major General May 24, 2001

(Current as of February 2004)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Continental U.S. Aerospace Defense Command Region (CONR) field site visit
Type of event: Interview with William A. Scott, retired U.S. Air Force (USAF), A-5
Date: Wednesday, February 04, 2004
Special Access Issues: Clearance check
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: CONR Headquarters Building
Participants - Non-Commission: Major Mike Gullilory, Staff JAG
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown, John Farmer, Miles Kara, Kevin Shaefffer

Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

Scott entered the Air Force in 1970, and spent eleven years in Air Defense. He transitioned into the F-16 in 1981, and entered the general purpose section of the Air Force. He toured in Korea, and in Tactical Headquarters at Langley. He was in Command of squadrons in operations Just Cause, Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

For his last two years in the USAF he returned to Tyndall AFB, Panama City as the Director of Operations and Chief of Operations with First Air Force (1st Air Force) in June 1998. He became Vice Commander in June of 2000.

He was a civilian Department of Defense (DoD) contractor on September 11, 2001 (9/11). On November 29th, 2002 he became a civil servant with DoD. He works for General Arnold on “special projects”, and with AirINC as a contractor.

Scott commented that a substantial amount of his work could be described as a “corporate thread” for General Arnold during the transition from NORAD’s Cold War architecture to a modern air theatre control system.

Overview of RAM Team:

According to Scott, in the late 1990s there was “a feeling” at DoD that the NORAD Air Defense mission was a “sunset” mission, and NORAD was identified for potential closure. Thus one of Scott’s first projects for General Arnold was to address a 1998 recommendation to close 1st Air Force. In response, General Arnold put together a team that was reasonably neutral to the mission (Air Combat Command, NORAD, and the Guard Bureau) who were asked to address whether or not the mission was a sunset
mission, and if it was, to compile a plan that would divest the mission within the Air Force. Scott informed Commission staff that the report concluded that the 1st Air Force mission was a priority of the highest magnitude as it pertained to the higher military echelon.

According to Scott, the RAM team did know that Osama Bin Laden appeared on the Command Briefing slides in 1998 due to the Hart-Rudman report, and made the connection that the country had been attacked twice on domestic soil by terrorists, but overall concluded that the bombings at the World Trade Center and at the Oklahoma City Federal Building did not stir public awareness, and was not prioritized by the First Air Force. Scott did not think there was “an intelligence member or an intelligence insert” in the RAM report, but recalled that they did note that asymmetric threats were the most credible threat to national security. Specifically, the RAM team believed the greatest threat was “a poor man’s cruise missile” that would be launched from an offshore site.

Besides the cruise missile threat, Scott noted the RAM team believed the symmetric threat of a long range aviation cruise missile launch was still significant, and the Russians did test the NORAD Air Defense Zone (ADZ) two years in a row during the time of the RAM team’s work.

The other asymmetrical threats assessed by the RAM team included those posed by ultra-light man and unmanned aircraft and those associated with the advent of personal GPS systems. Scott explained that GPS advanced the ability for a threat fly 24 hours and at low-altitude. Scott noted that there were exercises to account for the variations of these threats.

**Air-defense bases:**

Scott noted to Commission staff the Langley Air Force Base had originally been “stood down” as an air alert defense site, but regained their air defense mission. Scott commented that there was a feeling in the 1980s that having robust military air power over Washington, D.C. was the “wrong message” to send to foreign powers. But he commented that the Air Defense community fought back against this with a “you don’t pull your goalie” mentality, and were able to have Langley re-established as a twenty-four hour air alert site.

**Aircraft as weapons:**

Scott noted that while he was on active duty there were scenarios that exercised hijacked aircraft carrying WMD onboard (sarin gas, etc.). He remembered a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was approaching New York City that was exercised. But Scott does not know of any exercise while he was on active duty that accounted for a hijacked suicide mission. He did not partake in those exercises once he left active duty.

Scott noted that on 9/11 there was no escalation of awareness on what the hijackers were going to do. There was no “ramp up” of ROE, or timeline over which the
engagement protocols escalating in accordance with the realization that the aircraft would crash in a civilian setting.

**Indicators of 9/11:**

Scott commented that the events of 9/11 were "a true asymmetrical event". And the "dots" that can be connected after 9/11 do not point to "micro-level" blame, but instead can lead to faults at the macro-level. He continued and commented that there are very few human failings, but many process failures that are indicated by artificial barriers between agencies. He attributes part of the interagency fault is that they are designed to horde power in order to maintain their budgets and operational effectiveness.

**Roles in internal threats:**

Scott commented that despite the notice of the terrorist events that were analyzed in the RAM report they still looked at the NORAD mission as a direct mission to protect the continental United States (CONUS) from external threats, and that it was a firm and Constitutionally sound line between what was a NORAD responsibility and what was a FBI/law enforcement responsibility.

He also commented that the exercises that accounted for threats from aircraft headed from outside CONUS that entered into CONUS qualified as a NORAD responsibility strictly because threats that originate outside CONUS are DoD events. He explained that hijackings prior to 9/11 were not scene as a national emergency, and that once hijackings became a national emergency the DoD took some responsibility for the response.

According to Scott, if the NORAD mission began to address what was scene pre-9/11 as FBI/law enforcement responsibilities it would have been “mission creep”, would have caused much tension, and would have received little support.

**Russian threat:**

Scott noted that the primary "asymmetric threat" that was addressed prior to 9/11 was considered from Russian Special Forces teams that could disable the FAA radar capability, and thus allow for an undetected cruise missile attack. There was not thought that considered an Islamic militant suicide attack on the scale of 9/11.

Scott related to Commission staff that the mission of the Air Force pre-terrorism, when the main threat was from the Soviet Union, was an "away game" with a national strategy of foreign engagement.

**Rules of Engagement (ROE):**

Scott noted to Commission staff that the prime indicator of when the authority to engage a target is apparent is entirely dependent on if the target has hostile intent. Scott
noted that he did not analyze the timing of the shoot-down authorities, and that he was not directed to do so in his Commission briefing.

**Efforts to reconstruct events of 9/11:**

Scott commented that the first time he saw a NORAD reconstruction of the events of 9/11 was a few weeks after the attacks when General Eberhart brought Doctor David Finkelman, a chief scientist, to present a computer-generated reconstruction of the flight paths overlaid with a map of Washington.

Within the “last two or three weeks” prior to his interview with Commission staff, Scott discovered that there was an after-action review at NORAD. He heard of this in conjunction with a discussion on the Commission’s work. He believes NORAD also ran a 9/11 reconstruction based on the current force posture. He does not know any details on these projects.

Scott commented that he developed the 9/11 briefing for CONR based on an 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADS) forensic reconstruction of the flight paths he received from NEADS and on the official NORAD timeline that dealt with the sequence of major events. He commented to Commission staff that he attempted to take the series of attacks and attempted to understand the fog and friction that was generated in the national system with all the ongoing simultaneous events, but that those were the only two sources of information for his briefing. His briefing was based on the assumption that his two sources were coherent between the radar hits from the 84th RADS and the timeframe set by the NORAD timeline. Scott commented that the briefing was built not at a tactical level but as a theatre level review. Scott further explained that he did not know that NEADS had a Dictaphone system until after the Commission began to request it, and that he never reviewed the operations logs from NEADS.

Scott commented that a “hot-wash” is usually compiled when an operation is over, but that after the 9/11 attacks Noble Eagle’s tempo never stopped. The context of the events was emphasized with what Scott qualifies as “the second attack”, the “anthrax attacks”. He explained that these factors kept NORAD from generating a traditional comprehensive analysis of the events.

He further commented that he received no direction to compile a complete and thorough accounting of the events, and NORAD was overwhelmingly concerned with the Noble Eagle Operations.

Scott was not involved with the 9/11 briefing compiled by Sherry Gott in the summer of 2002.

**Comments on Air War over America, by Leslie Filson:**
Scott noted that in the same week in approximately October, 2003 when the Air Force responded to a Commission request the book was published. Scott commented that through ACC he provided the Filson book, and indicated that the Commission is going to receive all of Filson's compiled materials. He noted that that delivery occurred concurrent with his interview. He believes that Filson began compiling the book up to eighteen months ago.

The book developed because the 1st Air Force did not have a historian. Now there are two historians assigned to 1st AF, but in the past General Arnold pointed towards Filson to fill this gap since she had already written an account of 1st Air Force transition to a guard mission.

Scott commented that he was one of Filson’s contacts with 1st Air Force, but Don Arias was the main contact. Filson was more of a subject matter expert on the draw down of 1st Air Force and the air defense mission than the NORAD expert on the 9/11 timeline. Scott commented that he worked with Colonel Marr to receive clarification on the NORAD timeline.

Scott commented that though he personally is not aware of any special tasking to analyze the events of 9/11 from NORAD, he does not know if one of the CONR active duty officers was tasked to do so.

Scott said he had no reason to doubt the veracity of the two documents from which he built the briefing that was presented to the Commission. He further explained that he did not feel compelled as an analyzer of the event based on the documents provided to him to investigate the timeline of the attacks.

**The 9/11 Commission May hearing, and NORAD’s presentation of facts:**

Scott noted that when he built the brief for the Commission based off his earlier material he checked to make sure that the NORAD timeline and the NEADS 84th RADS data that he originally used were still the official sources of information. He explained to Commission staff that the briefing he gave to the Commission was built directly from his original briefing presentation. Thus the material given to the Commission was consistent with his earlier briefing. The reason he checked for the NORAD official timeline was to make sure that nothing more current had been issued by NORAD to supplant the earlier timeline. He noted to Commission staff that he did pull times from online websites run by NBC, ABC and CBS in order to fill in gaps for events that NORAD did not account for. He used his own judgment for what sources of information were reputable. He further commented that he trusted NORAD to have the larger, more accurate time, but if NORAD did not have a time then he trusted the reputable source.

Scott commented that he had not dealt with the 9/11 timeline topic for months before a forty-eight hour timeframe given him by General McKinley to present the timeline before the Commission. Scott commented that he was not aware of the work done by NORAD to redefine its timeline, as displayed by the work of Sherry Godfried.
He became familiar with the FAA response based on the briefing that NEADS sent, the NORAD timeline, and the other websites he visited to “put flesh on the story”.

Commission staff questioned Scott on why his original presentation indicated that the Langley fighters scrambled in response to UAL 93 and his Commission briefing indicated that the fighters were scrambled on AA 77. Scott explained that General Arnold indicated to him prior to the Commission hearing that he recalled information on AA 77 that led to the Langley scrambled.

Scott told Commission staff he recalled Marr mentioning that the Langley fighters were initially scrambled to head towards New York, but with the realization of a threatened capital they were redirected to Washington, D.C.

Scott noted that the current effort at NORAD to compile a more comprehensive timeline of the events through NORAD is to “add granularity” to the understanding and information in the chain of events; and is in response “in part” to the work of the Commission.

Scott noted that based on the camera that captured the impact timestamp he changed the impact time at the Pentagon, and that was the only time he adjusted from a time he received from NORAD.

Complications around the Langley scramble:

Scott has no knowledge that the Langley scramble had any connection to AA 11 besides the information from Colonel Marr that the original intent of was for a New York City heading.

Scott noted to Commission staff that the awareness and the decision made at the NEADS level may not be all the factors contributing to the decision making at CONR.

Scott reiterated with Commission staff that General Arnold explicitly told him that the Langley scramble was not for the aircraft indicated in Scott’s original briefing, but was in response to “another” (implied one of the other) aircraft.

Otis scramble:

Commission staff presented to Scott the tracks that he indicated in his briefing were complicated by the fact that he was unaware the Otis launched fighters for a training mission. He overlaid the direction of the tracks onto the radar data that he found. He qualified for the Commission that he created the briefing based on his understanding of the events, and had no intent or desire to present inaccurate information.